> Due to the hashrate arms race, tremendous amounts of power are being wasted doing nothing useful.
But they are doing something useful. They're preventing someone from turning up and performing a 51% attack, thus ensuring the security of the network. You could suggest that there's better ways of doing that, but our ideas so far haven't panned out.
Interestingly, how it works at the moment is that essentially, through the mining of bitcoins, every bitcoin holder's bitcoins are devalued to pay for the security of the network. Therefore, if a significant amount of bitcoin holders decided that they could deal with less network security, they would use a coin which provided less network security (by paying miners less).
As it is, at the moment, we're not sure exactly how much security we need. Therefore, we're willing to pay for as much security as possible; nobody wants their bitcoins to be worthless tomorrow because they didn't pay enough to protect the network.
The thing I don't like about the way bitcoin mining works is that it's an arms race that leaves attacker and defender on equal footing - quite unlike a lot of crypto, where adding a bit increases the defender's work linearly but the attacker's exponentially. By its nature, then, we have to keep burning off more in value than someone could make with a 51% attack, regardless of improvements in tech efficiency.
Of course, lacking a better proposal, it could be that this is the best we can do. I don't have to like everything about every piece of technology in the world...
> You could suggest that there's better ways of doing that, but our ideas so far haven't panned out.
Can I ask, have you heard about Peercoin, which uses a combination of a proof of work and a proof of stake system rather than just a proof of work system? Do you have an opinion as to why such as system wouldn't be at least as secure as bitcoin?
My understanding is that it's currently unproven, and certain ideas we used to have about it have already been disproven. I'd love to see an actual academic paper on what it would take to break the network.
There's also the fact that wealth inequality - specific groups of people owning significant amounts of money - will break the network's assumptions. This could be a good or bad thing, depending on your point of view.
Additionally, minting a proof-of-stake block locks your stake for 520 blocks. Most reasonable people would be angry that they can't access their money for that long. There's a workaround of reserving a certain amount of coins so that it can't be used for proof-of-stake, but that doesn't actually solve the problem, and generally means that the poor will reserve all their money and never generate a proof-of-stake block.
And that leads on to another issue with proof-of-stake; the rich get richer, as a rule that's explicitly built into the system. Probably not much richer, but it's against common ideology.
The other thing that most cryptocurrency enthusiasts won't like about Peercoin is that it's eternally mildly inflationary. While some will understand that this is essentially payment for security, others will argue that those who use the network more should pay more (via transaction fees), rather than a "tax".
I suspect that it will see a mild increase in use when they prove that they can get rid of centralised checkpointing, but I think there's a very significant core group that will not be able to get past the ideological issues and lack of academic research.
But they are doing something useful. They're preventing someone from turning up and performing a 51% attack, thus ensuring the security of the network. You could suggest that there's better ways of doing that, but our ideas so far haven't panned out.
Interestingly, how it works at the moment is that essentially, through the mining of bitcoins, every bitcoin holder's bitcoins are devalued to pay for the security of the network. Therefore, if a significant amount of bitcoin holders decided that they could deal with less network security, they would use a coin which provided less network security (by paying miners less).
As it is, at the moment, we're not sure exactly how much security we need. Therefore, we're willing to pay for as much security as possible; nobody wants their bitcoins to be worthless tomorrow because they didn't pay enough to protect the network.