>The easiest way to get rid of them is to bring forward enough evidence to show they don't work as advertised.
Unfortunately I don't share your optimism. In 2012 SCOTUS wasn't impressed with any fancy notions about data or statistics regarding false positives in prior policework; although, they didn't seem to mind 'objective' measurements of dog qualification when they were favorable (controlled environment qualification trials).
>"We have rejected rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more flexible, all-things-considered approach. In Gates, for example, we abandoned our old test for assessing the reliability of informants' tips because it had devolved into a "complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules," any one of which, if not complied with, would derail a finding of probable cause. 462 U. S., at 235. We lamented the development of a list of "inflexible, independent requirements applicable in every case." Id., at 230, n. 6. Probable cause, we emphasized, is "a fluid concept--turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts--not readily, or even use-
fully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Id., at 232."[1]
Unfortunately I don't share your optimism. In 2012 SCOTUS wasn't impressed with any fancy notions about data or statistics regarding false positives in prior policework; although, they didn't seem to mind 'objective' measurements of dog qualification when they were favorable (controlled environment qualification trials).
>"We have rejected rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more flexible, all-things-considered approach. In Gates, for example, we abandoned our old test for assessing the reliability of informants' tips because it had devolved into a "complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules," any one of which, if not complied with, would derail a finding of probable cause. 462 U. S., at 235. We lamented the development of a list of "inflexible, independent requirements applicable in every case." Id., at 230, n. 6. Probable cause, we emphasized, is "a fluid concept--turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts--not readily, or even use- fully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Id., at 232."[1]
[1] http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&na...
see also:
http://reason.com/blog/2013/02/27/how-even-a-well-trained-na...
http://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/publish/news/newsroom/4968