Backdooring the RNG, if they can keep the trapdoor secret(and the NSA would think that, despite the fact that given Snowden, it seems they have some security problems), doest obviously weaken security against foreign attackers who don't have the key unless they can solve the discrete log problem. Plus, it's possible(I think likely) they didn't intend for it to be widely used( it's slow as hell after all and they knew that), but wanted it on systems so they could swap it out for targeted attacks.
Weakening crypto standards(as the NYT reported), on the other hand, seems very counter productive. Though I suppose from the NSA's point of view, it depends which standards. Screwing with IPSEC would seem to hurt US national security and they've been accused of doing that. Screwing with the encryption standards of mobile phone voice communications, on the other hand, would seem to have a far lower consequence.
Backdooring the RNG, if they can keep the trapdoor secret(and the NSA would think that, despite the fact that given Snowden, it seems they have some security problems), doest obviously weaken security against foreign attackers who don't have the key unless they can solve the discrete log problem. Plus, it's possible(I think likely) they didn't intend for it to be widely used( it's slow as hell after all and they knew that), but wanted it on systems so they could swap it out for targeted attacks.
Weakening crypto standards(as the NYT reported), on the other hand, seems very counter productive. Though I suppose from the NSA's point of view, it depends which standards. Screwing with IPSEC would seem to hurt US national security and they've been accused of doing that. Screwing with the encryption standards of mobile phone voice communications, on the other hand, would seem to have a far lower consequence.