> Despite your presumption that US policy is set "because it's popular" it empirically is not
Not what I claimed.
Vocal, motivated minorities who are willing to back a primary challenger, show or not show to off-cycle elections and potentially even switch parties over an issue command in American elections. What the majority loosely believes is irrelevant; this should be common knowledge given how our partisan primary system works.
The loose majority in American elections doesn’t care about foreign policy. A motivated minority does, and that minority has historically—in both parties—broken decisively in favour of Israel. This issue, moreover, was one that was important enough to enough of them to be a deal breaker. (And “them” doesn’t just mean American or even Israeli Jews. It encompasses a wide variety of liberal, neo-conservative and evangelical interests, for example.)
Not everywhere. But in enough places that if you’re a politician from one of the majority of places where Israel is a total non-issue, you don’t want to alienate your colleagues for whom it is an issue. Because there was no upside to fighting a battle against Israel, again, nobody in your district was going to reward you for going de Blasio on out-of-scope problems.
> Israel's sway has more to do with the power it holds over the political classes
Sure. The point is the “political classes” are those people who are willing to back a primary challenger, show or not show to off-cycle elections and potentially even switch parties over an issue. It’s far more similar to how NIMBY politics work than Russia’s election interference, which has a track record of backfiring more than helping.
Yet what you directly claimed hinges upon this fallacy.
>Vocal, motivated minorities who are willing to back a primary challenger
Or foreign countries.
(is Russia also a "vocal, motivated minority" in Moldova...? or is it just plain and simple foreign meddling? Russia believes it's motivated minorities).
>What the majority loosely believes is irrelevant
Sure. But, this would make your clain of "Israel has had unique sway in America because for most of its history it has been uniquely popular" uniquely self-contradictory.
> what you directly claimed hinges upon this fallacy
No. It doesn’t. It’s why I never cite general popularity for Israel. Only strong favour for and against.
> this would make your clain of "Israel has had unique sway in America because for most of its history it has been uniquely popular" completely untrue
Nope. Israel has a vocal minority that loves it. It has not had, until last last year, a vocal minority that hates it. Most people don’t care, and when they gave a view on caring, it was mild support. That’s a unique popularity profile that I don’t think any other country, other than maybe Cubans, have held.
Even today, very few voters would trade pocketbook issues for a pro-Palestinian policy portfolio. Several would for a pro-Israeli one.
It’s a tempting tale, and simplifying model, to assume unilateral causes of policies. Sometimes that is true. In this case, the theory requires a level of coördination across decades and the American public that borders on anti-vaccine levels of delusion. (It’s also, again, a self-defeating mythology. If Israel’s influence is untouchable, it isn’t worth touching.)
>It doesn’t. It’s why I never cite general popularity for Israel
Yet you cited "Israel is uniquely popular" as a reason for why they get their way.
Which is not true.
>Israel has a vocal minority that loves it. It has not had, until last last year, a vocal minority that hates it
It not only had a vocal minority that hates it it had a vocal minority of Jews that loathe it.
The minorities arent the point though, the money and the foreign influence over America's government is.
Remember the "vocal minority" in Moldova who fight for pro Russian policy? Theyre not "vocal minorities" thats just Russia.
Israel is no different. It's a foreign country taking control over the American government.
>Even today, very few voters would trade pocketbook issues for a pro-Palestinian policy portfolio
That's probably increasingly less true these days (genocide isnt a historically popular policy) but beside the point.
The "minority" which operates on behalf of a foreign government is getting real close to ramming $200 per barrel oil down everybody's throats not because theyre "motivated" but because America is run along plutocratic lines and is fully captured by that foreign government.
>It’s a tempting tale, and simplifying model, to assume unilateral causes of policies
I assume that'd where the "uniquely popular" thing came from.
To say that Israel has fully captured the American government is ridiculous. Pro-Israel spending is a fraction of all political spending.
take aipac, which barely scratches the top 10 of single-issue focused organizations. Aipac donated 43 mil to campaigns in 2023-24. The League of Conservation Warriors donated 50 million. Is the U.S. gov't being captured by environmental advocacy groups?
If you look at foreign agent registered spending, Israel spent 5.7 million in 2024. Compare that with China who spent 5.8 billion with a B.
Israel's influence is not just about how much money it spends openly on candidates and AIPAC is not the only foreign agent of Israel channeling cash to political campaigns.
Not what I claimed.
Vocal, motivated minorities who are willing to back a primary challenger, show or not show to off-cycle elections and potentially even switch parties over an issue command in American elections. What the majority loosely believes is irrelevant; this should be common knowledge given how our partisan primary system works.
The loose majority in American elections doesn’t care about foreign policy. A motivated minority does, and that minority has historically—in both parties—broken decisively in favour of Israel. This issue, moreover, was one that was important enough to enough of them to be a deal breaker. (And “them” doesn’t just mean American or even Israeli Jews. It encompasses a wide variety of liberal, neo-conservative and evangelical interests, for example.)
Not everywhere. But in enough places that if you’re a politician from one of the majority of places where Israel is a total non-issue, you don’t want to alienate your colleagues for whom it is an issue. Because there was no upside to fighting a battle against Israel, again, nobody in your district was going to reward you for going de Blasio on out-of-scope problems.
> Israel's sway has more to do with the power it holds over the political classes
Sure. The point is the “political classes” are those people who are willing to back a primary challenger, show or not show to off-cycle elections and potentially even switch parties over an issue. It’s far more similar to how NIMBY politics work than Russia’s election interference, which has a track record of backfiring more than helping.