> That always seemed like a meaningless argument to me.

Same as that is not the lived experience. I notice that I care about free choice.

The idea that there's no free will may be a pessimistic outlook to some but to me it's a strictly neutral one. It used to be a bit negative, until I looked more closely that there's a difference between looking at a situation objectively and having a lived experience. When it comes to my inclinations and how I want to live life, lived experience takes precedence.

I don't have my thoughts sharp on it, but I don't think the concept even exists philosophically, but I think that's also what you're getting at. It's a conceptual remnant from the past.

"Free choice" is the first step towards the solution to this paradox: free will is what a deterministic choice feels like from the inside. The popular notion of free will is that our decisions are undetermined, which must imply that there is a random element to them.

But though that is the colloquial meaning, it doesn't line up with what people say they want: you want to make your choice according to your own reasons. You want free choice. But unless your own reasoning includes a literal throw of the dice, your justifications deterministically decide the outcome.

"Free will" is the ability to make your own choices, and for most people most of the time, those choices are deterministic given the options and knowledge available. Free will and determinism are not only compatible, but necessarily so. If your choices weren't deterministic, it wouldn't be free will.

This is the position that is literally called compatibilist.

But when you probe people, while a lot of people will argue in ways that a philosopher might call compatibilist, my experience is that people will also strongly resist the notion that the only options are randomness and determinism. A lot of people have what boils down to a religious belief in a third category that is not merely a combination of those two, but infuses some mysterious third options where they "choose" that they can't explain.

Most of the time, people who believe there is no free will (and can't be), like me, take positions similar to what you described, that - again - a proponent of free will might describe as compatibilist, but sometimes we oppose the term for the reason above: A lot of people genuinely believe in a "third option" for choices are made.

And so there are really two separate debates on free will: Does the "third option" exist or not, and does "compatibilist free will" exist or not. I don't think I've ever met anyone who seriously disagrees that "free will" the way compatibilists define it exists, so when compatibilists get into arguments over this, it's almost always a misunderstanding...

But I have met plenty of people who disagree with the notion that things are deterministic "from the outside".

I'm a regular practitioner of magic, have written essays about it on Quora, and I can identify this mysterious third option as "the universe responding to your needs." You can use any number of religious terms to refer it to, like serendipity and the like, but none of them can capture the full texture of precisely how free will operates.

Approaching this subject from a rational perspective divorces you from subject and makes it impossible to perceive. You have to immerse yourself in it and one way to do that is magical practice. Having direct experience of the universe responding to your actions and mindset eventually makes it absurdly clear that the universe bears intelligence and it's in this intelligence that free will operates.

I'd never thought before now to connect magic this directly to free will. Thanks for the opportunity to think this through! If you're interested in a deeper discussion, happy to jump on a call.

lmao, magic? seriously?

You betcha.

It is stronger than compatibilism. Compatibilism argues that free will and determinism are orthogonal. The argument I summarized is that free will is and must necessarily imply determinism..

I think that is a distinction without difference in as much as it's an excuse not to deal with it. But compatibilist "free will" must imply determinism unless some "magic" third alternative exists, because there isn't another option, and there is no evidence to suggest such a third alternative exists, so in practice every compatibilist I've had this discussion with have fallen back on arguing free will is compatible with determinism.

Definition doesn't tell all implications. In practice compatibilists do deeper analysis that reveals that determinism is required for free will.

Opposing the term gives a wrong result too, as people jump to hard determinism.

However "hard" your determinism, there is no support for the notion of agency, and that is all that matters. Without agency, free will is nothing but an illusion, with same moral consequences.

This isn’t true. The position I argued for above is that agency derives from determinism because it is necessarily causal: you have agency because you make decisions in line with your goals. If you didn’t make decisions that were deterministically selected from your goals, you’d actually lack agency!

And agency as inner motivation exists and is determined by your character, otherwise it would be not yours.

I think a reasonable interpretation of the colloquial sense of incompatibilist free will is that people want to be (or have the experience that they are) their own causal origins or prime movers. That they originate an action that is not (purely) the effect of all other actions that have occurred, but in such a way that they decided what that action was.

From the outside, this is indistinguishable from randomness. But from the inside, the difference is that the individual had a say in what the action would be.

Where this tends to get tangled up with notions of a soul, I think, is that one could argue that such a free choice needs some kind of internal state. If not, then the grounds by which the person makes the choice is a combination of something that is fixed and their environment, which then intuitively seems to reduce the free-will process to a combination of determined and random. So the natural thing to do is then to assign the required "being-ness" (or internal state if you will) to a soul.

But there may exist subtle philosophical arguments that sidestep this dilemma. I am not a philosopher: this is just my impression of what commonsense notions of free will mean.

My point is that from the outside this doesn’t look like randomness at all, unless you are mistaking ignorance of their motives as a random oracle. If you can infer what set of goals drives their decision making, and the decision making process itself (e.g. ADHD brain vs careful considered action) you can very much predict their decisions. Marketing and PR people do this every single day. People don’t behave like random oracles, they behave like deterministic decision makers with complex, partly unknown goals so our predictions of their behavior are not always correct. That’s not the same thing as random.

People get emotional about free will because if you come to believe there is no free will it makes you question a lot of things that are emotionally difficult.

E.g. punishment for the sake of retribution is near impossible to morally justify if you don't believe in free will because it means you're punishing someone for something the had no agency over.

Similarly, wealth disparities can't be excused by someone choosing to work harder, because they had no agency in the "decision".

You can still justify some degree of punishment and reward, but a lack of free will changes which justifications are reasonable very substantially.

E.g. punishment might still be justified from the point of view of reducing offending and reoffending rates, but if that is the goal then it is only justified to the extent that it actually achieves those goals, and that has emotionally difficult consequences. For example, for non-premeditated murders carried out out of passion rather than e.g. gang crimes, the odds of someone carrying out another is extremely low and the odds that the fear of a long prison sentence is an actual deterrence is generally low, and and so long prison terms are hard to justify once vengeance is off the table.

And so holding on to a belief in free will is easier to a lot of people than the alternative.

My experience is that there are few issues where people so easily get angry than if you suggest we don't have free will once they start thinking through the consequences (and some imagined ones...).

I think that whether or not you have free will is not so important when making these considerations.

Whether or not you have a choice and free will, you can influence and be influenced by other stuff, since that is how anything is doing.

> punishment might still be justified from the point of view of reducing offending and reoffending rates, but if that is the goal then it is only justified to the extent that it actually achieves those goals

I do agree with that, and I think that whether or not you have free will is not significant. Being emotionally difficult is not what makes it good or bad in this case (and it also does not seem to be so emotionally difficult to me, anyways). Reducing reoffending rates is what is important.

(Another issue is knowing if they are actually guilty (you shouldn't arrest people who are not actually guilty of murder); this is not always certain, either.)

I also think that it should mean that prisoners should not be treated badly and that prison sentences should not be too long. (Also, they shouldn't take up too much space by the prisons, since they should have free space for natural lands and for other buildings and purposes, but that is not quite the same issue, though.)

However, there may be cases where a fine might be appropriate, in order to pay for damages (although if someone else is willing to forgive them then such a fine may not be required). This does not justify a prison sentence or stuff like that, though.

Also, some people will just not like them anymore if they are accused of murder, even if they are not put in prison and not fined. This is not the issue for police and legal things; it is just what it will be. And, if it becomes known, people who disagree with the risk assessment can try to avoid someone.

And, if someone does commit a crime again and may have opportunity to do again in future, then this can be considered as being wrong the first time and this time hopefully you can know better.

That’s more effective as an argument to get rid of the most extreme forms of punishment (eg drawn and quartered) not all forms of retribution.

In a world without free will crimes of passion are simply the result of the situation which means that person would always chose murder in that situation. People who would respond with murder in an unacceptably wide range of situations is an edge case worth consideration without free will. Alternatively if we want nobody to respond with murder in a crime of passion situation evolutionary pressure could eventually work even without free will.

> E.g. punishment might still be justified from the point of view of reducing offending and reoffending rates, but if that is the goal then it is only justified to the extent that it actually achieves those goals, and that has emotionally difficult consequences. For example, for non-premeditated murders carried out out of passion rather than e.g. gang crimes, the odds of someone carrying out another is extremely low and the odds that the fear of a long prison sentence is an actual deterrence is generally low, and and so long prison terms are hard to justify once vengeance is off the table.

That’s assuming absolute certainty about what happened. Punishments may make sense as a logical argument even if it’s only useful in a subset of cases if you can’t be absolutely sure which case something happened to be.

Uncertainty does a lot to align emotional heuristics and logical actions.

Whether or not you have free will is not relevant, as I had described in other comments.

> In a world without free will crimes of passion are simply the result of the situation which means that person would always chose murder in that situation. People who would respond with murder in an unacceptably wide range of situations is an edge case worth consideration without free will.

This is a significant argument. However, there is also worth considering if that is actually accurate, and if such a situation will occur (in a case where whoever would be killed would not effectively protect themself from this).

> That’s assuming absolute certainty about what happened. Punishments may make sense as a logical argument even if it’s only useful in a subset of cases if you can’t be absolutely sure which case something happened to be.

It is true that you do not have absolute certainty, but neither should you arrest someone who is not guilty.

> Uncertainty does a lot to align emotional heuristics and logical actions.

In some cases, yes, but it is not always valid. But, even if it is, this does not mean that you should not consider it logically if you are able to do so.

If there is no free will, thoughts about free will are predetermined and so is punishment. The punishers don’t have agency either. You seem to say that punishers do have free will, but criminals don’t?

I didn't say anything about whether free will exists or not, actually. The comment was specifically worded to explain why some people react to coming to believe there is no free will.

But, sure, I personally do not believe in free will. I'm saying there is no rational basis for thinking anyone has free will ever. I'm saying there is no evidence to suggest free will is possible. In fact, I'll go so far as to say that believing in free will is a religious belief with no support.

But that doesn't mean that events does not have effects on what happens next, just that we don't have agency. That an IF ... THEN ... ELSE ... statement is purely deterministic for deterministic inputs does not mean that changing the inputs won't affect the outputs.

If you "choose" to lay down and do nothing because you decide nothing matters because you don't have free will, you will still lose your job and starve. That it wasn't a "true" "free" choice does not change the fact that it has consequences.

One of the consequences of coming to accept that free will is an illusion is that you need to come to terms with what that means for your beliefs about a wide range of things.

Including that vengeance which might seem moral to some extent if the person who did something to you or others had agency suddenly become immoral. But we still have the feelings and impulses. Reconciling that is hard for a lot of people, and so a lot of people in my experience when faced with a claim like the one I made above that we have no free will tend to react emotionally to the idea of the consequences of it.

Are there deterministic solutions to the three body problem? Or the double pendulum? Or can you tell the t° at any point on earth for say, a millisecond in, say, 6h (feel free to chose a prefered point and time)? And what precision could you realistically produce in that?

If there are non deterministic processes that can be proven to exist, and those interact with deterministic processes, doesn't it follow that the deterministic process becomes non deterministic (since the result of the interaction is necessarily non deterministic), and that it is not continually deterministic.

So - can you see how nothing can be deterministic other than in isolation (or thought experiment really)?

Edit0: typo

There are deterministic solutions to the three body problem or the double pendulum in Newtonian mechanics.

We can’t measure things to arbitrary precision due to quantum mechanics, but Philosophy isn’t bound by the actual physical universe we inhabit. Arbitrary physical models allow for the possibility of infinite precision in measurement and calculation resulting in perfect prediction of future states forever. Alternatively, you could have a universe of finite precision (think Minecraft) which also allows for perfect calculation of all future states from initial starting conditions.

I agree, and indeed there are solutions to chaotic systems - the problem being precision as you mentionned. To me the precision problem it is important : it reframes the "mechanical universe" as being way out of our grasp not because of our understanding but because of it's structure. You got me!

Not certain that philosophy is not bound by our universe - is that something you could elaborate (or lend a link) on?

To apply these hypotheticals to our universe implies (from my understanding) that the density of information present at any and all times since it's inception was present (while compressed) at it's creation/whatever - which I imagine I can find some proof of theoretical maximum information density and information compression compare that to the first state of the universe we can measure to have a better idea if it tracks.

> Not certain that philosophy is not bound by our universe - is that something you could elaborate (or lend a link) on?

I simply mean it’s happy to assume perfect information, perfect clones, etc. The trolly problem generally ignores the possibility that choosing a different track could with some probability result in derailment because the inherent question is simplified by design. We don’t need for the possibility of perfect cloning to exist to consider the ramifications of such etc.

I think I see a distinction in that a hypothetical universe with perfect information is pertinent precisely because it is comparable to our measurable universe and could be tested against.

I guess that's the point of any hypothetical, exploring a simplified model of something complex, but it's not easy to simplify the fabric of reality itself.

I don't find the consequences very hard to bear:

For example

> E.g. punishment for the sake of retribution is near impossible to morally justify if you don't believe in free will because it means you're punishing someone for something the had no agency over.

and

> E.g. punishment might still be justified from the point of view of reducing offending and reoffending rates, but if that is the goal then it is only justified to the extent that it actually achieves those goals

are simply logical to me (even without assuming any lack of free will).

So what is emotionally difficult about this, as you claim?

I agree; they seem logical to me too, whether or not you have free will.

However, it would seem that not everyone believes that, though.

(It is not quite as simple as it might seem, because the situation is not necessarily always that clear, but other than that, I would agree that it is logical and reasonable, that punishment is only justified from the point of view of reducing offending and reoffending rates and only if it actually achieves those goals.)

Then you're highly unusual (in a good way). Look at the amount of comments on social media with outcries over "too short" sentences for example, and the lack of political support for shortening sentences or improving prison standards.

I'm saying it's emotionally difficult to people because I've had this discussion many times over then last 30+ years and I've seen first hand how most people I have this conversation with tend to get angry and agitated over the prospect of not having moral cover for vengeance.

> Then you're highly unusual (in a good way). Look at the amount of comments on social media with outcries over "too short" sentences for example, and the lack of political support for shortening sentences or improving prison standards.

I live in Germany.

When I observe the whole societal and political situation in the USA from the outside, it seems to me that it is rather "two blocks where in each of these there is somewhat an internal consensus regarding a quite some political positions. On the other hand, each of these two blocks is actively fighting the other one."

On the other hand, for Germany, I would claim that the opinions in society rather consist of "lots of very diverse stances (though in contrary to the USA less pronounced on the extreme ends) on a lot of topics that make it hard to reach a larger set of followers or some consensus in a larger group, i.e. in-fighting about all kinds of topics without these positions forming political camps (and the fractions for different opinions can easily change when the topic changes)."

Thus, in the given example, this means for a person out-crying "too short" sentences on social media, you will very likely find one who is out-crying the opposite position.

“ E.g. punishment for the sake of retribution is near impossible to morally justify if you don't believe in free will because it means you're punishing someone for something the had no agency over.”

False, the punisher also has no will, so it doesn’t matter.

If there is no free will, then all arguments about what should be done are irrelevant, since every outcome is either predetermined or random, so you have no influence on whether the project at work will choose Rust or C++. This choice was either made 13 billion years ago at the Big Bang, or it is an entirely random process.

> If there is no free will, then all arguments about what should be done are irrelevant, since every outcome is either predetermined or random, so you have no influence on whether the project at work will choose Rust or C++.

This is not correct. Whether or not you have free will, stuff influences and is influenced by other stuff, so these arguments are not meaningless or worthless.

> This choice was either made 13 billion years ago at the Big Bang, or it is an entirely random process.

I had thought of this before, and what I had decided is that both of these are also independent of having free will. For example, if the initial state includes unknown and uncomputable transcendental numbers which can somehow "encode" free will and then the working of physics is deterministic, then it is still possible (although not necessarily mandatory) to have free will, even though it is deterministic.

Lack of free will doesn’t prevent logical arguments from seeming to work.

Depends on whether you consider facts or theory. Facts don't prevent logical arguments from seeming to work, but lack of free will is theory. When theory doesn't match facts, theory is wrong.

We have built systems that don’t have free will and respond to logical arguments, so no theory is required here.

Random processes can’t use logic.

Fuzzy logic deals with truth values between 0 and 1. You can for example map water temperatures in such systems without having arbitrarily important cutoff points.

Such system often deal with uncertainty quite well including random noise on their inputs. The output ends up a function of both logic and randomness, but can still be useful.

Agreed, I don’t believe a system like that can access the platonic realm of mathematical truths. It’s clear that an electron doesn’t carry the laws of physics with it as it travels.

Why not? The human brain is hardly a perfect system of logic but can emulate such.

This is a strawman argument extended by those who rely on supernatural explanations. In reality, people's utterances and actions are part of the environment that determines future actions, just like everything else.

Sure, but that still doesn't matter: the fact that I wrote my previous comment is what caused you to write your response, but it's not like I had a choice to write that comment or some other: the fact that I wrote that comment, as well as everything that led to me writing it (conversations with teachers, my parents letting me watch English cartoons so I learned English, etc), were predetermined the moment the Big Bang happened, or they're just a quantum fluctuation.

What I'm saying is that there's no logical point to the concept "should" unless you have some concept of free will: everything that happens must happen, or is entirely random.

Randomness based free will still gives you a non-inevitable future.

So does a computer without free will acting on a physical RNG. Therefore it’s the RNG that matters not free will.

For naturalistic libertarians , free.will is.partly constituted by indtermimksm, not something entirely different.

Divorced from a religious context, it doesn't make any difference.

Which religious context, and why?