I'd say superintelligence is more about producing deeper insight, making more abstract links across domains, and advancing the frontiers of knowledge than about doing stuff faster. Thinking speed correlates with intelligence to some extent, but at the higher end the distinction between speed and quality becomes clear.
If anything, "abstract links across domains" is the one area where even very low intelligence AI's will still have an edge, simply because any AI trained on general text has "learned" a whole lot of random knowledge about lots of different domains; more than any human could easily acquire. But again, this is true of AI's no matter how "smart" they are. Not related to any "super intelligence" specifically.
Similarly, "deeper insight" may be surfaced occasionally simply by making a low-intelligence AI 'think' for longer, but this is not something you can count on under any circumstances, which is what you may well expect from something that's claimed to be "super intelligent".
I don't think current models are capable of making abstract links across domains. They can latch onto superficial similarities, but I have yet to see an instance of a model making an unexpected and useful analogy. It's a high bar, but I think that's fair for declaring superintelligence.
In general, I agree that these models are in some sense extremely knowledgeable, which suggests they are ripe for producing productive analogies if only we can figure out what they're missing compared to human-style thinking. Part of what makes it difficult to evaluate the abilities of these models is that they are wildly superhuman in some ways and quite dumb in others.
It is really more of a value judgement of the utility of the answer to a human.
Some kind of automated discovery across all domain pairs for something that a human finds utility in the answer seems almost like the definition of an intractable problem.
Superintelligence just seems like marketing to me in this context. As if AGI is so 2024.
> It's a high bar, but I think that's fair for declaring superintelligence.
I have to disagree because the distinction between "superficial similarities" and genuinely "useful" analogies is pretty clearly one of degree. Spend enough time and effort asking even a low-intelligence AI about "dumb" similarities, and it'll eventually hit a new and perhaps "useful" analogy simply as a matter of luck. This becomes even easier if you can provide the AI with a lot of "context" input, which is something that models have been improving at. But either way it's not superintelligent or superhuman, just part of the general 'wild' weirdness of AI's as a whole.
I think you misunderstood what I meant about setting a high bar. First, passing the bar is a necessary but not sufficient condition for superintelligence. Secondly, by "fair for" I meant it's fair to set a high bar, not that this particular bar is the one fair bar for measuring intelligence. It's obvious that usefulness of an analogy generator is a matter of degree. Eg, a uniform random string generator is guaranteed to produce all possible insightful analogies, but would not be considered useful or intelligent.
I think you're basically agreeing with me. Ie, current models are not superintelligent. Even though they can "think" super fast, they don't pass a minimum bar of producing novel and useful connections between domains without significant human intervention. And, our evaluation of their abilities is clouded by the way in which their intelligence differs from our own.
Comparing the process of research to tending a garden or raising children is fairly common. This is an iteration on that theme. One thing I find interesting about this analogy is that there's a strong sense of the model's autoregressiveness here in that the model commits early to the gardening analogy and then finds a way to make it work (more or less).
The sorts of useful analogies I was mostly talking about are those that appear in scientific research involving actionable technical details. Eg, diffusion models came about when folks with a background in statistical physics saw some connections between the math for variational autoencoders and the math for non-equilibrium thermodynamics. Guided by this connection, they decided to train models to generate data by learning to invert a diffusion process that gradually transforms complexly structured data into a much simpler distribution -- in this case, a basic multidimensional Gaussian.
I feel like these sorts of technical analogies are harder to stumble on than more common "linguistic" analogies. The latter can be useful tools for thinking, but tend to require some post-hoc interpretation and hand waving before they produce any actionable insight. The former are more direct bridges between domains that allow direct transfer of knowledge about one class of problems to another.
> The sorts of useful analogies I was mostly talking about are those that appear in scientific research involving actionable technical details. Eg, diffusion models came about when folks with a background in statistical physics saw some connections between the math for variational autoencoders and the math for non-equilibrium thermodynamics.
These connections are all over the place but they tend to be obscured and disguised by gratuitous divergences in language and terminology across different communities. I think it remains to be seen if LLM's can be genuinely helpful here even though you are restricting to a rather narrow domain (math-heavy hard sciences) and one where human practitioners may well have the advantage. It's perhaps more likely that as formalization of math-heavy fields becomes more widespread, that these analogies will be routinely brought out as a matter of refactoring.
