Folks are focusing on this point unnecessarily. Large scale real-time collection and cracking of SSLv2 is still out-of-scope for everybody, I suspect.
Large scale MITM, though, isn't, through compromised CA's, etc. That threat is much more severe and affects basically all software that relies on SSL/TLS (whatever version) for securing a connection or the CA system for validating the authenticity of downloads. That's a much more serious problem.
If MSFT is indeed not honoring opt-out of CEIP and other programs, the issue is them not honoring that preference. The particulars of the encryption built on top of a broken model are not the issue.
Large scale MITM, though, isn't, through compromised CA's, etc. That threat is much more severe and affects basically all software that relies on SSL/TLS (whatever version) for securing a connection or the CA system for validating the authenticity of downloads. That's a much more serious problem.
If MSFT is indeed not honoring opt-out of CEIP and other programs, the issue is them not honoring that preference. The particulars of the encryption built on top of a broken model are not the issue.