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This isn't what Vista "used to do". Vista had a single elevation popup dialog / shatter attack prevention screen. Any request that required elevation required this popup.

macOS has not only elevation requests but entitlements. Using the local network is an entitlement. What macOS gets very wrong is any denied entitlements will re-prompt next time you perform that action with the app, which may simply be starting the app. It also does one entitlement at a time, i.e. if you have an app that requires screen sharing and camera, you'll get the first entitlement, restart app, go to do action you wanted again, second entitlement.

Both OSes have MoTW, but Apple goes beyond with the notarization warning/block.

macOS users are going to suffer from prompt fatigue. And the /r/macos "secure cus UNIX!" will be wrong on two points.



Technically you're right. From an end-user standpoint, it's irrelevant. Apple's mock vista ad applies just as well to Ventura: they're all annoying and a security theater if the user is just told to input admin password into any random popup.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VuqZ8AqmLPY


Quick clarification on terminology. From a developer perspective, entitlements a static dictionary (or a collection of key-value pairs) attached to the app at code-signing time. The entitlements you mentioned don't "entitle" the app to access resources, as user consent is still required.

An app with [the com.apple.security.device.usb entitlement](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/en...) is technically always going to have that entitlement attached to the app regardless of user consent.


FWIW, Vista's level of prompts is the only way to run UAC in any kind of secure fashion. The configuration that has been the default since Windows 7 makes it trivial for a low-privilege application to gain UAC privileges.

Microsoft doesn't regard UAC as a security boundary if you're logged in as an admin (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archi...). You can use UAC as one as part of a defence-in-depth approach by logging in as a non-administrator user (like everyone tells you to do but nobody wants to do) and entering a password for every prompt, but for that to work well you'd need to make sure to turn UAC prompts back to max (read: Vista level or worse). I don't think I'd set up a system like that without a fingerprint reader or Windows Hello facial recognition camera, because typing out the password that often is just a massive pain.

Windows, as configured by default, barely runs any downloaded files. You can pay hundreds of euros for a certificate, sign your installer, and still have users get told off by SmartScreen for daring to open an executable file. I don't think Apple's notarization has done anything useful so far, but their security prompts are a lot less scary than Windows'. I think it's a matter of time before unsigned Windows executables with the MotW simply won't open by default like those on macOS.




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