I think you're joking, but at a certain point you're essentially getting live attestation from the CA, with the certificate duration only serving as sort of a caching function to enable faster responses by the server and to avoid overloading the CA. In that model, you might as well have much shorter duration certificates, with maybe the only limiting factor being the capacity of the CA.
These threads are so weird. There almost certainly is a thread you can go read on a mailing list about this where people discussed this ad nauseam. But nobody is going to go out of their way to prove this to you. We have the before/after picture of the WebPKI with respect to root programs actively managing, and disregarding the concerns of systems administrators and enterprise customers. It's the world of Certificate Transparency, LetsEncrypt and TLS 1.3. The "won't anybody please think of the middlebox operators" perspective, which I'll grant still has some currency in the IETF, is almost completely discredited.
