This really seems the like 'oh duh' insight. The output of your revenue-making equipment (the kitchen) went up without requiring additional floor space and staff to serve a larger customer-base.
More specifically - the restaurants that survived (which is already a feat in and of itself) could serve more customers since they didn't have to turn as many tables. Even with the "overhead" of food delivery apps - restaurants could still purchase whole-sale ingredients in bulk and sell to more people without building out their physical plant.
To add - the dine-in experience has gotten faster. You don't need to wait for menus and you don't need to do the dance when settling your bill. Even if you didn't expand your delivery clientele you could probably turn tables faster without any 'hit' on rushing out your loyal customers.
Maybe what is happening is before 2020 the people who carried the food from the kitchen to the customer were employees and after the people who carried the food from the kitchen to the customer are gig workers not employees which would explain "Figure 1. Annualized Real Sales per Employee (1992=100), Food Services and Drinking Places, Seasonally Adjusted" [0]. Restaurants now use gig workers and not employees to deliver the food. Of course, there are more sales per "employee."
Take out is terrible for restaurants. All the profit is in alcohol which people rarely take out. In distant second, profit comes from understaffing. So it should be obvious how and why productivity rises: in the absence of lucrative dine in drinkers, understaff. Then the denominator in the productivity calculation is smaller.
Where does the profit from subsidies go to? A few years ago, McDonalds has subsidies of $1.5B USD, and $1.5B in profits. They really are a real estate company, and nursemaids for broken ice cream machines.
McDonalds corporate and its franchises are not real estate businesses. I understand there are insight porn Substack writings saying so. The locations of a McDonalds doesn’t change but same store sales fluctuate a lot. They suck because the food sucks, and it got too expensive for its audience of people who eat shitty food. This is not at all an unorthodox opinion. The real estate idea is the unorthodox one.
I am not sure which subsidies specifically you are talking about but you are probably right that the fact that they pay their workers so poorly relative to others in hospitality, and that the services their people need are paid for by taxpayers in their communities instead of McDonalds, is a subsidy that is relevant to their bottom line. But, since I don’t know how comparable they are to SMB hospitality, it’s really hard to say. One POV is that McDonalds is the addictive thing that competes against alcohol, and maybe it has gotten less addictive, or it faces cultural headwinds like smoking did.
> All of our restaurants offer a full-service bar where our entire menu is served. During fiscal 2022, alcoholic beverage sales represented 12% of The Cheesecake Factory restaurant sales. We offer all items on our menu, except alcoholic beverages where disallowed by regulation, for off-premise consumption, sales of which comprised approximately 25% of The Cheesecake Factory restaurant sales during fiscal 2022. [0]
Industry benchmarks for similar chains put food ingredients typically around 28–35% of the menu price and alcoholic beverages around 20–25% of the menu price. Nonetheless, making 2x profit on 25% of sales is incredible for restaurants.
At Cheesecake Factory, total food and beverage cost is 24.6%. Labor cost is 36.7%: of that waitstaff is ~50% of labor and kitchen staff is ~30% of labor. Operating cost is 26.7%. Looks like after other costs the profit was ~1.2%. Not much but that profit comes from the 25% off-premise consumption without alcohol.
Takeout for Michelin star restaurants is not a good idea. For almost all other restaurants, takeout is were the profits are. Engineering a menu and kitchen is like engineering a database, you have to ask things like are there a lot of writes and few reads or a lot of reads and few writes to determine how to structure it. When designing a restaurant and menu there needs to be equilibrium between how many seats in the dining room, what if any liqueur license to acquire, an expectation of percentage of food will be takeout, and menu items that will satisfy both dining room and takeout quality expectations. We eat with our eyes first even if it is opening a steaming hot carton of Orange Chicken from the Cheesecake Factory. There are always tradeoffs and it matters what the end goal is and more often than not the goal for both a database and kitchen is to earn as much profit as possible.
Some advice if you ever open a restaurant. The single biggest pain point when working in a kitchen opening a brand new restaurant is not enough storage. [1] You need enough containers to hold each of every element. You need enough containers to hold each of every element in cold storage for backup during service. Lastly, you need enough clean containers to switch the contents of each element into at the end of each night or to be dirty waiting for cleaning while the others are being used. The week before you open a restaurant, count how many containers you thought you needed and have in stock and triple that amount. Nothing will slow down service like not having enough containers. See, engineering a kitchen is like engineering a database.
More specifically - the restaurants that survived (which is already a feat in and of itself) could serve more customers since they didn't have to turn as many tables. Even with the "overhead" of food delivery apps - restaurants could still purchase whole-sale ingredients in bulk and sell to more people without building out their physical plant.
To add - the dine-in experience has gotten faster. You don't need to wait for menus and you don't need to do the dance when settling your bill. Even if you didn't expand your delivery clientele you could probably turn tables faster without any 'hit' on rushing out your loyal customers.