I don't think the article did assume that. If you read between the lines the writer might well believe Intel is beyond saving no matter what Gelsinger does. Zero in on:
> The CEOs who got Intel into this mess were much longer than Pat and a worse fit. Meanwhile, the board let most of his predecessor’s activities go unchecked as they sped through disaster.
That really captures the spirit of the article. It is pointing out that the people ultimately responsible for getting Intel into a mess are still in charge and have started to flail. That doesn't mean the writer thinks Gelsinger was going to be a great CEO because he is technical. They think that the board is terrible and there is evidence that it hasn't changed.
This behaviour by the board would be a common enough pattern in both business and political failures. Something goes wrong, the people in charge don't admit they made mistakes (or everyone just assumes it is too late to recover) and retain power.
The article focuses on the boards alleged ineptitude, not about Gelsinger directly, but the article directly states that Gelsinger was the best possible candidate:
> But the reality is he’s the single best candidate for the company.
However, directly before this, the author offers this:
> Meanwhile, Pat wanted to pursue the big, bold IFS bet, with 100s of thousands of wafers, when the reality is just getting 10s of thousands of wafers is a massive problem as is.
This sounds oddly reminiscent of people I've worked with in the past. They have grand, pie-in-the-sky visions of what something should be, but don't know how to quickly and efficiently take the steps to get there.
> The CEOs who got Intel into this mess were much longer than Pat and a worse fit. Meanwhile, the board let most of his predecessor’s activities go unchecked as they sped through disaster.
That really captures the spirit of the article. It is pointing out that the people ultimately responsible for getting Intel into a mess are still in charge and have started to flail. That doesn't mean the writer thinks Gelsinger was going to be a great CEO because he is technical. They think that the board is terrible and there is evidence that it hasn't changed.
This behaviour by the board would be a common enough pattern in both business and political failures. Something goes wrong, the people in charge don't admit they made mistakes (or everyone just assumes it is too late to recover) and retain power.