On reading the incident report it becomes apparent that the flight display system contributed significantly to this incident, not just in failing, but also by its design. It reminds me a lot of the collision incidents in the Sea of Japan, where touchscreen displays were implicated.
In this case, among other things, losing the PCD meant losing the backup radio. From page 35 of Pt. 1 of the incident report:
>"a. Discussion: MP experienced a failure of COM-A and COM-B. The
Backup Radio was still functional; however, with a PCD failure, MP
would have been unable to change frequencies via the PCD. The F-35B
has radio knobs as an alternative; however, they are notoriously
unreliable. Most pilots resort solely to changing frequencies via the
PCD. This increases pilot workload and decreases situational
awareness because pilots must access this feature via a drop-down menu
which covers half of one portal. Changing frequencies this way is
especially difficult in high workload situations such as when flying
formation and/or in instrument meteorological conditions. The F-35 is
also equipped with a voice activated communication control system that
has not functioned since 30P05 software was installed."
Wow. So, when losing main coms, the pilot could not easily change to the backup radio in a timely and safe manner, to, say, tell his wingman to take the lead. He couldn't use voice commands, which should have been there, but oh well. The PCB was down, but even if up it is cumbersome to access the backup radio. The knobs weren't "reliable", per report. It is legit hard to understand how this is possible in such an advanced and costly aircraft. I'd think that the Commandant of the USMC has bigger fish to fry than the pilot.
Oh, and I'd love to see the recommendation but it is redacted.
>"a. Discussion: MP experienced a failure of COM-A and COM-B. The Backup Radio was still functional; however, with a PCD failure, MP would have been unable to change frequencies via the PCD. The F-35B has radio knobs as an alternative; however, they are notoriously unreliable. Most pilots resort solely to changing frequencies via the PCD. This increases pilot workload and decreases situational awareness because pilots must access this feature via a drop-down menu which covers half of one portal. Changing frequencies this way is especially difficult in high workload situations such as when flying formation and/or in instrument meteorological conditions. The F-35 is also equipped with a voice activated communication control system that has not functioned since 30P05 software was installed."
Wow. So, when losing main coms, the pilot could not easily change to the backup radio in a timely and safe manner, to, say, tell his wingman to take the lead. He couldn't use voice commands, which should have been there, but oh well. The PCB was down, but even if up it is cumbersome to access the backup radio. The knobs weren't "reliable", per report. It is legit hard to understand how this is possible in such an advanced and costly aircraft. I'd think that the Commandant of the USMC has bigger fish to fry than the pilot. Oh, and I'd love to see the recommendation but it is redacted.