> The investigation report said the F-35′s transponder failed as a result of the electrical malfunction
So there is serious electrical malfunction and the pilot loses communication and also some of his displays multiple times.
In hindsight we know it wasn't that serious and the plane could have kept flying.
But how can the pilot figure that out, while flying the aircraft? One needs to evaluate decisions based on the information available at the time the decision was made.
And as a bit of context it's mentionned at the end that:
>It was the Marines’ third aviation crash in six weeks, following the August crash of an F/A-18D Hornet in southern California, which killed its pilot, and an MV-22 Osprey crash in Australia that killed three Marines.
No, but 3 crashes in 6 weeks looks bad, and he was the only one that survived. That makes him a prime candidate for under-the-bus throwing by leadership.
> One needs to evaluate decisions based on the information available at the time the decision was made.
Sure. He was at 1900 feet and in a climb when he ejected. I can understand it’s nerve wrecking to trust your backup instruments in this situation, but it’s not like ejecting is a completely safe zero risk option either. That jet could have come down anywhere.
If a ship's captain is asleep, as he logically must be some of the time, and the officers on watch crash the ship into a reef, that captain's career is over even though by normal civilian standards it might be surmised that he did nothing wrong. Even if he's got the receipts to prove he trained his men properly according to the book and they passed all their tests. Civilian intuition about blame doesn't really apply.
And no need to worry about loosing talented people due to circumstances outside of their control (and preventing other from even consideringto join) - they attract bad luck and that is more dangerous in the long term!
There are some situations where you try to reduce type II errors (false negative) even if you increase type I errors (false positive).
The hypothesis is "the captain was to blame". If this is true but you reject it (type I error) you will probably loose another ship. If this is false but you reject it (type II error) you need to find another qualified captain (which, depending on the field might or might not be a problem).
My guess is that there are more pilots/captains trained that planes/ships.
There are all kinds of subtle factors which may allude quantification, but which nonetheless matter because they contribute to outcomes which matter. When things really matter you can't afford to ignore these factors just because you can't pin them down. So yes, you favor those who are "lucky".
I hate this sort of "everything that requires subjective judgement is luck" trope that is pervasive on HN and similar parts of the internet.
The line between luck and skill is blurry. The captain's job is to avoid the preconditions for failure. Maybe that means a different route, maybe that means scheduling such that you're awake for the sketchy stuff. Yes, all of this is subjective and has tradeoffs, that's why it's skilled work people take years to develop the skills for.
So you're in a thing going close to the speed of sound, the thing starts malfunctioning, you look out the window, think "ahh the weather is nice, therefore the machine will probably not kill me" and keep flying? How does that thought process go?
You more or less described standard operating procedure for operating a malfunctioning aircraft. That's why training starts with the eyes of the pilot and instrument-only flying comes later.
(And if you're going the speed of sound on a landing approach, something has already gone way off the rails).
> the report said its standby flight display and backup communication system “remained basically functional.”
Just to be clear, the pilot had the backup instruments available and functional, and the plane could be substantially controlled (i.e. could be pointed in the pilot's desired direction).
People are using feelings rather than facts to judge this pilot. So they do it differently then they would for example a police or SWAT team member shooting the wrong person under pressure. The same actions would have been judged very differently if chance hadn't kept that plane from crashing into a populated area.
The pilot left that to chance and chance made it that nobody was killed. At the very least you can recognize this was a failure of the pilot especially when the plane was realistically flyable, and backup instruments were available, in line with his training. In line with that overly broad definition of "uncontrolled flight" he ignored the backup instruments and punched out before attempting alternatives.
> a malfunctioning plane
The report called the aircraft flyable. The manual being overly broad on what's an "out-of-controlled flight" means he was not derelict in his duties but ejecting from a flyable aircraft (and leaving it to crash at the whims of randomness) was a mistake.
> If his plane went towards the ground with mach 1 at 1900 feet impact would occur in 1.5 seconds
But it wasn't, he wasn't in the middle of the crash, some instruments malfunctioned, the backups were working (they're there to be used in case the primary fails or else the designers would have bothered to put backups). The plane flew another 64 miles which took substantially more than 1.5s.
The "well technically" argument works less as the stakes go higher, and even less when dealing with a squadron commander. The plane flew, the instruments worked, and the pilots are trained for this. The report recognizes this.
So there is serious electrical malfunction and the pilot loses communication and also some of his displays multiple times.
In hindsight we know it wasn't that serious and the plane could have kept flying.
But how can the pilot figure that out, while flying the aircraft? One needs to evaluate decisions based on the information available at the time the decision was made.