Is this per circuit? So if someone switches circuits every X hours, the chance of being caught after a year is actually quite high?
And even catching 0.14% of pedophiles would probably be worth it to the FBI or whatever, nevermind Iran catching dissidents or whatever.
My point is that is seems very cheap to do this (I as a random staff engineer could do it myself) and catch some people. A nation state could easily catch a much higher percentage if they increased the number of logging nodes slowly and carefully and deliberately did things like use many isps and update the servers gradually etc.
The happy equilibrium is that if you have enough adversary nation-state intelligence services doing this and not sharing information, they'll cancel each other out and provide free node hosting.
You're misusing probability and ignoring critical information.
There's 1000 red marbles added to a jar with 8000 blue marbles (9000 total).
Take three marbles from the jar randomly, one at a time.
The odds of getting three red marbles is ~0.14%. That's all.
Tor nodes are not randomly picked marbles.
The Tor network is not a jar.
Is this per circuit? So if someone switches circuits every X hours, the chance of being caught after a year is actually quite high?
And even catching 0.14% of pedophiles would probably be worth it to the FBI or whatever, nevermind Iran catching dissidents or whatever.
My point is that is seems very cheap to do this (I as a random staff engineer could do it myself) and catch some people. A nation state could easily catch a much higher percentage if they increased the number of logging nodes slowly and carefully and deliberately did things like use many isps and update the servers gradually etc.