I was advocating for a paper fall back. That means that WHILE the computers are running, you must create a paper record, eg “medication x administered at time y”, etc., hence the receipt printers, which are cheap and low-dependency.
The grandparent indicated that the problem was that when all tow computers went down, they couldn’t look up what had already been done for the patient. I suggested a simple solution for that - receipt printers.
After the computers fail you tape the receipt to the wall and fall pack to pen and paper until the computers come back up.
I completely understand the scale of the outage today. I am saying that it was a stupid decision and possibly criminally negligent to make a life critical process dependent on the availability of a distributed IT application not specifically designed for life critical availability. I strongly stand by that POV.
> I suggested a simple solution for that - receipt printers.
Just so I understand what you are saying you are proposing that we drown our hospital rooms in paper receipt constantly. In the off chance the computers go down very rarely?
Do you see any possible drawbacks with your proposed solution?
> possibly criminally negligent to make a life critical process dependent on the availability of a distributed IT application
What process is not “life critical” in a hospital? Do you suggest that we don’t use IT at all?
Modern medicine requires computers. You literally cannot provide medical care in a critical care setting with the sophistication and speed required for modern critical care without electronic medical records. Fall back to paper? Ok, but you fall back to 1960s medicine, too.
Why would you ever need to move a patient from one hospital room containing one set of airgapped computers into another, containing another set of airgapped computers?
Why would you ever need to get information about a patient (a chart, a prescription, a scan, a bill, an X-Ray) to a person who is not physically present in the same room (or in the same building) as the patient?
Local area networks air gapped from the internet don't need to be air gapped from each other. You could have nodes in each network responsible for transmitting specific data to the other networks.. like, all the healthcare data you need. All other traffic, including windows updates? Blocked. Using IP still a risk? Use something else. As long as you can get bytes across a wire, you can still share data over long distances.
In my eyes, there is a technical solution therr that keeps friction low for hospital staff: network stuff, on an internet, but not The Internet...
Edit: I've since been reading the other many many comment threads on this HN post which show the reasons why so much stuff in healthcare is connected to each other via good old internet, and I can see there's way more nuance and technicality I am not privy to which makes "just connect LANs together!" less useful. I wasn't appreciating just how much of medicine is telemedicine.
I think wiring computers within the hospital over LAN, and adding a human to the loop for inter-hospital communication seems like a reasonable compromise.
Yes there will be some pain, but the alternative is what we have right now.
> nobody wants to do it.
Tough luck. There's lots of things I don't want to do.
A hospital my wife worked at over a decade ago didn't use EMR's, it was all on paper. Each patient had a binder. Per stay. And for many of them it rolled into another binder. (This was neuro-ICU so generally lengthy patient stays with lots of activity, but not super-unusual or Dr House stuff, every major city in America will have 2-3 different hospitals with that level of care.)
But they switched over to EMR because the advantages of Pyxis[1] in getting the right medications to the right patients at the right time- and documenting all of that- are so large that for patient safety reasons alone it wins out over paper. You can fall back to paper, it's just a giant pain in the ass to do it, and then you have to do the data entry to get it all back into EMR's. Like my wife, who was working last night when everyone else in her department got Crowdstrike'd, she created a document to track what she did so it could be transferred into EMR's once everything comes back up. And the document was over 70 pages long! Just for one employee for one shift.
1: Workflow: Doctor writes prescription in EMR. Pharmacist reviews charts in EMR, approves prescription. Nurse comes to Pyxis cabinet and scans patient barcode. Correct drawer opens in cabinet so the proper medication- and only the proper medication- is immediately available to nurse (technicians restock cabinet when necessary). Nurse takes medication to patient's room, scans patient barcode and medication barcode, administers drug. This system has dramatically lowered the rates of wrong-drug administration, because the computers are watching over things and catch humans getting confused on whether this medication is supposed to go to room 12 or room 21 in hour 11 of their shift. It is a great thing that has made hospitals safer. But it requires a huge amount of computers and networks to support.
Why would a Pyxis cabinet run Windows? I realize Windows isn't even necessarily at fault here, but why on earth would such a device run Windows? Is the 90s form of mass incompetence in the industry still a thing where lots of stuff is written for Windows for no reason?
I don't know what Pyxis runs on, my wife is the pharmacist and she doesn't recognize UI package differences with the same practiced eye that I do. And she didn't mention problems with the Pyxis. Just problems with some of their servers and lots of end user machines. So I don't know that they do.
The grandparent indicated that the problem was that when all tow computers went down, they couldn’t look up what had already been done for the patient. I suggested a simple solution for that - receipt printers.
After the computers fail you tape the receipt to the wall and fall pack to pen and paper until the computers come back up.
I completely understand the scale of the outage today. I am saying that it was a stupid decision and possibly criminally negligent to make a life critical process dependent on the availability of a distributed IT application not specifically designed for life critical availability. I strongly stand by that POV.