There is no way to explain how awesome Pinkie Pie's exploit is without simultaneously explaining how intricate Chrome's security model is.
A great way to market a browser is to have a security model so interesting/effective/intricate that any description of a working exploit will also serve as marketing.
I disagree. Marketing does not have to be in everydamnblogpost.
It's just annoying ;-)
While they attempt (and apparently succeed) to make you believe that exploiting Chrome is exceptional and it's such a super high security program:
The bottom line is, 2 guys showed up with a complete remote exploit of Chrome. And there are more exploits that are obviously unreleased, and some that will get released each year.
That is the true bottom line.
So again, while the article is nice and clear, the exploit is a good pony job as well - the marketing behind it makes the read annoying. It's a trend and it's not just Google. You even justify is as if marketing was a required thing to have and if you don't try to do it, you're just missing out. Well, I digress.
The only place I see some rhetoric is the second sentence of the first paragraph, the second paragraph, and the first sentence of the second to last. It's tame: it emphasises the exploit being very involved, which is well supported by the rest of the report. Everything else is necessary detail that describes the progression of the exploit from Pinkie Pie's point of view.
Your contributions, on the other hand, are much more content-free, being mostly value judgements against Chrome's PR or the supposed overconfidence of their programmers. And while you do brush on more technical matters, you do so by name-dropping products rather than being informative and describing the relevant security property.
But I'm curious about this equation, interesting == effective == intricate. Intricate == complex, right? So, the exploit certainly reveals that Chrome's security model is complex. And this is supposed to be a good thing? Seems like a good thing, if you're Pinkie Pie...
I too am bullish on sandboxing, but I suspect, like all security boundaries that have come before it, that it will be secure in inverse proportion to the amount of functionality that is allowed to pass through it. App developers will poke more and more holes through the sandbox to enable new ways to cater to users. E.g. the WebGL^H^H^H^H^HGPU command buffers channel leveraged by PinkiePie.
Well yeah WebGL is a freaking good target. And NaCl is too.
In fact, when I look at Chrome I look at NaCl and WebGL first. Because they're typical targets.
Chrome did make a good attempt at securing their browser and it works well. Unfortunately it seems that devs write slightly more sloppy code (i mean some of the exploits used are kind of basic, as if they just didn't care all that much because there's a sandbox).
That's my take tho, and it's very arguable.
I like memory-safe based OSes with secure message passing for such reasons. Singularity by Microsoft is a pretty neat implementation for such a concept. While it's not bullet proof it's simple yet (way) more powerful than the hacks we've to go through to sandbox apps on various OSes today.
A great way to market a browser is to have a security model so interesting/effective/intricate that any description of a working exploit will also serve as marketing.