Mostly irrelevant to their ability to defeat Ukraine in a conventional war, though it may constrain outside aid to Ukraine somewhat.
> and their ability to manufacture traditional weapons is far less than the United States.
This is not something that works in their favor.
> Ukraine, is just depending on a hope and a prayer from other countries to support them, which is faltering and realistically they have lost a ton of young people and many of the kids don't want to fight, they want to escape.
Russia has also lost a ton of young people (far more than the USSR lost over a decade in Afghanistan, a major contributor to the political collapse of the USSR), and seen lots of people trying to escape. Or firebombing recruitment centers, etc. They've also lost a lot of not young people — quite a lot of their senior/experienced combat pilots, and an unusually large proportion of field grade and general officers.
Economists have a way to measure that: Add the manufacturing sectors of the economy and convert currencies using PPP. At a pinch, GNP minus raw materials will do.
So what? if the US is spending 8x as much it's a losing proposition for the US eventually is it not? The US is already suffering with a massive and growing national debt
War is a loss for everyone, when it happens. That doesn't mean that future potential war is a loss for everyone.
One of the common stories of wars up through the ages is this: Country A has merchant shipping and a navy. Country B raids the merchant ships. Country A declares war on B. The war is a loss for everyone, including A.
After the war, merchant shipping resumes. Is it going to be raided again? Those who might raid it know that A will declare war even if it's clear that war leads to pain and suffering for A itself.
Avoiding war is great if you can either protect your interests with a credible threat or in other ways. Remaining credible is a challenge if you've backed down a few times.
> if the US is spending 8x as much it's a losing proposition for the US eventually is it not?
If you assume that the only effect of the war is spending and that the spending has no productive value (the second might be approximately true the first is... not, even approximately), then... sure, that seems true by definition.
If you drop the first assumption, then the other effects of the war (and more specifically, the delta between with the spending and without) is important to determining if the spending is a net win or a net loss.
Mostly irrelevant to their ability to defeat Ukraine in a conventional war, though it may constrain outside aid to Ukraine somewhat.
> and their ability to manufacture traditional weapons is far less than the United States.
This is not something that works in their favor.
> Ukraine, is just depending on a hope and a prayer from other countries to support them, which is faltering and realistically they have lost a ton of young people and many of the kids don't want to fight, they want to escape.
Russia has also lost a ton of young people (far more than the USSR lost over a decade in Afghanistan, a major contributor to the political collapse of the USSR), and seen lots of people trying to escape. Or firebombing recruitment centers, etc. They've also lost a lot of not young people — quite a lot of their senior/experienced combat pilots, and an unusually large proportion of field grade and general officers.