I don't have much issue with Gisin's solution, the idea that the reals are random is one solution to the problem of how to deal with them that I like (since, my meta-issue is whether reality is computable, I say it isnt, and randomness is not computable).
There's a problem for people who think reality can be modelled by computable functions of finite inputs: this makes classical physics non-deterministic, because chaos requires infinite precision for determinism.
So either you go for "reality is deterministic and continuous, and not computable" or "reality is non-deterministic, and discrete, and not computable"
either option in this fork includes properties that offend the minds of the people who want everything to be discrete.
I lean towards a preference for determinism & continuity (via, in QM, superdeterminism) since that's trivial to justify on our best physics
Well, I don't think Gisin's mind is offended by non-determinism:
> I argue that there is another theory, similar but different from classical mechanics, with precisely the same set of predictions, though this alternative theory is indeterministic
and in the footnote he describes indeterminism to mean:
> given the present and the laws of nature, there is more than one possible future
Out of curiosity, why do you lean towards superdeterminism and not other deterministic interpretations of QM such as Many-Worlds or Bohmian mechanics?
There's a problem for people who think reality can be modelled by computable functions of finite inputs: this makes classical physics non-deterministic, because chaos requires infinite precision for determinism.
So either you go for "reality is deterministic and continuous, and not computable" or "reality is non-deterministic, and discrete, and not computable"
either option in this fork includes properties that offend the minds of the people who want everything to be discrete.
I lean towards a preference for determinism & continuity (via, in QM, superdeterminism) since that's trivial to justify on our best physics