The Mercedes example is just strictly in response to the idea that property X of a system must somehow (already) be present in one of its sub-components. It doesn't.
So a concept like free will could exhibit itself in the output of -say- a turing machine, (or turing-like entity, like a DNA strand - think tape and multiple read heads), even if none of the components has that property.
I do actually think that certain [deterministically] chaotic systems have a lot of the properties we associate with free will (the ability to make some sort of sensible choices that still seem 'random'); so I tend to see them as very similar concepts. You might have a different definition though!
So a concept like free will could exhibit itself in the output of -say- a turing machine, (or turing-like entity, like a DNA strand - think tape and multiple read heads), even if none of the components has that property.
I do actually think that certain [deterministically] chaotic systems have a lot of the properties we associate with free will (the ability to make some sort of sensible choices that still seem 'random'); so I tend to see them as very similar concepts. You might have a different definition though!