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>However all relevant CPUs on the market now has the same vulnerabilities so it became a feature so software has to be designed to mitigate it.

I don't understand what you mean when you say the vulnerabilies to speculative exucution side channel attacks is a CPU "feature." Could you expound on your meaning there?

In my mind, a CPU feature would be something like out-of-order execution or integrated memory controllers. Isn't this more of a side effect (or an "oh shit..."). For example, I'd consider speculative execution to be a feature of CPUs with a side effect causing these vulnerabilities to side channel attacks, much like weight loss is a feature of the medicine Xenical (orlistat) with a side effect causing anal leakage.

Also, mitigations for newly discovered spectre-like attacks have to be done software side, but successive processor generations will bake those mitigations into the silicon to reduce the performance penalties associated with software fixes.



> mitigations for newly discovered spectre-like attacks have to be done software side, but successive processor generations will bake those mitigations into the silicon to reduce the performance penalties associated with software fixes.

This is not correct. Spectre-like bug in the same privilege domain (as to the CPU) is just unfixable. Meltdown, L1TF etc were fixed in hardware because they leak data across hardware enforced privilege domains (i.e. userspace/kernel/enclave), in this sense it is a hardware bug.

In case of browser, the CPU feature is "CPU is eager to leak arbitrary data in the same address space even if on the face the code does not seem to do it". This can't be fixed in the hardware because it's not a hardware bug: there's no hardware implemented security boundary, it's purely software defined.




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