Can you provide an example of this actually happening in a competitive market?
> Only one party is incentivised to say trot out this “regulation is bad” BS and its businesses that want to operate in an ancap utopia because they weren’t lucky enough to make regulatory capture work for them.
Businesses that want to challenge an incumbent who succeeded in making regulatory capture work for them would be an obvious counterexample, and for the same reason the customers who want to see the challenger succeed in making the market more competitive.
> Can you provide an example of this actually happening in a competitive market?
No doubt you'll no-true-scotsman "competitive market", but buying a house in the UK got significantly smoother/cheaper when sellers were required to provide a certified survey to all interested parties, rather than each buyer having to commission their own survey. Lemon laws are widely recognised as making it cheaper to buy a reliable car. Food safety regulations made food a lot cheaper by rendering imported food trustworthy.
What you're getting at here is regulations that... increase the competitiveness of a market. Which does imply something about the preexisting competitiveness of that market, and was the reason for that caveat.
Competitive markets are what keep prices down, and you need a regulatory environment that facilitates them. The trouble is you can't even say things like "food safety regulations increase competition by rendering unknown sources trustworthy" because it depends on both details and context. You could easily have food safety regulations that impose high overhead and drive small providers out of business, or different market dynamics that provide an alternate way for customers to evaluate trustworthiness.
And each attempt is an opportunity to make a mistake and do the opposite of what you intended -- or the exact thing the incumbents wanted and lobbied for. It has to be done with care, and rarely in only cases of great need, because it's so easy to screw up. And then competition can't fix it, because regulations are enforced by a monopoly. Which is where we are now, in all too many cases.
Well, I'm as pro-market as the next person, but surely fire brigades are the classic anti-example: the market was competitive with many fire brigades, prices were inelastic sure, and there was a lot of time-elasticity of demand, but the customer had the short-term ability to shop, etc. Government regulated fire brigades reduced competition and decreased cost.
I default to "regulation increases cost" as well, and think that the default position should be to justify it, but I don't think the opposite is a zero-instance situation.
The time-elasticity of demand is the reason there was no price competition. You use whichever fire brigade arrives on the scene first. So you get lots of competition for getting there fast but not for lowering the price. It's like a competition for who gets to be the monopoly today.
And then because it was a chance to monopolize something it got infested with organized crime. Which is the main reason it was short-lived and never got to evolve into a functioning market. Governments found it easier to prohibit whatever was going on there than hire enough police to arrest all the firefighters.
There are fairly obvious ways to recreate something that looks pretty much like the modern system without government regulation. A city has however many fire houses that major fire insurers prepay a rate negotiated based on how many homes they insure in that service area. Since prepaying is cheaper than paying per-incident that's what substantially all the insurers do, which mutes the incentive for firefighters to hack each other to pieces to get there first.
That still isn't a lot of competition, but at least now you're negotiating for a price before the house is on fire. Which could be enough to cost less than what the government currently does.
You are blinded by your love of the market. "The market" (the unregulated one) is a very unstable and unsatisfying beast. It is precisely because of regulations that western countries and some Asian ones are so succesfull.
Many regulations are needed to keep the "free" market from destroying all the good that it can do. One famous example is monopolists that are created in a free market and then use their power to make the market unfree. Only government regulations destroy these monopolies with anti-trust laws.
Then there is pricing in so called free markets that are not in fact free. Such as pricing of infrastructure and services.
To name one perfect example of where government regulations lower the prices of services is in the healthcare industry. In most western countries (not the us tho) healthcare is relatively cheap and also accessible. This is because it is regulated. In the US it is barely regulated and very expensive. Without regulation the market will also destroy the environment. This is a "hidden cost" or an externality.
I'm not patiënt enough to write a more coherent and better written response. But if you are at all interested in learning something or allowing yourself to be disproved, I would suggest you start by googling: "succesful regulation" or "examples of market failure".
> One famous example is monopolists that are created in a free market and then use their power to make the market unfree. Only government regulations destroy these monopolies with anti-trust laws.
The thing about "free market" is that it's like "reasonable person" in that it's an ideal rather than something you can actually find in the street. You want to get closer to it even if you can never actually find a flawless example.
A monopoly is basically the opposite of a free market. But where does a monopoly come from? For the most part they're a result of government regulations. The monopoly sucks and everyone hates it so you want to go into competition with them, what stops you? For the monopoly to persist there has to be some law that prohibits anyone from doing that or makes it infeasibly expensive.
The problem here is that unless you're going to go ideologically pure full anarchist, you can get to that point if the government does as little as enforcing contracts or property rights. Because then you could have contracts for selling your children into slavery or a single corporation that the government says owns all property.
So once the government gets involved with something, it has to be sure nobody is leveraging that into a private monopoly. But this is why government involvement should be minimized -- that risk increases the more they do, and there is abundant evidence that governments repeatedly fail to mitigate it effectively and prevent private monopolies from forming.
> Then there is pricing in so called free markets that are not in fact free. Such as pricing of infrastructure and services.
You're referring to natural monopolies, which is once again obviously not an example of a competitive market. The key in these cases is to narrow the natural monopoly as much as possible and prevent anything more from being tied to it than is absolutely necessary. For example, one of the classic mistakes we've made is allowing the natural monopoly on the physical last mile for data service to be leveraged into control over interconnection and over the top services like video and telephone.
> To name one perfect example of where government regulations lower the prices of services is in the healthcare industry. In most western countries (not the us tho) healthcare is relatively cheap and also accessible. This is because it is regulated. In the US it is barely regulated and very expensive.
The US healthcare industry is one of the most highly regulated industries in the world. Competition is low because FDA approval is hard to get and the AMA uses regulatory capture to limit the supply of doctors, government incentives promote employer-provided health insurance that disguises pricing from patients, "certificate of need" laws constrain competition between healthcare providers etc. etc.
The typical claim is that single payer systems have lower costs, but nearly everything has lower costs -- the US has some of the most expensive healthcare in the world -- because it has some of the most onerous healthcare regulations. Meanwhile countries like Singapore have lower costs and good outcomes with a predominantly private healthcare system, because it is less inefficiently regulated.
> Without regulation the market will also destroy the environment.
This is clearly not an example of regulation lowering consumer prices. The claim was never that regulation can never be necessary. You don't want the widget factory dumping industrial waste in the river, but prohibiting that isn't generally a means to lower widget prices.
It can even do both things at the same time. You can have a regulation that succeeds in reducing pollution while also being dramatically less efficient than some other means of achieving the same goal. This is why government regulation is so precarious: If you get it wrong nobody else can fix it because anybody who tries to do it another way is incarcerated.
I’m not sure if it’s relevant to the issue here, but if you want an example of a regulation that reduces cost: “you cannot sell medicine X for more than $Y”. You could argue that in a pure market such a rule would never help (a competitor would naturally offer it cheaper, if possible). But if you look closely there few “pure” markets.
I am speaking from experience here. I'm an anesthesiologist, and with three exceptions I can think of, our drugs are all off-patent, so their prices are basically a function of production costs. But the federal government of the US, which buys a lot of drugs under the VA and Medicare, has a rule that you can't increase the price by more than X% per quarter (or year, not sure). Now, we all agree that this sounds like a good regulation. Right? Nobody can just raise the price of insulin by 40000%?
Except that generic drugs really don't make much money, and when one company leaves the market for a given drug (there are usually only 2-3 manufacturers per drug), the remaining corp(s) can only make up the shortfall by moving to 24-hour operations (in the short term). Staffing that means hiring more people and paying overtime. So the cost of production... doubles, at least.
The part that is missing: it's a drug that sells for twenty cents for a sterile ampule. Doubling it to forty cents is not going to break the bank. It's cheap, it will continue to be cheap, and yes - in the long run, someone will set up a line to make it for ten cents and sell it at twenty. But in the short run? You run out of drugs. I've seen it in almost every category of anesthesia drugs (induction, opioids, paralytics, paralytic reversal, etc.) in the last ~20 years. You'd think that "not being aware during surgery" would be one of those things that people would care about, but it isn't.
Or lower margins. After you spent millions/billions on R&D, testing and approval, why would you purposefully decrease your product just because your margin now is not 2500% but 1000%?
Of course this might affect your willingness to invest into developing new drugs in the future
It leads to shortages in a competitive market and lower margins in an uncompetitive market.
But if you have an uncompetitive market on purpose as a result of patents meant to increase margins to fund R&D, a law capping prices is a screw up because it was meant to be the way it was.
Whereas if you have an uncompetitive market unintentionally as a result of some other regulatory failure, a law capping prices is a screw up because you're not actually lowering margins from 2500% to 1000%, you're just raising them from the ~5% they ought to be to 1000% instead of 2500%, which is still bad.
Which is better given an uncompetitive market, an regulation that says "you cannot sell medicine X for more than $Y," or a regulatory change that restores competition to the market?
The latter is better to such a degree that the former is just a toy example with no practical use outside of academic discussions and corrupt politicians who want to avoid solving the underlying problem on purpose.
Living in utopian abundance would be even better but sometimes not every option is feasible, especially in the short term. The objectively inferior option might still be better than doing nothing.
Inefficient hacks are often worse than nothing because they remove the momentum behind fixing the underlying problem. You reduce the margin from 2500% to 1000% and think you're helping, but what you're really doing is condemning yourself to paying a 1000% margin forever because it's now below the threshold that people get outraged enough to do something about it.
>>Can you provide an example of this actually happening in a competitive market?
Tobacco companies probably made a bunch more money as aspects of their advertising became restricted/regulated/banned - because they were basically in an arms race with one another and spending more and more to maintain market share. But that is a pretty specific case, I'm not going to make any claim that's general or applies to airlines.
Either there isn't a lot of competition between carriers there and they were just sticking the roaming fees in their pockets before, or there is a lot of competition and the carriers had to make up for the increased usage and loss of roaming fees by raising the prices of phone plans.
This isn't the same thing as whether you like the result of the rule. Maybe paying a little bit more in total in exchange for having a more predictable monthly bill is something people like. It would still be paying a little bit more, if the market there is competitive.
It's not assuming the market is competitive. Wireless markets are often not competitive, because entry is limited by scarce spectrum availability etc. which incumbents lock up to limit competition. The point is that if you had a competitive market, margins would be thin and the only place for lower prices to come from without a reduction in operating costs is higher prices somewhere else.
It's easy for regulations to lower costs in an uncompetitive market because the lack of competitive pressure allows the incumbents to do all kinds of inefficient nonsense that would drive them out of business if it was actually practical for new competitors who don't do that to enter the market and undercut them on price. But what you want to do in those cases to the fullest extent possible is to restore competition to the market, not try to regulate the incumbents while keeping them as a monopoly/oligopoly. A set of regulations that gets you 8% of the benefit of actual competition can be a significant improvement from the status quo while still being by far the less effective solution.
Roaming used to be very expensive and so people almost never used it. Instead they would buy cheap local prepaid SIM cards when they traveled across intra-EU borders.
The carriers would charge high prices to each other for roaming, and pass those on to their customers. The market had worked itself into a stupid corner where nobody wanted to come down on wholesale roaming costs because they would lose out to cross-border carriers.
The EU capped the wholesale rates and mandated that there be no retail cost, so now carriers are charging less to each other and consumers are roaming on their own numbers without worry, and without the hassle, expense, and waste of buying SIM cards all the time.
It's been moderately beneficial for carriers, and a huge benefit for the public. The imposition of regulation has enabled the companies to be more profitable and consumers to get more value.
> Roaming used to be very expensive and so people almost never used it. Instead they would buy cheap local prepaid SIM cards when they traveled across intra-EU borders.
So it was already available at a low price via a different route.
> The carriers would charge high prices to each other for roaming, and pass those on to their customers. The market had worked itself into a stupid corner where nobody wanted to come down on wholesale roaming costs because they would lose out to cross-border carriers.
You're describing an uncompetitive market. The local carriers have such high market share that charging otherwise-profitable wholesale rates would deprive them of a monopoly rent so they're not willing to do it.
Compare this with a market where there are carriers with low market share who don't care about cannibalizing someone else's retail sales to get more wholesale customers.
> It's been moderately beneficial for carriers, and a huge benefit for the public. The imposition of regulation has enabled the companies to be more profitable and consumers to get more value.
The drawback of this approach isn't that it can't produce an improvement relative to a preexisting uncompetitive market, it's that it leaves the uncompetitive market in place. Which is almost certainly itself a result of existing regulations.
Suppose the way mobile networks operated is that anyone can build an independent cell tower and then auction off capacity in real time. Which makes it easy to operate a cell tower; you just build one and sell into the market. So you end up with dozens of local cell tower operators or more and any carrier, local or otherwise, with a customer in the area can bid for capacity from any of them. Which also means that anyone can start a carrier, because "carrier" just means you resell wholesale capacity from all these independent cell towers and your business is to bill the customer and provide customer service.
Doing it that way is going to solve your roaming problem and seven hundred other problems and lower prices. But existing regulations don't facilitate this, do they?
So unless you have 3-5+ of towers in every area what prevents the company which owns them from charging whatever it wants? As pong as that whatever is less than the cost of building a tower yourself?
It makes about as much sense as having multiple competing rail networks or power lines, the more tower there are the higher overall cost per user.
> So unless you have 3-5+ of towers in every area what prevents the company which owns them from charging whatever it wants? As pong as that whatever is less than the cost of building a tower yourself?
That's the amount you'd expect them to charge -- the cost of building a tower. That is what they have to recover.
If they try to charge much more than that then it's profitable for someone else to build one.
> It makes about as much sense as having multiple competing rail networks or power lines, the more tower there are the higher overall cost per user.
If you have more towers you can reduce the transmission power of each one and it increases the available bandwidth by reducing signal overlap. If the towers themselves used realtime spectrum auctions then the tower nearest the user could come in with the lowest price because it could use lower transmission power and less spectrum.
You can also very reasonably have competing rail networks or power transmission lines because they don't have to use 100% all the same routes to ultimately still connect all of the same cities. Then some may be more efficient for certain routes but the alternative still puts an upper limit on what they can charge, and provides for redundancy in case one of the lines or networks is unavailable.
Can you provide an example of this actually happening in a competitive market?
> Only one party is incentivised to say trot out this “regulation is bad” BS and its businesses that want to operate in an ancap utopia because they weren’t lucky enough to make regulatory capture work for them.
Businesses that want to challenge an incumbent who succeeded in making regulatory capture work for them would be an obvious counterexample, and for the same reason the customers who want to see the challenger succeed in making the market more competitive.