All of them are proven computational? Mind laying out your evidence for that statement? Because it sounds like what you have is a presupposition, not evidence.
I note that, in your reply to GMoromisato, you asked for evidence. I ask you to meet the standard you expect of others.
I wouldn’t say they are proven computational, but I would say they can be explained in terms of processes on information. Sense data, body awareness, perceptions, noticing things, evaluating situations and options all seem to me to relate to information and processes on it. We use these experiences to form memories and make decisions. Both these are processes on information. Those are all things that consciousness actually does. Is there any function of consciousness we’re aware of that doesn’t relate to information?
That leaves the experience itself. It’s an experience of informational content, but is there more going on than transformations of information? What could that be? Maybe a physical substance, or a physical structure, in which case we should be able to physically synthesis consciousness stuff, or assemble a consciousness structure. What else is there?
Re. your second paragraph: Like others in this thread, you're assuming the answer. Or rather, you're assuming the presupposition. And that's fine, if you want to do that. But be aware that you're doing it, and that it's unproven. (And maybe be aware how much you're doing it.)
> Is there any function of consciousness we’re aware of that doesn’t relate to information?
Maybe awareness of your own emotional state? (Though I'm sure that there are views where that also is information processing, and nothing more.)
All of them.
> If you rigorously and consistently don't assume materialism, what can be proven?
Nothing. Without that premise (or a compatible one), all you have is handwaving.