Never surprised when someone opposed to the Civil Rights Act misunderstands the basic premise and importance of Wickard v Filburn, which was not about "growing your own feed for private use."

In a nutshell, WvF was about a guy growing enough feed to sell and an additional surplus for his own use, in violation of Depression production controls introduced to restore the wheat industry from the complete collapse it suffered during the Depression. Filburn could have grown wheat for his own use, or for sale, since the threshold was set high enough for either purpose (but was deliberately set too low to allow for both for all but subsistence farmers). But Filburn wanted to have his cake and eat it too, and got caught doing both, which he could only do because he had violated the production controls. Very importantly, Filburn sold his wheat across state lines...

If Filburn's actions had been replicated at a national level, wheat prices would have plummeted, the U.S. wheat industry would have collapsed, again, and Filburn would likely have been murdered by his fellow farmers for destroying their industry.

IF you accept the aggregate effect on interstate commerce reasoning, then you agree with me that feds are not constrained from addressing mabbo's hypothetical of discriminating against people with regards to political affiliation. Such discrimination if replicated at the national level would have substantial influence on interstate trade. Even zooming in on much smaller effect (like limiting those employed by entities engage in litigation you disagree with) arguably create aggregate interstate influence as even smaller things like federally banning even intrastate trade of cathinone (a coffee/alcohol like drug predominantly used by a few relatively few ethnic minorities) seems to be accepted limitation of interstate trade in purview of federal power.

And that's my point. I'm of the personal opinion that the discriminatory issues addressed in the civil rights act should have been clearly codified/amended in the constitution to unquestionably seal the federal power to address them. Rayiner (who I replied to) cast doubt on federal power to stop certain kinds of discrimination that would even have strong aggregate interstate effect (like political affiliation), and my point is if Rayiner is correct then perhaps much of the civil rights act was in the purview of the state police powers unless the federal powers are expanded.

And I'd like to point out my critique here is examining the kinetics in how these things are enforced and play out. At least one person here (not referring to parent gamblor) has accused me of being indicative of being a "racist" or somehow someone down with racism, and I hope we can move forward thinking about the kinetics of dealing with discrimination of various kinds without presuming the counterparty must be a racist who doesn't like civil rights. Lets keep in mind the interstate trade kinetics used to enforce the civil rights act have also been used to enforce racism.

You're literally just describing several decades of established interstate commerce case law.

In an interconnected, modern society, wholly intrastate commerce is a very, very, rare thing. It's almost impossible for retail to be wholly intrastate except for de minimis sales by itinerant merchants, as most supplies used in manufacture will have crossed state boundaries (but the courts do recognize when such commerce occurs and is excluded from the purview of federal regulation).

Service is more easily constrained to the intrastate level, since local regulation of services has always been a local power. But yes, in the aggregate discrimination can have interstate effects. Indeed, there is a fair amount of federal civil rights legislation or case law that is predicated on, and requires, aggregate discrimination in order to apply at the local level because isolated incidents don't give rise to federal jurisdiction.

I'm of the personal opinion that the discriminatory issues addressed in the civil rights act should have been clearly codified/amended in the constitution to unquestionably seal the federal power to address them.

Literally, the last phrase of the 14th Amendment.

But note that job title isn't a protected class under federal law, which is rayiner's point. And they aren't generally needed, since there are a number of state/local laws which make MSG's actions illegal. MSG doesn't simply risk fines, they risk the loss of their liquor license, their tax exemption, bookings from artists that don't want to be associated with the wanton use of facial recognition, and numerous tort lawsuits for excluding people with valid tickets.

Your statements seems to back my opinion then. That congress (in the context of today's viewpoint of interstate commerce) can clearly address commerce that discriminates based on political affiliation that have substantial potential aggregate effect on interstate commerce.

How are you citing these cases and holding this, completely ridiculous position on the civil rights act, while simultaneously not understanding that attorneys aren't a protected class under the act?

I'm aware they aren't a protected class.

My position is clearly this isn't something just deferred to the state police powers. The fed can conjure up, via the interstate commerce clause, the requirement that businesses not discriminate even for local intrastate trade.

If you think that logic applies to the few attys that go to MSG, I think you should read back on those cases. I'm curious if you went to law school or not.

The example above was political opinion/affiliation, but sure we can also consider the situation of the lawyers.

If congress can invent the authority out of thin air to govern intrastate commerce with regard to enforcing all of the now protected classes, I'm curious why you think they absolutely cannot also deal with discrimination on the basis of political affiliation or whether one is affiliated with an entity litigating something you disagree with.