If anyone is interested in the plaintiff's argument, it is here [1]
Argument #1:
> The lower courts have mistakenly interpreted “publisher” to have its everyday meaning, referring to an entity or person in the business of publishing, and have at times compounded that error by insisting that section 230(c)(1) applies to virtually any activity in which such a publisher might engage, including making recommendations. But “publisher” in section 230(c)(1) is used in the narrow sense drawn from defamation law. If section 230(c)(1) is properly so understood, the imposition of liability based on a recommendation would not in every instance treat the defendant as a publisher within the meaning of that provision.
Argument #2
> the content at issue must have been provided by “another information content provider,” not by the defendant itself. Recommendations may contain information from the defendant, such as a hyperlink with the URL of material the defendant hopes the user will download, or notifications of new postings the defendant hopes the user will find interesting. The Ninth Circuit erred in holding that URLs and notifications are not information within the meaning of section 230(c)(1).
Argument #3
> the Ninth and Second Circuits erred in holding that section 230(c)(1) protects a defendant if it sends to a user content which the user did not actually request. A defendant is acting as the provider of an “interactive computer service,” and thus within the scope of section 230(c)(1), when it is providing “access...to a computer server.” A computer functions as a “server,” as that term is used in section 230, only when it is providing to a user a file (such as text, or a video), which the user has actually requested, or is performing other tasks (such as a search) at the request of the user.
Hey, Google may win this (I am pretty sure they will). But this claim that a loss would turn the internet upside down is histrionics. No, if Google loses, the internet will still be just fine:
> Thus, although some practices that might be characterized as recommendations could satisfy all three elements of the section 230(c)(1) defense, others would not.
> Search engines are in two important respects different from social media sites. First, search engines only provide users with materials in response to requests from the users themselves, and thus necessarily function as providers of interactive computer services. Second, although search engines provide users with hyperlinks embedded with URLs, those URLs are created by the website where the material at issue is located, not by the search engine itself.
Argument #1:
> The lower courts have mistakenly interpreted “publisher” to have its everyday meaning, referring to an entity or person in the business of publishing, and have at times compounded that error by insisting that section 230(c)(1) applies to virtually any activity in which such a publisher might engage, including making recommendations. But “publisher” in section 230(c)(1) is used in the narrow sense drawn from defamation law. If section 230(c)(1) is properly so understood, the imposition of liability based on a recommendation would not in every instance treat the defendant as a publisher within the meaning of that provision.
Argument #2
> the content at issue must have been provided by “another information content provider,” not by the defendant itself. Recommendations may contain information from the defendant, such as a hyperlink with the URL of material the defendant hopes the user will download, or notifications of new postings the defendant hopes the user will find interesting. The Ninth Circuit erred in holding that URLs and notifications are not information within the meaning of section 230(c)(1).
Argument #3
> the Ninth and Second Circuits erred in holding that section 230(c)(1) protects a defendant if it sends to a user content which the user did not actually request. A defendant is acting as the provider of an “interactive computer service,” and thus within the scope of section 230(c)(1), when it is providing “access...to a computer server.” A computer functions as a “server,” as that term is used in section 230, only when it is providing to a user a file (such as text, or a video), which the user has actually requested, or is performing other tasks (such as a search) at the request of the user.
Hey, Google may win this (I am pretty sure they will). But this claim that a loss would turn the internet upside down is histrionics. No, if Google loses, the internet will still be just fine:
> Thus, although some practices that might be characterized as recommendations could satisfy all three elements of the section 230(c)(1) defense, others would not.
> Search engines are in two important respects different from social media sites. First, search engines only provide users with materials in response to requests from the users themselves, and thus necessarily function as providers of interactive computer services. Second, although search engines provide users with hyperlinks embedded with URLs, those URLs are created by the website where the material at issue is located, not by the search engine itself.
[1] https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/21/21-1333/247780/202...