Derisking and geographically diversifying these assets (crucial unique capabilities, technologies, skills, processes, etc.) are IMO the most obvious wins here. If there's a PRC-TW invasion, at least some assets will exist outside Taiwan that can be leveraged to scale out beyond going from scratch, this really gives a head start.
I'm not entirely sure the goal in the US is to nationalize the resources to mask a 'steal' although I'm sure nationalization is a thought out contingency. I think TSMC ownership and people of Taiwan wouldn't need much incentive to scale up and would happily welcome an onpour of resources from the US and other governments should China invade or pressure them. The US isn't typically in the game of flat out stealing although it's undoubtedly a last resort desperation option that's embedded in this decision making.
Also, if I were Taiwan, this helps remove at least one strategic attraction from a PRC invasion scenario. It takes the option of basically controlling world chip supplies off the table as an incentive for PRC. There are undoubtedly plenty of other incentives, but it's one less thing in their cost/benefit analysis of an invasion that could help sway the decision away from an invasion.
Yes but I think important to recognize that contingency is the large basis of the "stealing" TSMC narrative. The other consideration TW semi workers who get to jump the H1B VISA line eyeing for immigration shortcut to US if that option ever opens up = expertise transfers to Intel/US semi. Both US and TW has restricted TW semi talent from working in PRC semi to prevent knowledge transfer, the same concern applies when TW talent is in US, who has much better capacity to brain drain and "steal" expertise.
> TSMC ownership and people of Taiwan wouldn't need much incentive to scale up
There's been ample signals that TSMC leadership are weary of Arizonal expansion, and the meme of of US stealing TSMC are from murmurs in TW by people unhappy with erosion of silicon shield. On the flip side you have TSMC leadership angry that US export controls is cutting off major revenue / future growth in PRC, while underpaid semi workers are angry over controls to work in PRC semi for massive compensation. Opinion on the island falls in camp of preserving silicon shield (i.e. no leading edge fabs abroad) to leverage US into assistance. Or preserve silicon shield to keep money printing strategic industry for barter with PRC if US doesn't assist. There isn't a camp that thinks scaling up TSMC infra outside of island is a good idea that I'm aware of. Also I want to wadger even without funding UKR war, US weapon sales / deliveries to TW has been susipiciously slow with many dates set after fab openning, almost like onpour of US resources is dependant building these fabs in first place.
>one less thing
I argue it's one more thing with Oct export controls, since PRC has even less access to leading edge semi from island, vs US who maintains unrestricted access. Now there is more incentive, arguably pressing short/medium term need, to distrupt TW semi because it would hurt US disproportionately more, and close relative semi gap.
I'm not entirely sure the goal in the US is to nationalize the resources to mask a 'steal' although I'm sure nationalization is a thought out contingency. I think TSMC ownership and people of Taiwan wouldn't need much incentive to scale up and would happily welcome an onpour of resources from the US and other governments should China invade or pressure them. The US isn't typically in the game of flat out stealing although it's undoubtedly a last resort desperation option that's embedded in this decision making.
Also, if I were Taiwan, this helps remove at least one strategic attraction from a PRC invasion scenario. It takes the option of basically controlling world chip supplies off the table as an incentive for PRC. There are undoubtedly plenty of other incentives, but it's one less thing in their cost/benefit analysis of an invasion that could help sway the decision away from an invasion.