Russia generally acts rationally. It's just that the assumptions and axioms on top of which rationality is applied is different from the West and ― apparently ― not uncommonly delusional. This made it very hard for the West to believe what Russia was saying for years about Ukraine, for example.
Further, the explanations seem to differ whether they're addressed to Russians or to other countries. Russia's own population tends to get what they want to hear (which we often consider bizarre), and what the West gets doesn't matter much what (because the West has already proven they don't understand Russia even on the big things so why not lie about military training near Ukrainian border as well just to avoid any extra yet futile discourse?)
With delusions in the case of Ukraine I refer to the idea that Ukraine never was a real country and it has belonged to Russia all the time. This falls in line with the worldview of the ex-KGB grandpas from the Soviet era but there's a notable difference they don't seem to accept. Back in the Soviet times USSR had the (fire)power to keep their member states in line and practically own the local governments. There was nowhere to go and it wasn't until the USSR was disbanded that the small Eastern European countries could run away. And run away they did. But Ukraine and Belarus are so close to Russia that it can be easy to think of them as extensions of Russia if you assume you can retain control over the countries, both politically and ultimately militarily. But Russia is much weaker than USSR. Russia have Belarus because, to my understanding, their president basically sold his country to Russia to personally remain in "power" but Ukraine has been looking to West much more than to Mother Russia. And they overruled their Russian leaning president and replaced him with one who's much more open to the West. Here's where I think the delusion comes to play.
Russia somehow thought it would be a simple matter to put Ukraine back in line to avoid them drifting too far into West. Like a father who had no trouble beating his son when he was a kid, the son is now a young adult and the father is much older and weaker, and it's necessary to realize the change. So far, Russia seems to be stuck with the idea that they can maintain control in Ukraine, even after a war. But Russia doesn't seem to be in any position to boss their neighbours around like USSR could.
Even if I ultimately believe that what Russia wanted was Crimea with their old naval city and a land route over there I think they figured why not just go for the whole Ukraine while they're at it, and for once reset the country with a government that makes things easier for Russia in the future. The old USSR could've done that but Russia can't, yet Russia acts as if they're still operating like in the times of USSR. To achieve a "reset" like that you need citizens who agree with you or who are so oppressed that they won't revolt. Russia has neither.
Putin's approval rating in Russia has only increased since the war in Ukraine started. Also, Russian weaponry has only improved since the fall of the USSR. I'm not sure why you're arguing that Russia cannot do what they are currently doing.
It is hard to measure approval in places like Russia, where people who say the wrong things publicly enough disappear from their homes. Most ordinary Russians hold two opinions: a public one and one for round the kitchen table. Which one are you referring to?
Russian weaponry didn't improve, in opposite. Don't look at the paper numbers, they have maybe 10% of the machinery fully operational, spread over very wide territory. The rest is there for spare parts at best.
You mean the russian tank (armata) that they found out they can't build en masse? Or those 40 or 50 years old tanks actually used in Ukraine, which were new during USSR but not so much anymore, and javelins make a quick work out of them. At least from those that don't break by themselves due to poor maintenance (which is due to theft and corruption and general russian approach).
I saw some pictures how the pockets of active armor were empty or stuffed with egg paper wrappings. Again. Same happened in Georgia. Some mighty army. Soldiers selling gas to belarus civilians just before the invasion. Then running out of it in the fields. This conflict showed how weak their army is in conventional conflict.
That being said they have some impressively horrifying thermobaric weapons like TOS-1 which they currently use on civilians. But it doesn't seem they have a lot of it and those alone don't win wars.
Further, the explanations seem to differ whether they're addressed to Russians or to other countries. Russia's own population tends to get what they want to hear (which we often consider bizarre), and what the West gets doesn't matter much what (because the West has already proven they don't understand Russia even on the big things so why not lie about military training near Ukrainian border as well just to avoid any extra yet futile discourse?)
With delusions in the case of Ukraine I refer to the idea that Ukraine never was a real country and it has belonged to Russia all the time. This falls in line with the worldview of the ex-KGB grandpas from the Soviet era but there's a notable difference they don't seem to accept. Back in the Soviet times USSR had the (fire)power to keep their member states in line and practically own the local governments. There was nowhere to go and it wasn't until the USSR was disbanded that the small Eastern European countries could run away. And run away they did. But Ukraine and Belarus are so close to Russia that it can be easy to think of them as extensions of Russia if you assume you can retain control over the countries, both politically and ultimately militarily. But Russia is much weaker than USSR. Russia have Belarus because, to my understanding, their president basically sold his country to Russia to personally remain in "power" but Ukraine has been looking to West much more than to Mother Russia. And they overruled their Russian leaning president and replaced him with one who's much more open to the West. Here's where I think the delusion comes to play.
Russia somehow thought it would be a simple matter to put Ukraine back in line to avoid them drifting too far into West. Like a father who had no trouble beating his son when he was a kid, the son is now a young adult and the father is much older and weaker, and it's necessary to realize the change. So far, Russia seems to be stuck with the idea that they can maintain control in Ukraine, even after a war. But Russia doesn't seem to be in any position to boss their neighbours around like USSR could.
Even if I ultimately believe that what Russia wanted was Crimea with their old naval city and a land route over there I think they figured why not just go for the whole Ukraine while they're at it, and for once reset the country with a government that makes things easier for Russia in the future. The old USSR could've done that but Russia can't, yet Russia acts as if they're still operating like in the times of USSR. To achieve a "reset" like that you need citizens who agree with you or who are so oppressed that they won't revolt. Russia has neither.