> Should fighting continue into March, mechanized forces would have to deal with the infamous Rasputitsa, or thaw.”
That's a key point. It does go to show that the Russians expected this to be a very short affair. I wonder if they have any real contingency plans for when that thaw sets in.
It would be almost ironic if, of all the armies in the world, the Russians would be caught unprepared by Rasputitsa. And quite embarrassing, to be honest.
There are reports of Russian forces running out of fuel and food. It sounds like with the thaw if Ukraine's forces focus on shutting down major roads then the current "siege warfare" approach by Russia may backfire badly. If their supply lines are easily cut off, they siege themselves.
This is what I don't get. Isn't Kyiv a few hour's drive from the border? How can you run out of fuel and food? I guess the only way is if you expected to simply drive directly to a victory march, but surely it's worth being prepared?
Russia’s truck logistic support, which would be crucial in an invasion of Eastern Europe, is limited by the number of trucks and range of operations. It is possible to calculate how far trucks can operate using simple beer math. Assuming the existing road network can support 45 mph speeds, a single truck can make three trips a day at up to a 45-mile range: One hours to load, one hour to drive to the supported unit, one hours to unload, and another hour to return to base. Repeating this cycle three times equals 12 hours total. The rest of the day is dedicated to truck maintenance, meals, refueling, weapons cleaning, and sleeping. Increase the distance to 90 miles, and the truck can make two trips daily. At 180 miles, the same truck is down to one trip a day. These assumptions won’t work in rough terrain or where there is limited/damaged infrastructure. If an army has just enough trucks to sustain itself at a 45-mile distance, then at 90 miles, the throughput will be 33 percent lower. At 180 miles, it will be down by 66 percent. The further you push from supply dumps, the fewer supplies you can replace in a single day.
The resupply line from Belarus to the outskirts of Kyiv is more than 100 miles and over "back roads" - definitely not highway roads.
Ok but then what was the plan for driving to Paris during the cold war? Surely there's enough support vehicles to do that, and so there should be enough to get to your own back yard?
1) The point of the article is that the Russian logistics is primarily rail-based. Once they are forced to use trucks, they will struggle. Also, the plan was a 2-3 day assault which would not have required a resupply. Now the initial supplies have run out and they are struggling to resupply. A "40 mile convoy" that has not moved substantially in a couple of days is a massive logistics failure.
2) "Driving to Paris" during the cold war was a different time and a different place. And they never attempted it, so you cannot assume it would have been a success.
Their routes into Ukraine in the north and east do not appear to have rail lines for logistics. Note that they have had more success in the south where they likely have a better logistics supply line (more roads, probably better roads, closer to "friendly" territory).
Military vehicles, especially the armored ones, consume a huge amount of fuel. Especially when getting delayed, some of those will be idling. And expecting a fast advance could mean limited supplies. Would be stupid, but this whole thing doesn't strike me as particularly smart.
Ukrainians have very cleverly focused on hitting the fuel trucks and there are plenty of Russian troops who wreck their own gear so they can stay out of battle.
A few hours drive in ideal conditions that don't involve going off the pavement and using pontoon bridges to get around blown up bridges, dodging craters, the potential for land mines, etc.
I've also seen rumblings that the Russian units weren't adequately supplied before setting out, they had been eating through their rations and burning fuel for heat as they sat along the border prior and weren't properly restocked before heading out.
The article describes supply line attacks as a crucial part to disrupt enemy convoys. I expect that this is what is happening behind the scenes. You need an enormous amount of fuel for this many tanks.
How do you invade somewhere and not have contingencies for being denied the use of major roads? That's in the top three essential (and obvious!) things the defending force will do. For a Russian force you'd also think dealing with a post-winter thaw would be part of their general military strategy, it's not like Ukraine has a vastly different climate than Russia after all.
The current reports are fuel shortages are at least partially self-sabotage (hole in the gas tank), Russia has mandatory conscription. It does look like low morale and dissent are not insignificant. And when people stop “tanks with their hands” it’s not because of technical logistics.
>I wonder if they have any real contingency plans for when that thaw sets in.
The plan is/was always to control the roads and the air by then.
Even when conditions are "good" moving an army overland is absurdly less efficient than using infrastructure hence why you only ever see it for initial attack thrusts.
I've already seen some photos of tanks stuck in mud. The good news for the Russians is that Ukraine has plenty of roads between the major objectives. It would be a totally different situation if the Russians had to cross a lot of wilderness.
That's a key point. It does go to show that the Russians expected this to be a very short affair. I wonder if they have any real contingency plans for when that thaw sets in.