Systems of least privilege prevent the levels of access exploitation (either vuln or misconfigure) from going further than is risk assessed. Or from "accidents" like a little utility script nuking the database with root privilege. Or having multiple entry points with their own tables of data. That's the difference between "hackers stole X but not Y and Z" and "hackers dumped everything".
Your "backend" should not be assumed to be the infallible security. Outside of limiting DB access procledges, we have proper selinux and other configs to lock down the software abilities so even in the case of Arbitrary code execution caused by a common exploit it may be very difficult to use. This is important when you're running a box with multiple other applications with their own DB's as well.
Infact these reasons are why many times the "backend" software and DB are hardware isolated or at least VM isolated so that those db access limitations aren't bypassed.
I haven't done anything like this before, but simple FS level file permissions should resolve the issue as long as the data with separate priv requirements is put into different sqlite databases.
Your "backend" should not be assumed to be the infallible security. Outside of limiting DB access procledges, we have proper selinux and other configs to lock down the software abilities so even in the case of Arbitrary code execution caused by a common exploit it may be very difficult to use. This is important when you're running a box with multiple other applications with their own DB's as well.
Infact these reasons are why many times the "backend" software and DB are hardware isolated or at least VM isolated so that those db access limitations aren't bypassed.