Thomas's dissent explicitly points this out. Without diving into "are APIs copyrightable?", the majority are skipping what should have been evaluated first before saying if they were fair-use or not.
Yeah, but Thomas said "The majority can not square it's fundamentally flawed fair-use analysis with a finding that declaring code is copyrightable".
Which is obviously false. A fair use analysis can -only- take place if the assumption is the code is copyrightable; if the majority had first decided the code was not copyrightable, fair use is immaterial.
Thomas' argument, if followed, would either have led to this same decision, or would make the opposite point he was trying to make.
> Thomas said "The majority can not square it's fundamentally flawed fair-use analysis with a finding that declaring code is copyrightable".
Which is obviously false. A fair use analysis can -only- take place if the assumption is the code is copyrightable
You are not disputing Thomas's point; you are agreeing with it. Thomas's point was exactly that, before even embarking on a fair use analysis, the Court should have first decided the question of whether the code was copyrightable. In the absence of a finding that the code was copyrightable, fair use analysis indeed makes no sense.
The "cannot square" part of Thomas's statement is just saying that the reason the majority did not even attempt to decide the question of whether the code was copyrightable was that the reasoning they would have had to use in order to find that it was copyrightable--which they would have had to do to even embark on a fair use analysis--would also have completely invalidated the reasoning they used to decide that Google's use was fair use. In other words, they are simply ignoring a glaring inconsistency in their position.
A decision that the code was not copyrightable in the first place would have been consistent, but the Court did not do that. A decision that the code was copyrightable and Google's use was not fair use would have been consistent, but the Court did not do that either. Instead, Thomas is saying, the Court decided that Google's use was fair use, on grounds that are inconsistent with the code even being copyrightable at all. As much as I hate to side with Oracle, I have to agree with Thomas on this point. The Court should either have ruled explicitly that the code was not copyrightable at all, or should have refused to let Google get away with what is obviously not fair use if the code is copyrightable.
> Thomas' argument, if followed, would either have led to this same decision, or would make the opposite point he was trying to make.
No, Thomas's argument, if followed, would end up with the opposite decision from the one the Court made: that Google's use was not fair use and that the decision below should have been affirmed, not reversed.
Not so. The appeals court found in Oracle's favor, not Google's. Meaning they found that the API was copyrightable, and that Google's use was not fair use.
The majority supreme court opinion basically said "even assuming it is copyrightable, this IS fair use", with the implication that if it's not copyrightable, there is no case, so the same outcome, a win for Google. They intentionally were keeping their decision as little precedent setting as possible.
Thomas' dissent said "you can't decide this based on hypotheticals! You have to decide whether it's copyrightable or not first!" - had justice Thomas felt the code was not copyrightable in the first place he could have written his own concurring opinion. In fact, he did not; his position, as made clear in his dissent, was that he felt APIs -were- copyrightable, AND that this was not fair use.
The court did not agree with him. And had the court first started with addressing whether an API was copyrightable, the outcome would have either been they are not (a more far reaching decision, but still a win for Google), or that they were, and that this was fair use (so the same outcome, but now with, again, a more far reaching decision).
You claim that Thomas is saying that "if the court decided it was copyrightable, then they would have also had to have found this was not fair use". If that is indeed what he said (not my take on it, but I'll grant it), that is false on the face of it, as that is -explicitly what the court did not do-. They accepted it was copyrightable as a hypothetical, and then focused solely on, if that is true, was this was fair use? And they found that it was. To form an argument in this way is logically consistent; Thomas may disagree with it, as is his right, but the statement that the court has made a logical error is absurd.
> Not so. The appeals court found in Oracle's favor, not Google's. Meaning they found that the API was copyrightable, and that Google's use was not fair use.
Again, you are not disagreeing; you are agreeing. Thomas is arguing that the appeals court's ruling, which you correctly describe, should have been affirmed. Which is the opposite decision from the one the Court made, just as I said.
> The majority supreme court opinion basically said "even assuming it is copyrightable, this IS fair use"
Here is the exact quote from the opinion:
"we assume, for argument’s sake, that the material was copyrightable. But we hold that the copying here at issue nonetheless constituted a fair use."
In other words, the Court did not even consider the question of whether or not the material was copyrightable. They assumed it "for the sake of argument", which is just a dodge. They should have considered the question directly; and here is what Thomas says about that:
"The majority purports to assume, without deciding, that the code is protected. But its fair-use analysis is wholly inconsistent with the substantial protection Congress gave to computer code. By skipping over the copyrightability question, the majority disregards half the relevant statutory text and distorts its fair-use analysis."
Further comments below.
> You claim that Thomas is saying that "if the court decided it was copyrightable, then they would have also had to have found this was not fair use".
Yes, because the relevant facts that would support a ruling, based on the statute, that the code was copyrightable, also indicate, based on the statute, that Google's use was not fair use. But by skipping over the copyrightability analysis, the majority is simply ignoring those facts and those portions of the statute. That is Thomas's point.
> To form an argument in this way is logically consistent
Not if it ignores additional information that is not consistent with information used in the argument. Thomas is not saying that the Court's argument is logically inconsistent on its face. He's saying that it's inconsistent once you put back in the information that the Court left out: the facts that support a ruling, based on the statute, that the code was copyrightable, also support a ruling, based on the statute, that Google's use was not fair use. The majority is simply failing to consider those facts.
In other words, the Court can't just "assume for the sake of argument" that the code is copyrightable in a vacuum. They have to take into account the relevant facts of the case that support such an assumption, and consider the implications of those facts, and the relevant parts of the statute, for the fair use analysis.
>> Not if it ignores additional information that is not consistent with information used in the argument
That is your assumption. You assume the majority ignored that additional information. You say the court is failing to consider the facts that would indicate it copyrightable; that is -assumption- on your part. The court had the same set of facts in front of it (read: the entire body of relevant law); the majority chose to apply them to a different problem than the one Thomas wanted them to be applied to, and came to a different outcome than the one Thomas wanted.
The court can totally "assume for the sake of argument"; it does not reduce the surface of the law, it does not take facts out of the equation. It just makes arguing one part of it moot.
> You assume the majority ignored that additional information.
If they didn't, why is it never even mentioned in the opinion? Why does the majority not even acknowledge the fact that there are other facts involved, which do not support their conclusion?
Of course any answer I might propose would also be an "assumption" to you, but I'll propose one anyway: because the majority knew quite well that if they did mention or acknowledge any of those other facts, it would be obvious to anyone reading the opinion that their argument was not cogent. My reading of many, many other Supreme Court opinions over the years tells me that that kind of thing happens all the time. At least dissenting opinions are available, though it seems like the ones that really point out fundamental flaws, like this one by Thomas, never actually get any traction.
> The court can totally "assume for the sake of argument"
The court can of course do whatever it pleases; there is no higher court of appeal to overrule them, and the Justices serve for life so they can simply not care what anyone else thinks of their rulings.
That doesn't make it right when they twist the law, or outright ignore it, to produce rulings that are in accordance with their ideological preconceptions. Which, again, is something that happens all the time.
Why would the court be obliged to reason front to back? Surely this is no different from e.g. "the defendant had adequate grounds for killing in self-defence, so there is no need to examine whether they intended to kill the victim".
This is more like deciding whether there was a murder to begin with before deciding it was self-defense.
The thing is that fair use implies the underlying data was copyrighted, but something being copyrighted doesn't imply fair use, which is why I think your analysis is backwards.
Majority Opinion: "We do not presently wish to venture an opinion on how this person died, but we can say authoritatively that the accused was not at the location the death took place at the time it took place. Therefore, even if a murder took place, the accused is innocent of murder"
Thomas' Dissent: "We can not decide the person is innocent of murder unless we decide whether a murder took place or not. Further, here are all the reasons I think the accused murdered the victim."
Majority Opinion: "We assume for the sake of argument that the deceased was murdered; we then argue that the accused did not do it, and rule that the accused is innocent."
Thomas's Dissent: "The facts of the case that support a conclusion that the deceased was murdered also support a conclusion that the accused did it. So if you are assuming that the deceased was murdered, you should also conclude that the accused is guilty."
The thing is that fair use is a defense to infringement -- so saying this is fair use implies they would have been infringing if not for that factor.
"I didn't commit murder at all" doesn't have the same relationship to some hypothetical murder, rather it's claiming there's no link there at all.
The analysis does feel like it puts the cart before the horse and possibly ends up implying or easily being argued as implying a statement I think they were trying to avoid opining on absent developments in the lower courts.
I get why they would do that, but it doesn't make it less strange and I would worry that this could be analyzed to say, in effect, that APIs should all be subject to copyright.
It wouldn't even be the first time a Supreme Court ruling one way on IP had been turned on its head, either. That has happened a lot with software patents, for example.
> The thing is that fair use implies the underlying data was copyrighted, but something being copyrighted doesn't imply fair use, which is why I think your analysis is backwards.
For those who may not understand: in the US, fair use is a defense, not a right. By arguing that your usage was fair use, you are admitting to copyright infringement. Just that your infringement was fair use. The analogy above to self defense is a good one; By arguing your killing was self defense, you are admitting that you killed somebody, but that it was justified.
> By arguing that your usage was fair use, you are admitting to copyright infringement.
No, its actually fairly common to argue both that an act wasn’t infringement but, if it was, it would be fair use.
One way you might do this is to argue that the thing copied was outside the scope of copyright, bur then argue that, if it was covered by copyright, it would be fair use.
That was, in fact, Google’s argument in this very case.
Your honor, I will show that (1) my client never received the Ming vase from the plaintiff, (2) he returned it in perfect condition, and (3) it was already cracked when he got it.
I agree such arguments are fairly common, but that doesn't make them any less fishy, in my view.
Where there are contradictory assertions of fact in the various defenses, I agree there's something... uncomfortable about it, at least.
But I don't think that applies in a case like "it's fair use, anyway." If we imagine a case where someone copied a small bit of written material for criticism or educational purposes, something clearly fair use, introducing uncertainty about whether the document had been placed in the public domain doesn't cloud the question of whether the behavior was okay, and answering the question in the easier way doesn't force any conclusions about the other matter.
> If we imagine a case where someone copied a small bit of written material for criticism or educational purposes
...then we are imagining a case totally unlike this one, where Google copied the entirety of Oracle's API interface declaration code for the purpose of using it to make money. This is one of the key points Thomas makes in his dissent. So this case is not a case of "we weren't sure whether the material was copyrightable, but in any case our use was clearly for a purpose that would be fair use if it was".
Another point in this respect that Thomas makes is that Google tried four times to get a license from Oracle to use their Java API code, before just copying it and using it anyway. That shows what, in legal terms, would be called mens rea--Google clearly knew the code was copyrightable, because if it weren't, they would not have tried to get a license. So Google now saying they aren't sure the code was copyrightable, as they did in their brief in this case, is, to say the least, disingenuous.
> ...then we are imagining a case totally unlike this one
That was my intent. My comment was meant to move to a setting where judgement was clear and then bring it back to see what was preserved; I don't think it did a good job of the second half of that.
> Google tried four times to get a license from Oracle to use their Java API code
Did Google try to license just the API? My understanding was that they tried to license the implementation, and eventually went with a (purported?) clean-room reimplementation. That doesn't seem to indicate a belief (or even a worry) that the interface itself is covered by copyright.
> Google clearly knew the code was copyrightable, because if it weren't, they would not have tried to get a license.
Even ignoring the previous point, I don't think that follows. Outcomes in law are rarely certain; "pay not to have to deal with the question" is not necessarily a bad response to ambiguity (particularly when that ambiguity was created by law and the courts rather than the counter-party, in which case there is concern about motivating more such ambiguity).
Apropos of the "four dog defense", Dashiell Hammett in The Thin Man has a woman say to a man she is walking out on: "I don't like crooks, and even if I did I wouldn't like crooks that are stool pigeons, and even if I did like crooks that are stool pigeons, I still wouldn't like you."
Over the years, the STEM professional in me has become increasingly intrigued by the ways in which law progresses because it is so fundamentally different from my preferred method of making sense of the world.
Within that, and with my incredibly limited understanding of how law evolves in the courts...it seems like Thomas says demonstrably incorrect things more frequently than I am comfortable with.
Interesting. In my very limited understanding I have a very opposite view, specifically around Justice Thomas.
If you read pdonis’s reply to your parent, you will see that Thomas was rather correct in the way law should have applied in this case. I find that in the limited few of few cases I have read , I politically like the judgement made but I identify more with how Thomas thought about the case.
Really fascinated by the American legal system. In some ways really elegant and so much better than the legal system in my own country.
I understand the intuition you're getting at: logically, the first question could make the second irrelevant. But if the second question resolves the issue even when the first is construed in favor of the other party, what's the rationale for demanding the court focus on the first question?
IANAL, but I can imagine something like the following:
A. We decide this is fair use based on the small number of LOC used and call it a day
B. OR we can decide that APIs are not copyrightable even though they're self-evidently creative works because of the importance of interoperability based on something something related to Borland v. Lotus, a case that we couldn't agree on the last time it came up.
While I agree that APIs should not be copyrightable, the Supreme Court has been criticized for "legislating from the bench".
Avoiding the temptation to set bigger and more far-reaching precedents than is strictly necessary for the case at hand avoids giving the impression that the judicial branch is doing the job of the legislative branch.
I have fundamental problems with an unelected council that serves for life creating law.
However, we have an extremely inefficient form of Government that doesn't allow for quick adaptation, and legal questions will arise tomorrow that did not occur to legislators today. The courts are supposed to help resolve any ambiguity.
The question over whether or not APIs are copyrightable is, however, not a question of ambiguity. APIs are software (or documentation, or source code, etc), and any category you place them into is copyrightable under the current law. If we don't want APIs to be copyrightable, then they must have explicit exemptions carved out in the law. The courts are bound to consider an API as copyrighted right now, and the only question is whether violating that copyright is fair-use.
I think the Court did the right thing in skirting the question. That's up to legislators, the Court cannot help. We need fundamental reform of IP protections for software anyway.
> We need fundamental reform of IP protections for software anyway.
That really is the root issue here. So many problems we're seeing (Pai's clownshow in the FCC, SCOTUS legislating from the bench, federal agencies trampling citizens' rights, etc.) stem from the legislative branch abdicating their authority to third parties -- the librarian of Congress, the FCC, SCOTUS, and even (by legal reference) professional organizations and laws in other countries. It's ridiculous.
A first principle of a democratic government is that citizens can soon fire someone whose legislation and/or executive decision they do not like. We would all have voted Pai out if we could have... but he shouldn't have had the power to do what he did in the first place (remove network neutrality rules). Congress gave him that power - which I would argue was an abdication of authority vested in them.
> Congress gave him that power - which I would argue was an abdication of authority vested in them.
Legislators assigning regulatory power to bureaucratic agencies is one of the cornerstones of modern democracies - it wouldn't work otherwise. Many of our legislators are barely qualified to send their own emails, let alone decide what is a telecom utility or how much ppb in drinking water is safe for a toxic chemical. Assigning that power to regulatory agencies allows experts to decide those issues in a neutral setting.
Pai's FCC aside, that structure prevented significant disruptions in the last four years and our country continues to function despite decades of increased partisanship and deadlock at the highest level.
Agreed that regulatory agencies are indispensable. But their job is to carry out the law, not make the law. Of course, the law has to delegate some decision-making responsibility to them -- the law can't make every decision ahead of time. But (a) the law can codify principles that regulatory agencies must uphold, and (b) lawsuits can be filed when someone disagrees that a principle has been accurately upheld -- the courts can decide.
We as a country ought to be arguing and disagreeing about principles, and the results (decided by legislators who are under the gun of potential non-reelection) ought to be codified as laws. A lack of principle in congress and in law is what really causes this abdication and delegation of authority.
An ideal legal corpus represents (as much as possible) a simply and directly expressed set of principles under which the country operates.
> regulatory agencies allows experts to decide those issues in a neutral setting
It is difficult to talk about "regulations" in the abstract but I would suggest that many regulations aren't about a perfect solution devised by an expert. They are more often about finding a tradeoff, a balance between competing goals. Those sorts of decisions can be informed by "expert" knowledge, but I think it is a mistake to think that domain experts are necessarily best positioned to resolve tradeoffs in public policy.
I'm not arguing against expert knowledge being incorporated into construction of regulations -- just pointing out that expert knowledge may be necessary but not sufficient to finding a workable public policy.
I fear that you will remain disappointed, because no prescriptive specification of law written by legislators can be detailed enough to catch every edge case.
If your democratically elected legislators don't like a bench ruling, they are free to make a new law that specifically overrides that ruling. The legislature is the ultimate source of authority in the land. The courts only have a bit of wiggle room in interpreting unclear statutes.
The system is designed well. Unfortunately, democratically elected legislators at the moment would rather obstruct, wreck, and go on wild-ass conspiracy rants, than legislate.
If that legislature spent half the time it complains about activist judges actually drafting law, it would have nothing to complain about. If you, as a constituent are unhappy about the current state of affairs, vote in legislators who are willing to do their job.
Slow legislation is a feature rather than a bug. Less opportunity for reactionary laws based on emotion or a collective misunderstanding of events that we later regret. It's not a perfect deterrent, obviously, e.g. the Patriot Act
However, the main reform that people are asking for is a shortening of copyright terms which really isn't a factor that plays into this case or, for the most part, with computer software generally. One can imagine copyright reform that broadly and explicitly exempts interfaces from at least copyright protection but that has generally not been one of the top issues historically.
Copyright law has received many reforms over the last 40 years. It may not have received the particular reforms you want, but that’s a very different issue.
AFAIK, the Court's overt mission is to interpret and regulate the intent of Congress. They literally must legislate from the bench where Congress has left them an obligation to do so. And Congress can legislate when they feel the Court has taken too much liberty with interpretation or regulation.
But I really do think this case falls squarely inside the parameters of "interpretation" as most members would see it.
That is part of the dynamic. More importantly, though, a narrow decision makes a broad decision easier. If some justices think the code isn't copyrightable, they can increase their voting power by agreeing to set a less sweeping precedent that more justices agree with.
With what I know of Amy Coney Barrett, I’m very surprised she had no part in this decision. You did an absolutely wonderful job of explaining her whole feeling on the bench in two paragraphs. Seriously friend, that’s some excellent writing - excellent excellent job!!
> Avoiding the temptation to set bigger and more far-reaching precedents than is strictly necessary for the case at hand avoids giving the impression that the judicial branch is doing the job of the legislative branch.
Well, that's the theory.
In fact, they are doing the job of the legislative branch, they can't stop people from noticing this, and sticking to this approach just means they're doing their job badly.
In an earlier concurring opinion when he was on the D.C. Circuit — i.e., before joining the Supreme Court as Chief Justice of the United States (his official title) — John Roberts referred to "... the cardinal principle of judicial restraint — if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more ...." [0]
But if the second question resolves the issue even when the first is construed in favor of the other party, what's the rationale for demanding the court focus on the first question?
The main influence of the Supreme Court is in setting precedent. In the absence of a ruling from the Supreme Court, the previous ruling from the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit is binding precedent on the whole country that APIs are copyrightable. That means that the most important precedents set in this case are still an issue for the software industry.
> In the absence of a ruling from the Supreme Court, the previous ruling from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is binding precedent on the whole country that APIs are copyrightable.
This is not true - other circuit courts are free to set their own, conflicting precedent. Each circuit's decisions are binding only on its own judges, and suggestive but not binding on other circuits.
Circuits deciding differently (a "circuit split") is uncommon, and considered urgent grounds for the Supreme Court to take up a test case to resolve the ambiguity; but it's not considered a "breaking" of precedent by either circuit, just a difference of interpretation for the Supreme Court to resolve
For most circuits what you say would be true. But the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is special. As http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction says, their jurisdiction is national and determined by subject matter.
That said I do not actually know whether they would be binding on another circuit court. But they are definitely binding on all federal courts lower than that.
However that question is sort of moot. It is extremely easy for the entity filing the case for infringement to include something about patent or trademark in the suit, which guarantees that you wind up in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Where that ruling is binding.
> their jurisdiction is national and determined by subject matter.
Copyright is not part of their subject matter jurisdiction.
> However that question is sort of moot. It is extremely easy for the entity filing the case for infringement to include something about patent or trademark in the suit, which guarantees that you wind up in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Where that ruling is binding.
It’s not, though; outside of its own subject matter jurisdiction, CAFC is bound by the law of the Circuit to which the trial court belongs, which it, in theory, merely applies. Another case coming up through the Northern District of California like Oracle v. Google did would be governed vy Ninth Circuit, not Federal Circuit, copyright precedent even if heard in the Federal Circuit because of other issues in the case.
> the previous ruling from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is binding precedent on the whole country that APIs are copyrightable.
No, its not.
The CAFC’s interpretation of Ninth Amendment case law on copyrightability in this case (before and after the Supreme Court sidestepped it) is binding on no one except future courts hearing cases on issues and between parties so closely related to those in Oracle v. Google that res judicata rather than rules of precedent is the deciding factor
That point is super weird, because the court has a tendency to make the narrowest ruling that is able to resolve the case in front of them. Clearly the fair use question is more narrow than the question of copyrightability of APIs.
APIs and most code is copyrightable, they are original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium, all that is required by he Copyright Act of 1976. It doesn't look like either party in this case claimed the code was not eligible for copyright either
If they shouldn't be copyrightable because the world would be better off, interoperability between business is harmed, it is up to congress to change the law. Historically legislation like this harms smaller companies mostly, larger companies can better afford to deal with the requirement to license or the cost/work required to stick to fair use or litigate over it, so the larger companies that can afford to lobby to change the law aren't going to want them changed.
This case certainly sets precedent that API re-implementation can be fair use, not that it always is. Fair use is very fact specific, based on a four part test where having one part in favor can be fair use, and having three parts in your favor can still be infringement. A future case with products that would have a more substantial effect on the market of the original work, or had more of the original work reused than was strictly necessary could very well be infringement. With regards to "the amount and substantiality of the portion used" in this case less than 1% of the original code was copied just measuring the lines of code. Substantiality is harder to put a number on, but arguably it was only a small portion of the original product. This is a very low and for many other APIs a more substantial portion would need to be copied to be useful. The precedential value of this case is unclear without either the law changing, or further litigation.
How often does the API itself exceed the level of creativity of uncopyrightable plain lists of facts? It's not clear to me that it should be considered copyrightable on its own, especially with the fact that copyright explicitly do not cover functional elements. The declarations only instructs you on how to interact with the actual code, and AFAICT rarely add any creative height on top of what's in the main source code.
If presence and order of keywords was sufficient, such legal precedence would create collateral damage at levels that is beyond absurd - outside of software, this would extend to atypical calendar formats, plenty of paper forms, automatic telephone voice menus, map projections, and so much more. Calling it "destructive" wouldn't suffice. Entire industries would be leveled by uncooperative rent seekers that hold old copyrights.
The threshold of originality is extremely low for a work to be considered a work of authorship. From the linked decision, " a work is “original” if it is “independently created by the author” and “possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.” Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U. S. 340, 345 (1991). The lines of declaring code in the Java platform readily satisfy this “extremely low” threshold. "
Paper forms are often protected by copyright, as long as they have creative non functional elements. And they are licensed much like stock photos in some industries.
There would be some APIs or code that only contain functional elements and aren't eligible for copyright protection, but in most cases there is a substantial amount that is not only functional.
Copyright protects works fixed in a physical media, not the underlying idea. Many people can create similar works based on the same underlying ideas. Like with a map projection a specific implementation can be protected by copyright. But the idea of a map projection where a constant bearing in the real world corresponds to a straight line on a map cannot be protected by copyright, someone else could create their own version that does the same thing without infringement.
Copyright only protects against copying, not against independent creation of the same work. With something like a calendar, or in some cases an API that only has a few creative elements, multiple people could make the same choices and create the exact same thing without there being any infringement.
Re forms: I did primarily mean rather simple ones (like say attendance forms), but there's a bigger argument here;
This type of API copyright would post likely not just mean the paper form is under copyright protection, but that the software to OCR scan it and parse it would also likewise be protected - as it is an ordered series of keywords with types, etc. It would then be a license infringement to parse forms without a license.
Independent creation is legal defense, not a cause for dismissal of a suit. You need to prove it - which becomes harder if they can argue you saw their work first and imitated theirs.
There's precedence where people have created their own works from scratch and held to be infringing because they mimicked an existing work too closely (like one case of a photo of a red London bus), and in civil copyright lawsuits the other copyright holder only needs to show its likely, which may reduce to showing you knew their work existed.
