> It's a trust issue. I don't trust my passwords on someone else's server.
They don't have your decryption key, therefore they save encrypted blobs and have no means to obtain your password. This takes care of trust issue - it simply is not an issue and never will be.
Even if malicious employee does something out of the ordinary or "hacker" gets the database, they still have the impossible task of breaking the encryption (which for all intents and purposes is impossible as of right now).
This returns us back to my starting point - there's *no objective* reason to use bitwarden_rs, apart from curiosity and/or convenience. I'm not saying it SHOULD not be used. We are all free to make choices as we see fit and don't need to justify them, however the reasons you listed are not reasons at all because the concerns you have don't exist.
> however the reasons you listed are not reasons at all because the concerns you have don't exist.
You've only attempted to address 1 of 3, and the other reply indicates that there is absolutely attack vectors from bitwarden.com if bitwarden LLC wanted to, was forced to, or was compromised.
They don't have your decryption key, therefore they save encrypted blobs and have no means to obtain your password. This takes care of trust issue - it simply is not an issue and never will be.
Even if malicious employee does something out of the ordinary or "hacker" gets the database, they still have the impossible task of breaking the encryption (which for all intents and purposes is impossible as of right now).
This returns us back to my starting point - there's *no objective* reason to use bitwarden_rs, apart from curiosity and/or convenience. I'm not saying it SHOULD not be used. We are all free to make choices as we see fit and don't need to justify them, however the reasons you listed are not reasons at all because the concerns you have don't exist.