That is not the argument the author is making at all. The portion of the article you’re referring to begins:
> Her point was that these authors did not avail themselves of respectable intellectual theories to justify their transgressiveness. They immersed themselves in what is basest in human nature and regarded doing so as acts of liberation. Arendt’s judgment of the postwar elites who recklessly thumbed their noses at respectability could easily apply to those of our own day who shove aside liberal principles like fair play, race neutrality, free speech, and free association as obstacles to equality.
The author isn’t criticizing non-discrimination—which can be justified by reference to traditional “liberal principles.” He’s criticizing things like Mozilla’s firing of Brendan Eich for his political donations, or declaring judges unfit because they are members of Catholic organizations that reject abortion. Those efforts go beyond non-discrimination to trying to stamp out traditional beliefs in ways that are often at odds with liberalism.
As I said, your own views may not match the author's. One doesn't subtitle a passage 'the desire to transgress and destroy' and cite the 'sexual adventurism, celebration of perversion and all manner of sensuality' in great detail as an illustration of its relevance to the Russian Revolution to argue that Brendan Eich ought not to have felt the need to resign. If he was making a freedom of conscience argument rather than a decadence leads to totalitarianism argument he'd hardly be suggesting that it was lamentable that labourers were sufficiently far from village gossips and 'the church binding their conscience with guilt' to find comfort in sex.
> Her point was that these authors did not avail themselves of respectable intellectual theories to justify their transgressiveness. They immersed themselves in what is basest in human nature and regarded doing so as acts of liberation. Arendt’s judgment of the postwar elites who recklessly thumbed their noses at respectability could easily apply to those of our own day who shove aside liberal principles like fair play, race neutrality, free speech, and free association as obstacles to equality.
The author isn’t criticizing non-discrimination—which can be justified by reference to traditional “liberal principles.” He’s criticizing things like Mozilla’s firing of Brendan Eich for his political donations, or declaring judges unfit because they are members of Catholic organizations that reject abortion. Those efforts go beyond non-discrimination to trying to stamp out traditional beliefs in ways that are often at odds with liberalism.