You can do whatever you want using Whatsapp (it has a proven solid e2e encryption), the key difference to Telegram is it requires a phone number to use which instantly reveals your real identity to any snoop, snitch or government mole.
If it were that easy to influence Whatsapp, India would not have a real problem with Whatsapp-mobilized lynching mobs.
Correct. It then goes on to - by default at least - upload everyones messages unencrypted to Google Cloud.
> the key difference to Telegram is it requires a phone number to use which instantly reveals your real identity to any snoop, snitch or government mole.
I usually defend Telegram but here I think you are wrong. Telegram also requires a phone number to sign up.
Session (Signal fork) doesn't require any information. It's end-to-end encrypted by default, and it connects via an onion routing network (LokiNet). And so only LokiNet nodes see the IP address that you connect through. But of course, you connect to them through VPNs or nested VPN chains.
Seems to somehow be associated with the working group for Loki cryptocurrency, but not using blockchain to store messages or message contents, per FAQ.
As I understand it, Session uses LokiNet, and there are also sites, analogous to Tor onion services, and potentially other services. However, running LokiNet nodes requires a substantial stake, which is payable in Loki. The stake is at risk for malicious behavior, and nodes get paid in Loki for services that they provide to the network. Perhaps some features require user payments, but I haven't researched that.
I've looked into a bit more. It uses a crypto based on monero called Loki. Service servers are to be paid out for maintaining the network. It's also possible to mine the crypto. There seem to be software wallet apps available for iOS and Android.
LokiNet reminds me of a self-funding P2P decentralized anonymous analog with massively more functionality to Google Jigsaw[1] project called Outline[2], which runs shadowsocks[3] on Digital Ocean droplets or your own Linux infra.
> TL;DR edition: an onion router with a tun interface for transporting ip packets anonymously between you and the internet and internally inside itself to other users.
> "What if I2P was made in the current year (2018)? What would be different?"
> In short we want to permit both anonymous exit and entry network level traffic between LLARP [aka LokiNet] enabled networks and the internet.
> In short, I want to take the "best parts" from Tor and I2P and make a new protocol suite.
> You can do whatever you want using Whatsapp (it has a proven solid e2e encryption), the key difference to Telegram is it requires a phone number to use which instantly reveals your real identity to any snoop, snitch or government mole.
Both Telegram and WhatsApp required a phone number last I checked, but you can install Telegram on a Desktop using a dumb phone for activation, you don't need to run the app.
> If it were that easy to influence Whatsapp, India would not have a real problem with Whatsapp-mobilized lynching mobs.
India has no jurisdiction over WhatsApp. They can ask Facebook nicely, but that's about it.
To stop communication you don't need to read WhatsApp-chats. You just disable the accounts that you want silenced. And you can't do that if you don't have control over the service (hence Western extremists use of Telegram).
If you're Russian and you want to talk about how free yourself of Putin, use WhatsApp or Signal, that is: an American provider. If you're American (or living in an American province) and you want to talk about how to free yourself of Washington, you use Telegram (or a Chinese messenger). Even if none of them can ever read your chats, they can a) use the meta data and b) disable your ability to communicate.
This also applies if you're a common criminal: US cops will have a much easier time getting meta data on your communication from WhatsApp than from Telegram. It's generally a good idea to know your threat model. Unless you're a Russian Oligarch or Ex-FSB, the FSB is not your problem. But your local domestic intelligence service may be, if you ever step out of line.
> instantly reveals your real identity to any snoop, snitch or government mole.
Yeah, WA isn't anonymous. The problem is with Telegram storing all your private messages on their cloud, by hacking the server, just knowing your username the state level attacker learns everything about you, metadata, and content, and because there's no forward secrecy, it will date back basically forever unless you're constantly deleting logs, and even then you can only hope Telegram also erases their backup tapes.
>If you're American (or living in an American province) and you want to talk about how to free yourself of Washington, you use Telegram
That's just stupid, why would you want less secure architecture to criticize Americans? NSA can trivially hack Telegram servers to see your criticism if they want. You want E2EE for your dissident group no matter what, thus Signal will always remain a better choice.
That's true, yes, but I believe it only applies if you are a high-ranking official or work in a very sensitive position. Either of those are usually a good indicator that you're okay with "the system", are not a threat to it and your country's intelligence services won't go after you.
I don't think the average citizen has to worry about the FSB finding their kinks and blackmailing them. You don't kidnap poor people's children for ransom, you don't blackmail people who have no special powers.
If it were that easy to influence Whatsapp, India would not have a real problem with Whatsapp-mobilized lynching mobs.