> [I]f, for example, sexual orientation is an innate trait, then changing a man attracted to men into a woman attracted to men is changing more than just that person's sex: it's changing their sexual orientation as well.
I think you're confusing "innate" with some sort of epistemic primacy. If I am heterosexual because I innately consider myself a man and I innately prefer women as partners, it is also case that I am "innately heterosexual", regardless of which of those facts are encoded explicitly and which is inferred. It's a trick of the structure of our labels things that we can't change "just one" of those three things.
> I think you're confusing "innate" with some sort of epistemic primacy.
No, I'm saying that what counts as "changing just one thing" is not cut and dried. The majority opinion takes it as too obvious to need argument that changing from a man who is attracted to men, to a woman who is attracted to men, is changing just one thing, leaving everything else the same. My argument is that it is just as consistent to say that that change changes two things--sex and sexual orientation--not just one. Which means the majority's claims are no longer obvious--but the whole majority argument rests on them being obvious. The majority claims to simply be laying out the plain language of the law. It's not.
I was responding specifically to the quoted passage, and the preceding sentence, which maybe should have been quoted; I will repeat both here:
> One of the key grounds given by LGBTQ individuals for their right to equal treatment is that those traits are innate. But if, for example, sexual orientation is an innate trait, then changing a man attracted to men into a woman attracted to men is changing more than just that person's sex: it's changing their sexual orientation as well.
The point that you claim to be reiterating is reasonable - what constitutes "a single change" depends on our choice of representation and it's not at all obvious what we should choose. I am undecided as to whether this significantly undermines the argument of the majority, lacking quite a bit of context.
But I am saying that choice of representation, or ambiguity thereof, does not follow from any particular understanding of what is and is not "innate".
> choice of representation, or ambiguity thereof, does not follow from any particular understanding of what is and is not "innate"
Perhaps "innate" is not the right word, but what I meant by it is simply that, in the view of LGBTQ individuals and supporters, sexual orientation is the same kind of property of a person as biological sex is, whatever word you want to use to describe that kind of property.
So far as I understand, there's a belief (not entirely unsupported, although I don't know the details) that sexual orientation is a relatively immutable property of the individual, built in from a young age if not from birth.
I think "innate" is a fair description of that.
But I don't know that there's any particular beliefs about whether that property (sexual orientation) as encoded directly in the brain[1] is "prefers men" or "homosexual", which I think is what we're discussing here. This is why I suggested "epistemic primacy" - whether other things we can say follow from "homosexual" or whether it follows from other things.
[1] for those who even subscribe to a physical understanding of consciousness - we're talking about a diverse group; otherwise we can possibly find an equivalent notion
> I don't know that there's any particular beliefs about whether that property (sexual orientation) as encoded directly in the brain[1] is "prefers men" or "homosexual"
Hm, yes, I see your point. I was assuming it was the latter, but it might not be; it would depend on the details of what's going on in the brain and the rest of the body.
I think you're confusing "innate" with some sort of epistemic primacy. If I am heterosexual because I innately consider myself a man and I innately prefer women as partners, it is also case that I am "innately heterosexual", regardless of which of those facts are encoded explicitly and which is inferred. It's a trick of the structure of our labels things that we can't change "just one" of those three things.