> Usually people can't work effectively toward goals that far in the future.
I certainly agree that the scale and longevity of some defense projects can be difficult to justify, let alone comprehend. However, a project that may not seem pragmatic from the outside doesn't make it unnecessary.
FYSA, from this FY18 report[1] under Programmatics - Static Structural and Durability Testing:
ACTIVITY:
The program suspended testing of the F-35B ground test article (BH-1) after completing the second lifetime of testing in February 2017. Due to the significant amount of modifications and repairs to bulkheads and other structures, the program declared the F-35B ground test article no longer representative of the wing-carry-through structure in production aircraft, deemed it inadequate for further testing, and canceled the testing of the third lifetime with BH-1. The program secured funding to procure another ground test article, which will be production-representative of Lot 9 and later F-35B aircraft built with a re-designed wing-carry-through structure, but to date does not have the procurement of the test article on contract. The program has not completed durability testing of the aircraft with the new wing-carry-through structure to date.
ASSESSMENT:
Based on durability testing, the service life of early-production F-35B aircraft is well under the expected service life of 8,000 flight hours, and may be as low as 2,100 flight hours. Fleet F-35B aircraft are expected to start reaching their service life limit in CY26, based on design usage. The JPO will continue to use Individual Aircraft Tracking (IAT) of actual usage to help the Services project changes in timing for required repairs and modifications, and aid in Fleet Life Management.
Back of the envelope sanity check: assuming this was all technical labor at a conservative enterprise rate of $125/hr in FY20 dollars, that's roughly $12.5MM/yr or 50 unabused man-yrs per annum at face value--nevermind the time-value of money, infrastructure, materials, tooling, turnover, all the unknown unknowns spanning a period of performance in excess of a decade, etc.--for the Navy to purchase a quantifiable level of predictability still 13 years ahead of its time based on an execution plan that doesn't yet exist, using bespoke equipment and new methods that have yet to be developed, on arguably the most complex variant of the platform (at a unit cost which currently exceeds $100MM) whose tech integrations are effectively riding on the bleeding edge state of the art.
Given the limiting speed of government contracting and the high stakes on the table, 12 years doesn't strike me as unreasonable.
I certainly agree that the scale and longevity of some defense projects can be difficult to justify, let alone comprehend. However, a project that may not seem pragmatic from the outside doesn't make it unnecessary.
FYSA, from this FY18 report[1] under Programmatics - Static Structural and Durability Testing:
ACTIVITY: The program suspended testing of the F-35B ground test article (BH-1) after completing the second lifetime of testing in February 2017. Due to the significant amount of modifications and repairs to bulkheads and other structures, the program declared the F-35B ground test article no longer representative of the wing-carry-through structure in production aircraft, deemed it inadequate for further testing, and canceled the testing of the third lifetime with BH-1. The program secured funding to procure another ground test article, which will be production-representative of Lot 9 and later F-35B aircraft built with a re-designed wing-carry-through structure, but to date does not have the procurement of the test article on contract. The program has not completed durability testing of the aircraft with the new wing-carry-through structure to date.
ASSESSMENT: Based on durability testing, the service life of early-production F-35B aircraft is well under the expected service life of 8,000 flight hours, and may be as low as 2,100 flight hours. Fleet F-35B aircraft are expected to start reaching their service life limit in CY26, based on design usage. The JPO will continue to use Individual Aircraft Tracking (IAT) of actual usage to help the Services project changes in timing for required repairs and modifications, and aid in Fleet Life Management.
Back of the envelope sanity check: assuming this was all technical labor at a conservative enterprise rate of $125/hr in FY20 dollars, that's roughly $12.5MM/yr or 50 unabused man-yrs per annum at face value--nevermind the time-value of money, infrastructure, materials, tooling, turnover, all the unknown unknowns spanning a period of performance in excess of a decade, etc.--for the Navy to purchase a quantifiable level of predictability still 13 years ahead of its time based on an execution plan that doesn't yet exist, using bespoke equipment and new methods that have yet to be developed, on arguably the most complex variant of the platform (at a unit cost which currently exceeds $100MM) whose tech integrations are effectively riding on the bleeding edge state of the art.
Given the limiting speed of government contracting and the high stakes on the table, 12 years doesn't strike me as unreasonable.
[1] https://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2018/pdf/dod/2018f35j...