Yes, but while "storing passwords in plaintext is bad, mkay?" is accepted in the industry, "transmitting passwords to the server is bad, mkay?" is, in fact, not accepted. It is usually considered "best practice" to transmit passwords to the server, which is obviously wrong.
That doesn't work. If you hash on the client then the hash IS the "password" and is thus sensitive info that you'd need to hash again on the server and shouldn't be stored anywhere in plain text.
While I agree with what you say, one could argue there is the additional element of protecting against user password reuse between sites.
If the client-side hash is strong enough it means that your plaintext password leak becoming a hashed password leaks at least protects the user from reuse on other sites.
I’d argue it is “best practice” to present credentials to an authentication server, and provide a token to the various user services to reduce the impact of things like over-logging.
That defeats the purpose of hashing. In your model, the hashed password is all an attacker needs to log in, so the hashed password essentially IS the password. Thus, when you store hashed passwords, you are doing the equivalent of storing plaintext passwords.
No, because if you salt it then that password becomes unique to your website. Since users tend to reuse passwords across websites, the password becomes far less valuable if it is already salted and hashed once first before sending to the server for a second round of salting and hashing.
"Far less valuable" depends on whether access to your site is particularly valuable. If you hash passwords once on the client and twice on the server, your site itself is no more secure than if you only hashed passwords once on the server (and not on the client). If you hash passwords once on the client and once on the server, your site itself is drastically less secure. The secondary protection of shared passwords on other sites, from a narrow class of data compromise involving request logs, is not the purpose of hashing, so you have not actually contradicted my statement.
>If you hash passwords once on the client and twice on the server, your site itself is no more secure than if you only hashed passwords once on the server (and not on the client). If you hash passwords once on the client and once on the server, your site itself is drastically less secure.
What do you mean by "once" and "twice"? Are you comparing splitting the hashing cost across client and server vs. adding extra hashing cost on client?
