> However, I'm not sure the poster I was responding to would agree with allowing that distinction. Certainly many commentators on Dennett have interpreted "denying the existence of qualia" as "denying the existence of subjective experience", which Dennett does not do. For a person who refuses to allow the distinction, I think one has to simply disagree that Dennett denies the existence of qualia; he just says they aren't what most people think they are.
I read a lot of his back and forth with Chalmers & co. (and philosophy of mind in general), and no one argues that Dennett doesn't think subjective experiences exist. But subjective experiences are not qualia. Qualia are phenomenal properties of experience. Presumably, one could have subjective experiences without these phenomenal properties. Indeed, that is what Dennett argues, see the IEP[1]
PS: Not sure why I'm getting downvoted -- guess the materialists have a bone to pick ;)
> no one argues that Dennett doesn't think subjective experiences exist
I don't know if anyone has stated that directly. But I've seen plenty of responses to Dennett that basically amount to saying that the only way they can make sense of his statement that qualia don't exist is that he means subjective experiences don't exist. So even if they don't think he actually believes that, they certainly seem to be unable to interpret his philosophical claims any other way.
> Qualia are phenomenal properties of experience. Presumably, one could have subjective experiences without these phenomenal properties.
Care to elaborate on this? From my angle, arguments if this sort tend to veer towards wild speculation. I understand others feel differently.
I usually can't help but read it as unnecessary leaps of logic spurred by some presupposed metaphysics. I hope I'm not projecting too much here -- you may have a more considerate take on things.
Elaborate on what, exactly? Qualia being phenomenal properties of experience? I think that's a pretty atomic claim.
Basically, your experience E (a headache, for example) has some physical properties attached to it (maybe being caused by blood vessels expanding and putting pressure on certain nerves), but also some phenomenal properties (the feeling of getting a headache). The instance of this feeling is a quale. It's debated whether or not qualia are the same across people[1] (but my intuition is yes). Empiricists like Dennett argue that you don't need qualia and that they are a sort of unnecessary hand-wavy magic.
> Basically, your experience E (a headache, for example) has some physical properties attached to it (maybe being caused by blood vessels expanding and putting pressure on certain nerves), but also some phenomenal properties (the feeling of getting a headache). The instance of this feeling is a quale.
Hmm. Does the nature of this particular "headache quale" depend in any way on the totality of current conceptions the subject has built up over the years their life?
My understanding and intuition tells me such "quale" are nothing more than the current instantaneous sensations being filtered through the accumulated mental conceptions, associations, and patterns that the entity has acquired over time (caveat: there are likely some very basic "pre-installed" conceptions that new-borns have from their genetics).
What is the argument to differentiate "quale" from mere momentary, initial perceptions, the raw sensation + initial neural processing? E.g. the first actual conscious awareness of some stimuli, framed and grounded by some initial mental conception of the sensation?
At the risk of being redundant: I have trouble imagining what it would mean, or that it is possible, or makes any sense at all, for a sentient being to be aware of some raw stimuli without it being grounded in some pre-existing conceptual framework. To me, that sounds like trying to play a video game by looking at the raw bits, the 1s and 0s, of the game data.
I realize that my interpretation of qualia doesn't provide a way to distinguish between the initial perception and any immediately subsequent integration/contemplation/reflection that may happen in the first second or two after the perception. I would argue that it may never be possible to draw a clear line, at least when talking about anything that has reached the level of conscious awareness. My view of the fundamental nature of conscious awareness does not seem compatible with any clear line between conscious sensation and conscious perception. I haven't read Dennett, but maybe this is similar to what he is getting at.
Edit: Almost forgot. Memory, especially short-term, plays a critical role here. My most immediate perception should "fit" with all of the perceptions that occurred over the past few seconds. I imagine that the initial neural processing which attempts to ground the stimuli and integrate it with the brain's acquired conceptual framework is also seeking to preserve "continuity". I think we all have experienced the jarring and sometimes unpleasant effect of when that process goes astray.
I read a lot of his back and forth with Chalmers & co. (and philosophy of mind in general), and no one argues that Dennett doesn't think subjective experiences exist. But subjective experiences are not qualia. Qualia are phenomenal properties of experience. Presumably, one could have subjective experiences without these phenomenal properties. Indeed, that is what Dennett argues, see the IEP[1]
PS: Not sure why I'm getting downvoted -- guess the materialists have a bone to pick ;)
[1] http://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/#H5