It sounds like her concern is that they might show her a magic piece of paper which, once you've seen it, requires you to do certain things and prohibits you from ever talking about it to anyone.[1]
Magic pieces of paper like that really shouldn't be a part of our legal system.
They would just serve the paper using the usual techniques for delivering legal papers to persons possibly unwilling to receive them. These techniques usually avoid identifying yourself upfront.
I believe they rather want information which they cannot legally force her to divulge (otherwise see above), so they're trying their luck at intimidation.
That isn't always true. In the U.S. legal system, a person can be granted immunity, and in doing so have their 5th amendment protection against self-incrimination terminated. With that, they could be forced to provide testimony, and refusal could result in fines and jail time without due process for as long as the courts see fit.
I don't understand your "without due process" statement. Surely there is a process for granting someone immunity?
Jail time does seem appropriate for non-compliance with a legally binding judicial order (I'm not endorsing or condemning the existence of these laws, btw)
In a sense, I think you are right and perhaps my bias is showing. From the perspective of a judge or prosecutor, they followed a legal process and gave a legal order, so there is no violation of due process in their eyes.
Through the eyes of a person compelled to give testimony, we may reach a different conclusion. Consider a journalist who is granted immunity and asked to give up their source. They refuse and spend six months in jail, with few to no options to appeal for their freedom. This isn't theoretical. It happens occasionally.
The definition of due process can vary from the common definition of fair treatment under the law, to the view more often taken by lawyers and governments that it just means following the process of the law as accepted by the courts and respecting legal rights.
The reporter probably would feel as though they weren't treated fairly under the law, but the prosecutor would argue that they followed the law in full. I probably should not have used the phrase "without due process" in this case, since that will make it difficult to communicate with anyone holding views of the government or lawyers.
NSL are used to compel a party to DO something to assist with, so called, matters of national security, under threat of physical force. If the letter isn't received and a person can't be physically detained then it can't compel anything, other than hiding from its possible existence
To make things more difficult, the very contents of the letter itself are considered a national secret. Typical methods for serving papers would needlessly jeopardize the confidentiality of such papers. So one would presume that these methods simply aren't in the cards.
My understanding is that the NSL is a subpoena, and therefore a request for production of documents. It does come with a gag clause however.
Government can only compel you to hand over information for third party which you possess. They can't compel you to DO something, as demonstrated by FBI v Apple recently.
> They can't compel you to DO something, as demonstrated by FBI v Apple recently.
In case anyone who's not familiar with the Apple case is reading this: The government didn't actually wait for the court to rule that they can't (which might or might not be the case, though my understand is that they would've probably ruled in favour of Apple), but rather withdrew the case after a third party unlocked the phone for them.
Just the same, they can compel someone to give over information that enables the FBI to do something on their behalf- private encryption keys or signing certificates, for example.
The process for serving legal documents which are also considered national secrets is to physically detain someone and have them read (or read to) the document. No copy of the document is made or delivered in a way which allows the individual to retain a copy of the document. That is the process, so far an NSL is involved.
If you are required not to communicate something, then you don't communicate it. Period.
Hackers are bad at thinking "oh, I'll just not not not not do the thing, and it will all be okay, I'm so clever." They imagine they are Captain Kirk talking a computer to death. No one has ever been as smart as them!
We wouldn't let a CEO route around insider trading laws with a "I don't say this is a good time to buy my stock" canary. We wouldn't let a prosecutor under orders not to discuss a case with the public get away with it by selectively deleting a series of canaries.
Not exactly sure of the legal situation about canaries, but generally they are constructed as a dead man's switch type situation, where you make a commitment to do something if something else hasn't happened. The idea being that compelling you to act and restraining you from action are two different things.
Given that Reddit has exercised their warrant canary already and other big companies have them, apparently actual lawyers think it's a valid strategy.
In any case, I think that you may be able to play chicken with them over warrant canaries, since the people who use NSLs probably aren't interested in giving anyone standing to challenge them in court.
The idea being that compelling you to act and restraining you from action are two different things.
Again: if you are told not to communicate something, you don't communicate it. How come the CEOs who try all sorts of crazy things to work around insider trading haven't tried this?
Given that Reddit has exercised their warrant canary already and other big companies have them, apparently actual lawyers think it's a valid strategy.
You have no idea what is going on with Reddit or Apple. I know the EFF is eager to get people to sacrifice themselves on this altar. That says more about the EFF than about the state of law.
I think being put under a security order you can't discuss is a serious liberty problem. It doesn't follow that some crazy scheme is the right reply.
Are you making some sort of case against canaries? The most direct reading of this thread is that you're shouting at clouds, because you've put forth no arguments, just contrary opinions.
And yet there are cases where the US constitution leads to this kind of weirdness. Safes in the US use combinations rather than keys (unlike most of the world), because bizarrely enough the authorities can (AIUI) get a warrant that forces you to give up a key, but not (or it's harder) to force you to disclose a combination. So it's not so implausible that there would be a similar legal technicality that was relevant here.
> If you are required not to communicate something, then you don't communicate it. Period.
Legal opinions vary on this subject. Some feel (as you apparently do) that an order not to reveal the receipt of a NSL would require someone to leave a "warrant canary" in place. Others[1] feel that the US legal system does not permit the government to require someone to lie. The only way to find out for sure is for the government to prosecute someone for deleting a warrant canary[2] and either succeed or fail. This has never happened.
Your basic point that "the judicial system isn't stupid, and you can't just violate the rules but with a squirrelly definition and expect to get away with it" is true in general. Your example of insider trading laws is correct. But there are reasonable arguments that a warrant canary is a legitimate legal tactic.
You talk about warrant canaries being an untested legal theory; I say this is putting the cart before the horse.
When were National Security Letters with gag orders prohibiting disclosure tested for constitutionality, in cases when the gag orders are violated and the government wants to punish somebody for disclosure?
It's never been directly tested in court (not publicly, anyway). The idea is that you can be compelled not to speak about something, but not compelled to speak about it. Forced speech (especially dishonest speech) has never been endorsed by a court.
Still, canaries are a bit complex. You obviously can't prove why one was taken down, because you can't speak about it.
People floated the idea of using long "canary lists" of different things ("haven't received more than one request for user data", "haven't received more than two requests", etc), but there's suspicion that it wouldn't be legal because it would count as revealing specific facts (and you could perhaps be compelled to remove all of them at once). As is, they don't seem to have been rejected or broken, but they have to take the form of one-and-done notices that something happened.
I don't think sending an email would legally count as a served subpoena, at least not unless you somehow (at the very least, but I doubt that's sufficient) indicated that you're fine with that? I'm not familiar with how this is practiced in the U.S., but in many EU countries, "regular" email is essentially useless in a court of law, even more so for something like a subpoena which needs to be served in person.
Can you provide a citation for that? It seems to be like it would be impossible to show proof that such an email was received[1], which I imagine is necessary to declare the subpoena served in a court of law. We do have some other means for sending things like that through the internet (mostly used by lawyers and courts), but I find it hard to believe that merely sending an email without (at the very least) prior contact where the servee indicates subpoenas can be served via email would hold up in court.
[1]: IIRC, in my country the courts ruled that a) SMTP logs of sending an email are not sufficient technical proof of delivery and b) even if it was, that's not enough because you cannot be expected to regularly check your email account and read new mail. Things might be different in the U.S., that's why I'm asking.
There's no need to prove that the subpoena was delivered unless the recipient claims otherwise. Email is regularly used to deliver subpoenas (in fact, it's probably the most common way to deliver them).
Interestingly, there's also this bit on their homepage[1]:
> In order for your subpoena / order to be processed, it must be sent to my lawyer. Do not send subpoenas to vc@cock.li or abuse@cock.li. Instead, E-mail or call me to request my lawyer's contact information.
It makes sense to have an established point of contact (which might be an email address) for LEAs if you're something like an ISP which regularly receives subpoenas. I'm more curious about subpoenas sent to individuals via email without any prior LEA contact.
It's also worth noting that the burden of proof for something like this is, at least in my country, on the sender's end, which is why all court communication is sent by registered post.
The method of delivery doesn't really have any bearing on the validity of the subpoena, however with some methods it may be easier for the recipient to fraudulently claim that they didn't receive it.
I'm sure they'll use alternate methods if the emails are ignored.
Service of process is regulated at the state, and sometimes local, level. For you to assert that email is a generally valid method requires some evidence.
I don't know any jurisdiction where email is a valid way of serving a subpoena. There is actually a little bit of debate about it, but most people agree that in the federal system, a subpoena must be hand-delivered.
Edit: Why the downvotes? cmurf certainly needs to elaborate as to why either of those would affect the validity of the thousands of subpoenas that have been served over email.
In most cases receipt of an e-mailed subpoena could be shown to have been opened by looking at a mail provider's logs (ex Gmail). It's likely that a core developer for the Tor Project does not receive email in such a way, meaning receipt could be trivialy denied.
But this is all beside the point, because an NSL could never be sent to anyone over internet postcard. Clinton discussed national secrets over email and look what happened to her.
They absolutely affect the validity if people claim non-receipt. Subpoenaing cooperative people is easy - you use mail, or email, or whatever you want and they acknowledge the thing and respond. That's why email is common.
The question is how things go when someone doesn't feel like playing ball. With email and not-signed-for letters there's no reasonable way to prove that the person saw the content. "Spam probably ate it." "It must have gotten lost in the mail." And so on.
So hand-served (and signed letter) subpoenas remain relevant for when people are dodging you. The fact that many people do respond to email subpoenas doesn't relate to whether non-respondents can be charged for their failure.
>They absolutely affect the validity if people claim non-receipt. Subpoenaing cooperative people is easy - you use mail, or email, or whatever you want and they acknowledge the thing and respond. That's why email is common.
I'm well aware that it's easier to claim non-receipt, but that has no effect on the validity of the subpoena. An emailed subpoena is still valid.
>So hand-served (and signed letter) subpoenas remain relevant for when people are dodging you. The fact that many people do respond to email subpoenas doesn't relate to whether non-respondents can be charged for their failure.
I never claimed they don't, all I claimed was that email is a valid way of delivering subpoenas.
And I'm sure non-respondents can be charged for their failure if it can be proven that they actually saw the subpoena. Not all illegal activities are easy to prosecute.
"I never received an email, your honor. I don't know what they are taking about. By the way, look at this cool statistic of how many emails get lost on their way from one mail server to the next"
If they dig into it and decide that you did it yourself, as the parent suggested, then yes, you would have a serious risk of prison time for willfully violating the NSL.
You would expect such a claims to be severely scrutinied (including seizing all involved hardware for forensic analysis), and if you'd be making a false claim while having disseminated the information yourself, that would be a crime by itself in this scenario.
They serve you the letter personally, don't give you a copy, and then tell you verbally what they require you to do. NSLs don't leave a paper trail on the recipient's side.
Yes, and they could've just gone to her and done it.
When the FBI served me with a subpoena they were waiting in the tube when I walked out of a plane. I'm sure they'd be capable of going even further to serve someone with a NSL.
Presumably the "matter of national security" has a time limit. That said, Applebaum and Snowden have seemingly managed to get comfortable enough without returning to their country of birth.
She lost my support at vegan gluten-free brownies. She's clearly a monster.
But seriously, this really stinks. If talking to the FBI wasn't going to have negative consequences for her then why would they choose to approach her like that?
The whole attitude by law enforcement that "anyone who doesn't 100% cooperate with us on our terms is an enemy and should be treated as such" really doesn't foster cooperation but it does foster fear and resentment. I think the whole Apple/iPhone debacle demonstrates that perfectly. It's gotten to the point that businesses are finding that they're in a better position if they lock themselves out of their own data and tell law enforcement to fk off because their hands are tied. It's ironic because this non-cooperative behavior is a direct result of the abusive and hostile tactics law enforcement use against everyone.
The part about "meeting her on the street" is particularly slimy. Declining to pass questions through a lawyer is shady, but asking a person to confirm their lawyer's identity as a trap to question them is bizarre.
The whole thing reads like its either an agency involved in something unethical, or an agency so far removed from decent behavior that they no longer notice when they're menacing innocents.
She's smart by putting this out there now. Even if they detain her for some unknown reason, she can still contact her attorney, who then alerts the local and national media and now the FBI have a firestorm of publicity they don't want. Along with several lawsuits I'm sure her attorney would file immediately.
Sure, they can do that, but the repercussions are something they certainly don't want to deal with.
What if it turns out that most of these agencies don't care about negative publicity (because they can't be fired) or lawsuits (because it's not their money)? That's the part that really scares me: no transparency, no accountability, and a bunch of secretive True Believers running things. Like the Chinese government!
These are the effects of suppressing causality. When a person or group believes the knowledge of their actions needs to be suppressed to increase the performance metrics of their actions, they literally become insane.
No government has the right to withhold information beyond a clear and reasonable timeframe. 3 months seems reasonable. 1 year is out of the question.
This is terrorism. Given what we all know based on past events about how the FBI conducts their activities, there is no way any reasonably aware citizen can conduct their life normally after such an encounter.
The last discussion thread on this topic had more than a few people complaining that Isis (the given name of the developer in the article) is overreacting and paranoid, which is a saddening response to see. It exposes the privileges and unfortunate circumstances citizens find themselves in because these agencies refuse to prosecute their anti-terror investigations in well-thought out ways, instead pursuing facile leads without regard to the external effects they cause.
We've even seen evidence that these agencies deliberately manipulate otherwise innocent people into behavior that implicates them in their "terror suspect" criteria, so it's hard to believe that anyone in this situation could be somehow too cautious.
It /is/ terrorism, but the FBI is not the agent of terror. Rather, they are reacting to terrorist boogeymen in the shadows, exactly how the terrorists want them to.
Terrorism is successful when our society becomes more of an authoritarian police state.
You're asking whether it's sincere or not? Not sure. But the political support from the public that they need to have power is, i think, sincere because the public is legitimately afraid of all this "risk" they're exposed to.
There is a german word for it - 'Zersetzung'. It was used by Stasi in former divided Germany and for sure has been used in recent years against other folks of the Tor community.
If you'll count "people running exit nodes" in "community", it's fairly common. People get searched and possibly charged for whatever is coming out of their node, but not convicted since its not their traffic.
And yes, that could be the legal system working normally, but there have been cases where the government already knows about the exit node, but doesn't reveal that information to the judge while obtaining a warrant.
What really worries me about this story is the following question: Are german agencies involved in this? I mean, assume the break ins are real, can the FBI operate in a foreign country without consent? At least they should know it and did nothing to stop it... Or am I msitaken here somewhere?
I always was under the assumption, that the FBI is a police-force, not a spy-agency (like the CIA or NSA). I kind of realize that the difference is getting smaller in recent years.
There is good reason to keep them (Police and Intelligence) separated, in germany we call this 'Trennungsgebot', this is a direct historical consequence of the Gestapo.
So, technically, is the FBI a police or an intelligence agency?
The FBI is an investigative law enforcement agency. So, I would say that they are intended to be both.
The CIA, a "pure" intelligence agency, has been competing with the FBI for decades, leading to the FBI becoming more and more of an intelligence agency over time (in addition to their law enforcement "police" activities).
Get the person thinking they're not safe anywhere, so they stop going out, stop being mobile and stick to a more confined area. Once they've determined where she is, it makes it a lot easier to get in contact with her.
If she's smart, she start moving more frequently, and travel in states where they don't have field offices, avoid air travel and create a constantly moving target for the FBI officers trying to nail her down.
>If she's smart, she start moving more frequently...
I don't think that's practical. It would cause her a lot of stress (not to mention cost quite some money) and sooner or later wear her out.
It also means that the FBI has reached their goal of intimidating her, since she is changing her behavior because of them (assuming that is their goal of course).
I wish the FBI agents who perform these kinds of actions were as introspective as Snowden. Once you define your team as "the good guys", you can do all kinds of morally objectionable things to the other side.
The worst thing about this is that it will turn out that the developers involvement will be relatively innocuous in the grand scheme of things, hence the lack of any real urgency from the FBI, but it is terrifying for both the developer and as a citizen that he FBI seem to be inept and/or deliberately making it so difficult to speak with someone who it would appear they think can assist them.
The problem is the attitude that the NSL is just another "tool" in the FBI's toolbox, to be used as aggressively as can be in the pursuit of criminals. There is no effective check or balance against this -- we are forced to rely on the investigators to use their discretion, knowing that any challenge to such a warrantless request has about a zero % chance of being successful before the FISA court.
I would like to see an activist attempt to challenge such an order, or even refuse to cooperate in an NSL where the FBI is acting outside of its legislative and Constitutional authority. However, the overwhelming incentive in any such situation is to cooperate. And from what I have read, even if the FBI is acting illegally, the subject of the investigation aided by the NSL may still be a fairly loathsome criminal -- so, you have to be quite a principled activist to risk prison time to make a civil rights statement, when this is directly going to benefit a badguy in the specific instance.
Why does everyone, including Ms. Lovecruft conclude that something is horribly wrong and that FBI wanting to speak with them means they are in deep shit? I'm by no means defending them, but to me, the whole (original) post looks overly paranoid.
I'm not an American, you can speak with Police freely here in Slovenia, so maybe I understand things wrong?
For a developer of a tool frequently used to conceal "terrorism", this amount of paranoia seems healthy.
Also, no you cannot "speak with police freely" in the US. Anything you say to an officer of the law can be, and it should be assumed that it will be, used to incriminate you. To make matters worse, you can be forced to give up your right to self-incrimination by being legally compelled to divulge information which incriminates you.
In general one should never speak to police in the US. Not even as the whiteness to a crime. For a great overview of the seriousness of why one should never talk to US police, view this lecture by a professor and former criminal defense attorney: http://youtu.be/6wXkI4t7nuc
Incidentially, the American Civil Liberties Union of attorneys (ACLU) has created a series of mobile apps to record police encounters because of their tendency to be problematic for citizens. For example, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.aclu.mobil...
The original story told about a couple of polite phonecalls where they have requested to talk with her. How does it get described as "harassment"? Of course, she also added a lot of paranoid speculation to her original blog post, but there's not a single confirmation of her fears so far, not even a hint.
She has wisely communicated her desire to do so only with legal council present and they are clearly saying that they will circumvent this if they can.
Given the behavior of bad apple cops and agents, she is right to feel threatened. If these are agents with good intentions, they have no reason to be afraid of a lawyer. If they are going to circumvent her legal protections, harassment is the minimum best outcome for her.
>The original story told about a couple of polite phonecalls where they have requested to talk with her. How does it get described as "harassment"?
As soon as they continued after the very first 'no' it becomes harassment. Imagine this was a work setting, the FBI was a coworker of this individual, and they asked for a date. After the very first "no, please don't bring it up again" it becomes harassment.
>> "As soon as they continued after the very first 'no' it becomes harassment."
Untrue, legally, at least in the UK where at least two incidents that cause you distress are required to have been committed by the same person/group. And then it's up to a judge to decide if the 'distressing' behaviour would be considered distressing by any reasonable person.
The point still stands. If a person tells you to stop an action they find uncomfortable for whatever reason in any way, no matter their gender, race, etc. It becomes harassment. The FBI is a government organization that you could argue has the job of doing this, however they fail to ever state why they require her assistance (and they seem kinda rude to me).
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) the Fifth Amendment “not only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution, but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings
You have no such protection if you won't be incriminated by the answers (e.g. they are asking you about someone else). You can of course be involuntarily called as a witness in proceedings where you're not being prosecuted.
AFAIK, (and IANAL), you would have to be certain the questions did not incriminate you. In other words, "pc86, were you or were you not on your couch May the 5th at 8PM EST?" "I plead the fifth." "Your honor, this doesn't incriminate the witness." "pc86, you must answer the question because it is non-incriminating." And of course if it was incriminating, the appellate lawyers would win resoundingly.
Logically, it would follow that if you don't know what a question IS, you can 'plead the fifth' to it on the basis that it could be incriminating. But again, IANAL.
1) Imagine the position of people who can't afford a lawyer, don't work for the EFF and know their rights, can't easily move to anothher country, and don't have a platform from which to publicly tell their story.
2) Imagine this power in the hands of a President with fascistic tendancies.
This is like the SA treated people at the beginning. They knew they did not have any legal foundation for their harrasments, but that they would never hold accountable for that. After some time without uprising against that the SA was replaced by the SS.
It is hard to say for a lot of reasons, like if you'd consider informants with explicit direction from the FBI as "FBI". Also, while living in DC many years ago, I was surprised by the number of homeless people I saw with Blackberrys - until I learned about the way FBI surveillance is conducted there.
How are conservatives on HN supposed to talk about what we perceive as psychological hangups and failings of our subculture, if you're going to simply cast them as snark/unsubstantive when you don't agree with them?
It's not like this sort of unpleasant psychological characterization is out of the norm on HN, it's just usually applied to the other side.
https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/fbi-harassment.html
Previous discussion:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11631329