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High-Speed Ad Traders Profit by Arbitraging Your Eyeballs (bloomberg.com)
74 points by r0h1n on May 1, 2016 | hide | past | favorite | 50 comments



I think the analogy here with Wall St is apples and oranges. In Wall st, the security traded is fungible. Here in the ad world, an ad view could be high quality or lower quality. It could be a bot or a human looking to buy something.

I am an engineer who spent 12 years in the ad tech industry. This problem is especially acute in the online video ad side where dollars are exchanged based on views and CPMs, not someone buying something online (this being more accountable is less open to abuse). In my old job, we tested what % of traffic are fraudulent. These traffic are daisy-chained from one ad buyer/seller to the next. Inevitably it will hit someone unscrupulous. In aggregate we found anywhere from 20% to 95% of the traffic we see for video ads to be fraudulent.

There are some very sophisticated bot farms out there that gets around detection, mostly operated out in Eastern Europe and Asia. If you look at Comscore 100 video sites, you can always tell who's gaming the system when from one month to next, an unknown brand just jumped high in the top 100.

This is the reason Facebook had shut down Liverail that they spent $450M on. Super high percentage of ad fraud.


I worked in ad-tech for the past 4 years, this is a very accurate write up. I think exchanges have had their day - the quality of traffic is just too low, and due to their incentives the exchanges put all the burden for detecting fraud on their clients.


Senior buy-side guy here. Viewability measurement has made a small dent in things, but for the most part, my personal view is that a huge percentage of display inventory (especially video) is very inflated. Pubs are chasing the much higher video CPMs without a care for quality, and buyers seem to be eating it up for some reason.

In my mind there's only two things that will really change this...better viewability/inventory auditing and attribution technology.

The larger, more reputable inventory sources (Google, FB, etc.) have a VERY vested interest in pushing quality and using whatever data they can bring to the table to build that trust, and then use that trust as a moat against their competition. Viewability providers likewise have an easy sell once they can improve the accuracy and reliability of their offerings (they have a long ways to go based on general sentiment in the industry). This will put pressure on other pubs to up their game or be left out. Why bother with a crappy news site that has 50%+ bot views that you're being billed for if FB or Google can prove that their traffic quality is much higher, better targeted, and infinitely higher reach?

On the buy side, the pressure will come in the form of attribution. Right now, display performance, video in particular, is a super murky area in terms of measuring success. What is the value of a view-through? Most advertisers couldn't tell you. And the ones that can probably have a very fuzzy picture of it that varies based on the attribution model they are using. However the space has improved dramatically, and at the end of the day, performance marketers will be able to do a much better job of telling whether traffic is crap or not based on whether it backs out. Bots don't buy things (although they do sometimes sign up for lead forms now). So if someone with a solid analytics stack sees a ton of impressions and no sales through their various attribution lenses, guess what? They'll stop buying those impressions. And the more big buyers that get smart about attribution and stop buying based on impression counts, the more pressure will be exerted on the sell-side to clean up their game.

So while the problem is "self-correcting" in the sense that there is big money with very vested interests in solving for this, unfortunately it is a big ship to turn and will take time.

Articles that talk crap about the ad industry rarely get into the nuances which is horribly infuriating and does a lot to give the industry a bad reputation. Like any space, there are bad players. Legit players in this industry want the bots and garbage out of the picture yesterday. They make our jobs harder, and reduce our performance.


Totally agree with this is why especially FB is winning. Especially in Mobile where every user is pretty a logged in user on FB, Instagram, WhatsApp, etc. Plus non-inferred actual demo data. Even Google can't touch FB...

Everyone else who's peddling non-logged impressions with BlueKai data, good luck - first, Bluekai is only accruage 1/3 of the time. Second, majority of those are bot views.

Attribution like you describe is notoriously hard to measure. As views get to mobile, FB wins again since most apps use FB auth.


> I think the analogy here with Wall St is apples and oranges.

The similarities lie in the real-time nature of trading systems in both sectors.


If these were concert or sports tickets the people doing it would be called "scalpers".

The world is a curious place, full of contradiction and wonder. We only like the free market for some activities.


> We only like the free market for some activities.

As we should... the free market is not a cure-all, it's good for some things, poor for others.


People buy up all the Bruce Springsteen tickets and try to charge 5x the face value - outrage

People buy up all the houses, "meh"


  > People buy up all the houses, “meh"
Where do you live? Throughout North American there are people bemoaning the effects of gentrification on neighbourhoods. Whether you agree or disagree, there is clearly no “meh” going on.


It isn't "buy up all the houses". "Oppose new development so that the price of my house keeps raising" is more like it. And there is outrage. NIMBYs are perceived as selfish assholes.


Scalpers provide liquidity, like most arbitrageurs. If reselling tickets was impossible and the price remained the same, then people who didn't manage to get one would be out of luck; now, they can pay more and still get one. Scalping is only possible when the market value of the ticket is more than the price charged, which means the demand will outstrip the supply.


“Scalpers make Benefit X possible” says nothing about whether “Scalpers create Harm Y.”

For example, you say "If reselling tickets was impossible and the price remained the same, then people who didn't manage to get one would be out of luck; now, they can pay more and still get one.”

But if there is a fixed supply of tickets, then there are a fixed number of people getting tickets. All you are changing is which people get the tickets.

Yes, people with more money and less time to stand in line or whatever will get a ticket. Yay! But people with less money can no longer stand in line and get a ticket. Boo?


>But if there is a fixed supply of tickets, then there are a fixed number of people getting tickets. All you are changing is which people get the tickets.

To be precise, you're allocating the tickets to those who value them the most, under the objective criteria of "who's willing to pay the most for them" (which may not be fair, but in the same way that capitalism favors those capable of getting money).

>But people with less money can no longer stand in line and get a ticket. Boo?

Those people value their tickets less than the people who actually get them. If you're only willing to pay X for a ticket, and someone else will pay Y>X, then the situation where you get a ticket for X and they don't isn't Pareto optimal; you'd prefer to sell your ticket for Y, and they'd prefer to buy your ticket for Y. (This does assume something about utility of money, which isn't strictly justified. To wit, I'm assuming that an unwillingness to pay more than X<Y for something implies a willingness to sell it for Y after you've gotten it. For X and Y sufficiently far apart, this should be true, but it might not be if they're close. On the other hand, if they're close then the harm here is very low.)


Okay as far as it goes, but the problem with that sort of analysis is that willingness to pay is only a good proxy for how much the ticket is valued for people with similar incomes. If you have enough money, being thrifty is optional. For someone barely breaking even, it's a requirement and there is a much higher threshold for spending money.

Taken too seriously, the result of ignoring this issue is absurdities like rich people caring more about anything they happen to spend money on than poor people care about eating.


Guess what happens if a rich man and a poor man try to eat in a restaurant.

Generally society's answer is to have the government give necessities to the poor, and otherwise let the rich buy what they want.

Edit: if you really want to untangle the money abstraction, look at it like this: person A has $X. They have $X because ultimately, other people gave them $X because A provided value to them worth at least $X. If they had a job, they got wages; if they sold a product, they got the sale; if it was A's ancestor's money, A's ancestor provided >$X value to someone or someones. (This is an abstraction, and obviously not always true; but we try to outlaw ways of making money that don't provide value to anyone, like stealing, or colluding with competitors. To the extent someone earned money illegitimately, that's a problem with how they got the money, not how they used it; the solution is to take away that money or prevent them from getting it, not prevent money from being used altogether. Also ignoring rents, interest rate/inflation, etc.)

So A's desire to pay $X to get a ticket is actually cashing in on society's "debt" to them of $X or the equivalent in happiness/utility. That's what needs to be compared with someone else who's only willing to pay some fraction of $X; the value they provided to society, that they're willing to give in exchange for the ticket, is less.

Again, obviously the abstraction is imperfect, but that's the ultimate justification for capitalism.


You can pretty it up with economic reasoning but that's still an essentially panglossian view of the world - a naive belief that fortunate people probably deserve their good fortune and unfortunate people probably did something wrong.


I had like three disclaimers in that comment.

But if you're going to criticize capitalism, maybe you could offer an alternative that does better?


I'm not criticizing capitalism. There are a lot of good things you can say about capitalism. It results in some efficient organizations being created, a lot of useful work getting done, and everyone having incentives to increase productivity and reduce waste. It produces a lot of wealth. I don't think we would do better without markets.

Like evolution, capitalism exists so we need to describe it and understand it. It's definitely a force to be reckoned with.

It's not a system for approximating justice. It doesn't result in people getting what they deserve, even approximately.

The problem isn't only the cheating but also the randomness, which basically gives outsized rewards for being lucky enough to be in the right place at the right time. Anyone watching the tech industry knows this.

If the people who end up with the money choose to spend it to pursue justice, sometimes the world becomes a better place. But nothing in economic theory guarantees it will happen. It's up to people to do it.


As you say yourself:

  > which may not be fair
That's my sole point. Capitalism is not fair, and really, it is not a "benefit," it just is what it is. Some benefit from it, some do not, and whether there is a "greater good" or whether that even matters is a matter of personal choice.


> All you are changing is which people get the tickets.

I don't think this is true. Without scalpers, a sold-out concert ends up with basically every seat filled. Since services like StubHub have gotten big, it is now more common for there to be many empty seats because those were snatched up by scalpers and never got bought.

The scalpers are often acting rationally here by holding out for high prices until the end instead of dumping their tickets because they make more overall that way even if some inventory goes unsold.


I don't think this undermines my point about value of tickets. If the total spent on some group of tickets goes up, then the buyers valued those tickets more than otherwise; it's thus better for them to have those tickets than the previous group.


This is your point, but not everyone agrees with your point. Which doesn't really mean that you're wrong, just that we have entered an area of subjectivity.

What you suggest is certainly one way to measure "better" objectively, but that doesn't magically make it the best way.

On a large scale, you can see this in the field of health care. Some people argue as you do, and this leads to a fully free market for medicine. And the principle is that the most good will be done, because the people who value their health the most will pay the most for their services.

But whether we agree or disagree with the principle, surely we must acknowledge that there are entire countries full of people who have a different belief about the greatest good with respect to health care: In Ontario, for example, it is usually illegal for a doctor to charge more than a set amount for a certain type of procedure, and thus the people able to pay more are prevented by law from doing so.

That doesn't make Ontario, Canada "right" and Ontario, California "wrong," but clearly the idea that "it is better if the people willing to pay the most get the most" is not a universally held belief.


>In Ontario, for example, it is usually illegal for a doctor to charge more than a set amount for a certain type of procedure, and thus the people able to pay more are prevented by law from doing so.

There are several different possible justifications for such a law:

1. We think the amount people can pay for some services should be capped, someone willing to pay more doesn't mean they value it more 2. We think that people are uninformed about the prices of services, and/or are extorted by time pressure, and/or the medical profession is extracting rents

If it's 2, then they can still agree that people should be able to pay what they want to, but there's an informational asymmetry because you don't have time to shop around when there's an emergency, or there's a monopoly that needs price controls to break, etc. None of those invalidate my point.

Does any of Ontario's rules apply to discretionary medical services?

Do you have any other example that applies without falling into one of the categories above?


Ontario has a third justification:

As a society, we value the idea of everyone having access to health care, and if we make medicine a free market, the only people who get it will be those willing to pay the most.

Thus, we specifically reject the argument that providing health care to fewer people who pay more results in a greater benefit.

The reasons for our belief vary from completely subjective moral arguments to arguments that society overall benefits from having a healthy citizenry, just as society overall benefits from having a healthy infrastructure.

I don’t need to debate the specific reasons with you, I’m just pointing out that it is neither #1 nor #2. We certainly think there are people willing to pay more, and that those willing to pay more are correctly valuing it form themselves. We don’t believe that those unwilling to pay more don’t understand the value of medicine.

In the end, not everyone agrees with your perspective on value. Many do. I understand there’s this gigantic country south of us who believe medicine should be a free market, and that many of its citizens think its health care system is providing better value than ours.

But I insist that your views, while valid from your perspective, do not represent a universal truth.


>As a society, we value the idea of everyone having access to health care, and if we make medicine a free market, the only people who get it will be those willing to pay the most.

Um what? If you artificially reduce the price, you reduce the supply, and thus decrease the number of people who get it.

My model of free market here is not supposed to affect the total supply, just the limited supply is divided based on money. If price controls increase supply, then there was a market failure of some sort, which probably counts under reason 2.


> , then people who didn't manage to get one would be out of luck

No

There are two reasons why people can't get a ticket:

- Fans bought all the tickets, limited places so the only way you could get them is if someone gives up. Nothing wrong in reselling a ticket for the price you paid for them or less

- Scalpers bought all the tickets. This is the main reason why today you can't get a ticket. Because they get on the queue and buy all of them before the fans had a chance to even get it.

So the problem of "you can't get a ticket" is not solved by scalpers, it is caused by them


A couple points:

1. It's unlikely that the price is set at $X, and there are precisely enough tickets to satisfy everyone who wants one at $X, but no more. Either the tickets won't sell out at $X, or there will be those who can't get tickets at $X.

2. If the original sellers knew how much demand there was, either they'd set the price to be as close to the balance point as possible, or not. If they did, then there should be no opportunity for scalpers unless the price is very unsticky upwards; but if there are a lot of people willing to pay well above the original price, then it's again unlikely that demand is equal to supply.

3. If the original sellers didn't try to set the market value, then there would have been a shortage anyway. Again, the fact that scalpers can extract a large amount from each resold ticket means there's enough demand at high prices, and therefore likely to be too much demand at low prices.


About 1. you're right, also there's some amount of price segmentation in some concerts/tickets (closer to the stage, VIP area, meet&greet tickets)

2 and 3 might be solved if (first) ticket sellers would set auctions for ticket prices, not sure if it's possible legally though


So, that doesn't address his point at all.


They assert that scalpers are an example where the free market isn't liked. I'm fine with the free market there, so that's a relevant point to make.


No it isn't because that doesn't negate his point; most people don't like scalping, that you don't mind isn't relevant.


But as opposed to a ticket to a once a year concert you're just buying something that's in abundance (ad space)

I can't feel too much sorry for the ones paying more in this case.


Can any average Joe sign up for these exchanges and start trading? Would be more than happy to lose a couple bucks playing around


Well you needs severs that can handle the 10,000+ QPS that they are going to send you and you need to write code decide what you are and are not going to bid on, and their is no trivial work to set this up so they are going to think that you might spend lots of money in the future.

You could play with https://contributor.google.com this works though Google's exchange and the gist is they bid on your behalf for ads that will get shown to you, you can then put arbitrary HTML in those ads. I saw one guy that was learning Japanese so he used it to display vocabulary words in place of ads. The major downside is it only works on ads that go to Google's exchange which is kinda random on most sites because of stuff like the article above. It ends up being a couple dollars a month to replace random ads on websites.


This article uses very odd language.

Traders buying and reselling at a higher rate “could be distorting the markets and removing the efficiency that we’re supposed to see through real-time bidding,” he said.

By definition successful arbitrage makes the market more efficient - it brings prices closer together (making the cheaper exchange more expensive and the more expensive one cheaper).

Furthermore, arbitragers in ad exchanges are causing more ads to be sold, providing a valuable service to buyers and sellers.

Suppose there is a sell order on exchange X, a buy order on exchange Y, and these orders are compatible. Unlike public equities markets (which have RegNMS) this order may NOT be routed from X to Y. The result is inventory is wasted or put to a lower value use.

If an arbitrageur notices this he can cause the transaction to occur which would not otherwise occur.


>By definition successful arbitrage makes the market more efficient - it brings prices closer together (making the cheaper exchange more expensive and the more expensive one cheaper).

Agreed. As header bidding and arbitrage proliferate, we also see ad tech companies targeting the supply side of the equation: with services that help publishers understand how well the header bidding product is performing, which ads work and which dont, and how viewers engage with their site. As pubs are getting more information into the ad selection process, losing exchanges will have to adjust the quality or lower the prices of their ad supply.


I have experience doing the exact thing described in this article, but not at the level of sophistication described. I still made a decent amount of money from it.

All of the exchanges (on the buy and sell side) know it's going on, and they generally don't try to stop it provided that it doesn't become news. A large number of well-known, venture-backed ad tech companies make money from this and they're not incentivized to stop it.

It's rare that the companies actively encourage arbitrage, but some do.


The level of fraud happening in the ad space from 2013-15 (when I worked in it) was astounding. I saw millions of dollars go up in smoke. AppNexus also recently said up to 60% of its traffic was fraudulent.


Could you elaborate on the mechanics of what's going on? Any insight is appreciated. Thanks.


The general idea is:

1. Get access to a DSP (either AppNexus, AOL, Doubleclick itself or a smaller DSP--there are literally dozens). DSP stands for demand-side platform, but in this case we're going to use them as a supply source.

2. At the same time, get access to a demand source, either AOL, Google, SpotXchange or someone similar. Someone that a reputable website publisher would use to fill ad spaces on their website.

Both steps one and two can be difficult to obtain, as every major player is on the lookout for fraudsters and arbitrageurs and doesn't more crappy, re-sold demand/supply on their platforms.

3. Place demand-source tags (AOL, Google, SpotXchange) in your DSP, so as soon as you buy an impression, you sell at almost the exact same time.

You make a profit when you amount your from demand-source tags (net costs + rev share) is higher than the cost of the ads you're buying (net costs + fees).

Even though the article is from 2014, there a still ton of people still doing this and making money, though the real money is running botnets and buying botnet traffic (which I know how to do but have never done).


Thanks for your reply. The ad-exchange-related jargon is foreign to me, but your explanation makes sense. Basically, the arbitrageur buys ad space on a website from a demand source (which essentially means buying a demand source tag which secures the ad space on that website) and turns around and re-sells that space which he/she just bought on a DSP. So, money is made when the cost to buy the ad space from the demand source is less than it's re-sold for on the DSP.

Is that about right? What information does the demand source tag include - is that basically a placeholder indicating you bought space for an ad on a website? I assume the arbitrageur's edge comes from finding traffic that can be bought cheaply from the demand source and sold higher on the DSP?


The information the demand source tag includes things such as domain name, ad size, among other things. Most of this information is publicly available--take a look at the AppNexus public wiki for more information.

This is generally something that only online ad professionals can pull off, but if you have enough of a bankroll, you can try it as well. It's a very saturated space and the amount of knowledge that goes into it is much more than what I'm able to include in a forum such as this. Good luck.


This is from 2014, reposts should specify the year in the title


My bad there. I honestly didn't notice it till you just pointed it out!


I tried to know more about these "two guys in Chinatown" but in vain, I really would like to know more !


What really bothers me about articles like this is the complete lack of understanding of what advertising actually is.

All Advertising is arbitrage, exploiting a market inefficiency between the cost to reach an eyeball and the value of that eyeball.

Whats the difference between a high speed trader and a mortgage broker advertising? Whats the difference betweem a retailer advertising to sell a product they bought wholesale and a high frequency trader reselling an impression in real time?

Im not saying we are not all better served by closing this information gap and finding market efficiency, but lets not pretend that this is any more unscrupulous than any other business that exploits information asymmetry...and its definitely not the same as high frequency traders...especially because these ad buyer may never have gotten the impression if the arbitrager didnt bring it to a different exchange or support it with a different data set.


(2014)


> Arbitragers win the first auction and resell the ad, finding exchanges where it’s more valuable and pocketing the difference

I don't understand how this is possible. The original advertiser has to trust that the first exchange is reporting accurate demographic info. How does the exchange know the demographic info is accurate if anyone can buy the ads and sell them on another exchange?


This is from 2014. Most of the DSPs are struggling now.


AppNexus is the only one doing relatively well, no? The rest are either laughably small (and so is AN compared to Google and FB) or went public and are tanking.




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