> Not for the encryption. That's done in software. A seized linux laptop with an encrypted partition using a strong key is effectively snoop proof by the definition we're using here.
You can't run the software without hardware, so it has to be trusted. Don't misunderstand me, this is obviously considerably more far fetched than the Apple attacking their own software/hardware combo. However, assuming (a big assumption) that we trust what Apple are telling us at the moment, a seized iphone with a strong password would currently be just as snoop proof. In fact, this includes the phone that has spawned this conversion.
They can be compelled to defeat their own security if you're accepting continued updates to your phone. Under the security architecture I've (loosely) described they can't attack it without the user accepting an update. Of course, you're totally correct in practice because you're most likely just going to have to trust Apple updates as they come out.
You can't run the software without hardware, so it has to be trusted. Don't misunderstand me, this is obviously considerably more far fetched than the Apple attacking their own software/hardware combo. However, assuming (a big assumption) that we trust what Apple are telling us at the moment, a seized iphone with a strong password would currently be just as snoop proof. In fact, this includes the phone that has spawned this conversion.
They can be compelled to defeat their own security if you're accepting continued updates to your phone. Under the security architecture I've (loosely) described they can't attack it without the user accepting an update. Of course, you're totally correct in practice because you're most likely just going to have to trust Apple updates as they come out.