Ironically, after the request from JSOC and the Marine Corps for a modified Super Tucano (A-29B) was nixed, the United States' main procurement facility for this plan is still building them... for the Afghan airforce.
Sure, the Super Tucano doesn't have the punch from the main gun or crazy survivability of the A-10. But in a battlespace where air supremacy is guaranteed, it has the advantage of being able to get a close-up visual on the target, and accurately fire ordinance tens rather than hundred of meters away from friendly forces.
My personal understanding is that the Super Tucano was sacrificed on the alter of the myth of technological progress.
Every airframe, every digital HMI, and every weapons system must be more technologically sophisticated than the last, even if that solution is completely unsuited to ongoing and forecasted combat missions.
The fact that our most common enemies can't field a proper SAM site, much less a fifth-generation fighter, be damned.
Of course there is also the cultural issue. That the great United States might have to admit that the South Americans know more than us about air warfare in counter-insurgency campaigns is anathema to both the military and the civilian government.
However, I think light attack roles that the Super Tucano can fill can be filled by the new Sikorsky S-97 Raider, and because the Raider is a helicopter, it can also server a number of other roles, and it can land anywhere, and when you consider the cost and strategy differences between a helicopter carrier and a carrier battle fleet, or between a helicopter carrier and taking over / maintaining / defending an airfield behind enemy lines, the Raider, IMHO, will be a godsend for roles where the Apache Longbow is overkill and where the goal is to continually push for new FOBs behind the lines (range for Thunderbolt II and Super Tucano is ~800nm - got a new air field every 325 miles? Only plan to attack targets near the ocean?).
The Sikorsky S-97 is the perfect emblem of what I mean by the myth of technological progress.
The Super Tucano A-29B:
•Has a greater range, at 800nm vs. 320nm, much more for the Tucano with one pilot and the extra fuel tank, with an even greater difference if the Raider flies at top speed. (Yes, I know, it's easier to refuel a helicopter.)
•Is currently in proven service in CAS roles in COIN operations with 23,000 combat hours vs. the S-97's zero combat hours, which only flew its first demonstration flight in 2015.
•Costs far less at $9 million per unit with almost no development cost vs. a government projected program cost of $200 million and a unit cost of $15 million at full production. Defense analysts expect this to rise to $30 million a unit and $500 million in development costs.
•A low-flying CAS helicopter is a great idea, unless of course you're flying in thin air in the Hindu Kush, or your opponent has the ability to down such aircraft. Ask the Soviets how that worked out...
But the totally unproven S-97 incorporates new technology, which requires R&D thus inviting the procurement bonanza, so it beats out the combat-tested Super Tucano in the GAO procurement arena every time.
You're right, except for the first point. The value of not having to return to a base or ship to refuel cannot be passed up as a small point. It's a game changer. Being able to establish FOB and project from there changes everything in irregular warfare.
I hadn't heard about the Raider costing $30 million eventually, but that's ridiculous, if it turns out to be correct. However, $30 million is still less than half that of the AH-64D.
The one thing I'll add to your criticisms is that the Raider (badly) needs more armament (perhaps another 7-shot Hydra 70 pod).
Sure, the Super Tucano doesn't have the punch from the main gun or crazy survivability of the A-10. But in a battlespace where air supremacy is guaranteed, it has the advantage of being able to get a close-up visual on the target, and accurately fire ordinance tens rather than hundred of meters away from friendly forces.
My personal understanding is that the Super Tucano was sacrificed on the alter of the myth of technological progress.
Every airframe, every digital HMI, and every weapons system must be more technologically sophisticated than the last, even if that solution is completely unsuited to ongoing and forecasted combat missions.
The fact that our most common enemies can't field a proper SAM site, much less a fifth-generation fighter, be damned.
Of course there is also the cultural issue. That the great United States might have to admit that the South Americans know more than us about air warfare in counter-insurgency campaigns is anathema to both the military and the civilian government.