I remember, it must have been in the late '90s, when Windows added the ability to get "important security updates" via the internet and a lot of people were turning it off. I remember a comment on slashdot about how we would all become conditioned to accept it.
Note the difference between what you said: "here's a different way of doing a thing that you're already doing, and don't mind doing, and understand the reasong for doing"
...and the thing that I said: "here's a thing that you don't want to do, and don't see the need for, but don't worry because it wont happen often" (then over time it starts happening often.
> Why would Windows systems be anywhere near critical infra ?
This is just a guess, but maybe the client machines are windows. So maybe there are servers connected to phone lines or medical equipment, but the doctors and EMS are looking at the data on windows machines.
> A normal number would mean that every finite sequence of digits is contained within the number.
Is that true? I don't see how that could be true. The sequence 0-9 repeated infinitely is, by definition, a normal number (in that the distribution of digits is uniform)
...and yet nowhere in that sequence does "321" appear ...or "654" ...or "99"
There are an infinite number of combinations of digits that do not appear in that normal number I've just described. So, I don't think your statement is true.
> I don't see how that could be true. The sequence 0-9 repeated infinitely is, by definition, a normal number (in that the distribution of digits is uniform)
Well, your first problem is that you don't know the definition of a normal number. Your second problem is that this statement is clearly false.
Here's Wolfram Alpha:
> A normal number is an irrational number for which any finite pattern of numbers occurs with the expected limiting frequency in the expansion in a given base (or all bases). For example, for a normal decimal number, each digit 0-9 would be expected to occur 1/10 of the time, each pair of digits 00-99 would be expected to occur 1/100 of the time, etc. A number that is normal in base-b is often called b-normal.
Your "counterexample" is not a normal number in any sense, most obviously because it isn't irrational, but only slightly less obviously because, as you note yourself, the sequences "321", "654", and "99" do not ever appear.
> Your "counterexample" is not a normal number in any sense, most obviously because it isn't irrational, but only slightly less obviously because, as you note yourself, the sequences "321", "654", and "99" do not ever appear.
lol. Your counterargument is a tautology because it contains "the sequences "321", "654", and "99" do not ever appear."
It's like if you claim, "A has the property B" then I say, "based on this definition, I don't think A has property B"
Then you say, "if it doesn't have property B, then it's not A"
...okay, but my point is, the definition that I had (from wikipedia) doesn't imply B. So for you to say, "if it doesn't have B, then it's not A" is just circular.
Now, you can point out that the definition I got from wikipedia is different from the one you got from wolfram. That's fine. That's also true. And you can argue that the definition you used does indeed imply B.
But what you cannot do is use B as part of the definition, when that's the thing I'm asking you to demonstrate.
You: all christians are pro-life
Me: I don't see how that's true. Here's the definition of christianity. I don't see how it necessarily implies being against abortion.
You: your """"counterexample"""" (sarcastic quotes to show how smart I am) is obviously wrong because, as you note yourself, that person is pro-choice, therefore, not a christian.
^^^^^ do you see how this exchange inappropriately uses the thing you're being asked to prove, which is that christians are pro-life, as a component of the argument?
Again, it's totally cool if you fine a different definition of christian that explicitly requires they be pro-life. But given that I didn't use that definition, that doesn't make it the slam dunk you imagine.
> But given that I didn't use that definition, that doesn't make it the slam dunk you imagine.
You might have a better argument if there were more than one relevant definition of a normal number. As you should have read in the other responses to your comment, the definition given on wikipedia does not differ from the one given on Wolfram Alpha.
> And you can argue that the definition you used does indeed imply B.
Given that the implication of "B" is stated directly within the definition ("For example, ..."), this seemed unnecessary.
> but my point is, the definition that I had (from wikipedia) doesn't imply B. So for you to say, "if it doesn't have B, then it's not A" is just circular.
Look at it this way:
1. You provided a completely spurious definition, which you obviously did not get from wikipedia.
2. You provided a number satisfying your spurious definition, which - not being normal - didn't have the properties of a normal number.
3. I responded that you weren't using the definition of a normal number.
4. And I also responded that it's easy to see that the number you provided is not normal, because it doesn't have the properties that a normal number must have.
Try to identify the circular part of the argument.
And, consider whether it's cause for concern that you believe you got a definition of "normal number" from wikipedia when that definition of "normal number" is not available on wikipedia.
It depends on your definition of "normal number". You seem to be using what wikipedia[1] calls "simply normal", which is that every digit appears with equal probability.
What people usually call "normal number" is much stronger: a number is normal if, when you write it in any base b, every n-digit sequence appears with the same probability 1/b^n.
IIRC the property ‘each single digit has the same density’ is the definition for a ‘simply normal number’ (in a given base), while ‘each finite string of a particular length has the same density as all other strings of that length’ is the definition for a ‘normal number’ (in a given base). And then ‘normal in all bases’ is sometimes called ‘absolutely normal’, or just ‘normal’ without reference to a base.
> they will still be marking the ticket as used in their backend.
I assume that's true, but it makes me wonder how their scanners are connected to the server.
I mean, if 10,000 people showing up to an event with smartphones overwhelms wireless networks, wont that also kick their scanners off the network?
They'd probably like to have a system where, if a scanner loses its connection, it can still validate tickets. It could store a copy of validated tickets locally, and upload it when the network connection is restored - that would mean a copied ticket would have to make sure they go to a different door/scanner. But it would allow copying.
It's all off-the-shelf electronics and standard protocols. Venue provides some wifi with a "Ticketbastard" SSID (or whatever) at entry points, and the COTS-built barcode-validating devices use that. Easy-peasy.
They might also provide other wireless networks for other purposes (definitely for vendors [$$$], but perhaps also for regular house staff, touring staff, and maybe even the guests who pay for it all!), but they'll all be under the venue's control and coordination: Other than the odd personal hotspot that wanders in, there's not necessarily any meaningful outside interference on 2.4/5GHz wifi bands in a big venue.
It's pretty easy to make short-range wifi work reliably in that kind of RF environment, such as the chokepoints where tickets are validated. (Modern apartment dwellers will have worse interference problems than that.)
There’s actually a ton of interference in the 2.4 GHz space, especially at venues like outdoor festivals. However your solution does work. I work at a festival that provides a WiFi network and an Ethernet drop for the ticket scanners. We have to use multiple APs to cover the main entrance area, but it’s feasible.
I was thinking more along the lines of a stadium crowd than an outdoor festival, but yes: I agree. I've had miserable luck with 2.4GHz stuff in festival environments where people camp out for a few days. :)
I don't pay very much attention to the ticket-scanning devices while I'm getting into a big show (which is generally a rather unpleasant experience on my side), but:
Don't they allow usage of 5GHz bands? Unlike 2.4GHz, I've had tremendous success with 5GHz bands in all kinds of environments -- including outdoor festivals.
I have no idea what connectivity options are available in current scanners, but it sounds like a viable solution could be to use an RF band that customers don't overwhelm, similar to wireless microphones perhaps, with a little hub situated nearby that consolidates the list of already-scanned tickets, possibly standalone or possibly on a wired network that includes other far-away entrances.
Was going to say it shouldn't be hard to run a wire around an entire stadium, but maybe some popup outdoor venues that might be complicated. Could use line of sight towers for fun.
No way, scanning tickets is slow because it rarely works seamlessly. It's pretty standard to stand there for a few seconds moving your phone back and forth and/or rotating it. Or when one person has all the tickets for their party and has to scroll to the next one between scans.
I think maybe 4-15 seconds between scans per scanner, at best.
Not at all, I was imagining over speccing the system.
E.g. this weekend I went to a show at a 70,000 seat arena. Knowing from experience, there are 4 entrances. This time there were 10 people scanning tickets at the gates I entered. Friends reported the same at the one they came in.
5 RPS per scanner is obviously overkill, but if those 10 at one gate were linked to a hub that could issue 5 RPS I would call that adequate, if barely.
If all 4 gate areas were linked centrally to a system that could do 5 RPS, well, actually, that might explain the throughput I experienced getting through lol
> however the brain thinks must be describable by math
Roger Penrose believes that some portion of the work brains are doing is making use of quantum processes. The claim isn't too far-fetched - similar claims have been made about photosynthesis.
That doesn't mean it's not possible for a classical computer, running a neural network, to get the same outcome (any more than the observation that birds have feathers means feathers are necessary to flight).
But it does mean that it could be that, yes you can describe what the brain is doing with math ... but you can't copy it with computation.
it feels self-evident that computation can mimic the brain. as a result, it's difficult to argue this line much further. to say the brain is non-computable is to assert the existence of a soul, in my opinion.
A lot of things feel self-evident then turn out to be completely wrong.
We don't understand the processes in the brain well enough to assert that they are doing computation. Or to assert that they aren't!
> say the brain is non-computable is to assert the existence of a soul, in my opinion
I don't believe in souls, but the brain might still be non-computable. There are more than two possibilities.
If it is the case that brains are doing something computable that is compatible with our Turing machines, we still have no idea what that is or how to recreate it, simulate it, or approximate it. So it's not a very helpful axiom.
> We don't understand the processes in the brain well enough to assert that they are doing computation. Or to assert that they aren't!
We absolutely do know enough about neurons to know that neural networks are doing computation. Individual neurons integrate multiple inputs and produce an output based on those inputs, which is fundamentally a computational process. They also use a binary signaling system based on threshold potentials, analogous to digital computation.
With the right experimental setup, that computation can be quantified and predicted down to the microvolt. The only reason we can't do that with a full brain is the size of the electrodes.
> I don't believe in souls, but the brain might still be non-computable. There are more than two possibilities.
The real issue is neuroplasticity which is almost certainly critical to brain development. The physical hardware the computations are running on adapts and optimizes itself to the computations, for which I'm not sure we have an equivalent.
dendrocentric compartmentalization, spike timing, bandpass in the dendrites, spike retiming etc... aren't covered in the above.
But it is probably important to define 'computable'
Typically that means being able that can take a number position as input and output the digit in that location.
So if f(x) = pi, f(3) would return 4
Even the real numbers are uncomputable 'almost everywhere', meaning choose almost any real number, and no algorithm exists to produce it as f(x)
Add in ion channels and neurotransmitters and continuous input and you run into indeterminate features like riddled basins, where even with perfect information and precision and you can't predict what exit basin it is in.
Basically look at the counterexamples to Laplace's demon.
MLPs with at least one hidden layer can approximate within an error bounds with potentially infinite neurons, but it can only produce a countable infinity of outputs, while biological neurons, being continuous input will potentially have an uncountable infinity.
Riddled basins, being sets with no open subsets is another way to think about it.
We can write code that writes code. Hell even current LLM tech can write code. It's at least conceivable that a artificial neural network could be self-modifying, if it hasn't been done already.
(b) all of classical physics is computable therefore
(c) thinking relies on non-classical physics.
(d) In addition, he speculatively proposed which brain structures might do quantum stuff.
All of the early critiques of this I saw focussed on (d), which is irrelevant. The correctness of the position hinges on (a), for which Penrose provides a rigorous argument. I haven't kept up though, so maybe there are good critiques of (a) now.
If Penrose is right then neural networks implemented on regular computers will never think. We'll need some kind of quantum computer.
> If Penrose is right then neural networks implemented on regular computers will never think.
I disagree that that is necessarily an implication, though. As I said before, all that it implies is that computational tech will think differently than humans, in the same way that airplanes fly using different mechanisms from birds.
Part of Penroses's point (a) is that our brains can solve problems that aren't computable. That's the crux of his brains-aren't-computers argument. So even if computers can in some sense think, their thinking will be strictly more limited than ours, because we can solve problems that they can't. (Assuming that Penrose is right.)
I wonder if LLM's have shaken the ground he stood on when he said that. Penrose never worked with a computer that could answer off the cuff riddles. Or anything even remotely close to it.
(a) doesn't hold up because the details of the claim necessitate that it is a property of brains that they can always perceive the truth of statements which "regular computers" cannot. However, brains frequently err.
Penrose tries to respond to this by saying that various things may affect the functioning of a brain and keep it from reliably perceiving such truths, but when brains are working properly, they can perceive the truth of things. Most people would recognize that there's a difference between an idealized version of what humans do and what humans actually do, but for Penrose, this is not an issue, because for him, this truth that humans perceive is an idealized Platonic level of reality which human mathematicians access via non-computational means:
> 6.4 Sometimes there may be errors, but the errors are correctable. What is important is the fact is that there is an impersonal (ideal) standard against which the errors can be measured. Human mathematicians have capabilities for perceiving this standard and they can normally tell, given enough time and perseverance, whether their arguments are indeed correct. How is it, if they themselves are mere computational entities, that they seem to have access to these non-computational ideal concepts? Indeed, the ultimate criterion as to mathematical correctness is measured in relation to this ideal. And it is an ideal that seems to require use of their conscious minds in order for them to relate to it.
> 6.5 However, some AI proponents seem to argue against the very existence of such an ideal . . .
Penrose is not the first person to try to use Gödel’s incompleteness theorems for this purpose, and as with the people who attempted this before him, the general consensus is that this approach doesn't work:
I remember, it must have been in the late '90s, when Windows added the ability to get "important security updates" via the internet and a lot of people were turning it off. I remember a comment on slashdot about how we would all become conditioned to accept it.