Have ad publishers pay users, instead of pay ad companies.
Instead of make an ad that already consumes the visitor's attention to also consume their cpu, and this to enrich the ad-tech company, consider making a website pay the visitor for having their attention consumed by the ad instead of pay the ad-tech company.
This would be open to abuse by visitors, where visitors reload a page over and over to get paid. To prevent this type of abuse, require visitors to submit money as collateral to the website. Users pay $x per month to be part of this "ad network". If users view and get paid for more pages than their submitted collateral, they keep the money the ad paid them but they don't get their collateral back. In a way this forces users to pick which pages to visit.
> well, the comparison is quite far off the track:
Might not be that far off the track.
A post on X says "US Military Intelligence leaders (MJ-12) didn't like this idea because it would antagonize the Extra Terrestrial Biological Entities who inhabited to the dark side of the moon."
Big platforms don't have an incentive to pay users. They collect the ad revenue themselves. Possibly because big platforms agreed among themselves to behave this way.
It only takes one big platform to start paying users to flip this around. Twitter started paying users for ad revenue derived from the user's feed. The next step would be for ad-tech to pay users directly.
It wouldn't shock me if an email services monopoly/duopoly would prefer email spam's only workaround to be signing up for their services, instead of fixing the root of the spam problem.
You may be surprised to learn that spammers, being criminals, have no issue with stealing money from others to spend on email delivery fees.
Edit: Proof-of-work "email postage" schemes are similarly doomed - The botnet that zero-day'd your mail servers does not care how much electricity they use.
The point to sending the spam is to enable further crime. Do you really think they don't stand to profit from what they promote? Spam is a business like any other, they aren't going to magically disappear just because their advertising costs suddenly become non-zero. Just like how they found ways of shifting the costs of hosting mail servers onto others, they will find ways of shifting the costs of any "email postage" scheme onto others.
This is very basic mathematics. If they have to do other crime to get their hands on the cash it would cost for them to spam, then why spam at all instead of only focusing on the other, more profitable crime?
Spam by definition is mass messaging. If the price per message is higher than the expected return per message, it becomes pointless.
Spam is advertising for their other more profitable criminal enterprises. It's a means to an end, not an end itself. If the goal were simply to send messages, there would be no content.
And the efficiency of spam is so low, that with a high enough cost per message, it would not be a net gain for the spammers. If you pay a million dollars to send a million messages, but only gain $100 000 from the subsequent scams, then it's a bad venture.
IP reputation, proof-of-work, and various fee-for-receipt schemes are trying to solve spam in the same way: by charging low-volume users a trifle to send messages at a "normal" rate, which adds up to become more expensive when you start bulk mailing. The problem is that these schemes have to assume that there is a single market-clearing price[0] for sending messages that is both low enough to not inconvenience legitimate users and high enough to make bulk messaging uneconomic.
Such a concept goes against how communications networks actually function. The amount of communications resources the average person uses is so low that it's not worth billing for them. Sending any sort of data isn't free, but it's "cheap as free[1]". Any communications technology that bets against this will fail in the marketplace. People are not going to go back to, say, buying (virtual) stamps at 73 cents[2] a piece to send mail with. Hell, the $10/GB I pay with Google Fi is already enough to make me cringe every time I actively use my data plan.
On the other side, charging a fee for misbehavior legitimizes that misbehavior; if the fee is less than the value of the misbehavior then you are just imposing a cost of business. Spammers need to send lots of mail because the rate at which people fall for your scam is comically low. But when you do hook a sucker in, they yield a huge return.
So what we have here is that legitimate users would balk at per-message rates that wouldn't even be close to what would make spammers flinch. Which is, again, the same problem that SPF/DKIM/DMARC have. People whose job it is to send garbage e-mail for a living have a far higher tolerance for Internet bureaucracy bullshit[3] than people who use e-mail to get their real work done or to talk to friends and family.
[0] Getting your IP banned for spamming or having to burn energy brute-forcing a hash can be considered a price.
Do you know of any data on this? It seems like the kind of thing that could be studied and measured. I'm inclined to believe the opposite about the viability of e-stamps, but I will readily admit I have no data to back that opinion up.
In some open source projects you have to deal with stakeholders, work with a known set of requirements and deal with organizational and time constraints.
If I’m just volunteering, I can choose what to work on, when to work on it and there is absolutely nothing at risk. What time constraints am I under if I’m just volunteering?
There is at least something at risk if you work on something people start to use because people start to have expectations about it continuing to be useful. They want bugs fixed, new features, the project not to die, etc. One risk is you make a lot of people upset. Another risk is you're viewed as irresponsible for starting something and leaving it half-finished.
So if you're "just" volunteering and don't deliver you possibly risk as much as your career.
The time constraints you're under are the time constraints of your free time in your life.
You could gain consistency of evaluation; being a lot clearer about the #1 thing you're looking for; hiring faster; paying for hiring costs.
There must be some reason a candidate is rejected. Putting the reason down in writing makes you accountable to the role, to the company, to the ideal candidate, and to the candidate currently evaluated.
Posting a job and not hiring until 6 months later doesn't make the hiring manager accountable.
To protect from legal liability, require candidates to sign something that clears the company from legal liability. Companies make candidates and employees sign all sorts of NDA/non-compete/etc documents anyway.
Writing down the reason for not hiring someone is helpful. Sending it to them isn't.
The reason is almost always "they did not appear to be good enough," usually around coding or problem solving. Very rarely is it something else.
I do prefer to give feedback, and so does our recruiter, so a lot of our candidates get feedback. But honestly I'm not sure how useful it is, being mostly "we have a high bar and they didn't reach it." The truly valuable feedback is how to get better, but that's hours and hours of help.
Plus, one time I did give feedback directly to the candidate over email, and they continued to badger me about it. I'm fine with shutting that kind of thing down, so I still give feedback, but it did sour me a bit.
You don't know that across all candidates. And you can get paid for sending it.
"they did not appear to be good enough" is very useful feedback for me compared to no feedback. Especially when my resume isn't even selected to interview. It at least tells me there's competition.
Else I never learn which of the tens of possibilities is generally the reason for rejection. This matters if the reason is something important that I don't know about, like "didn't have same role for at least 3 years."
Doesn't know React. Not enough Javascript experience. No k8s. No professional DevOps. Only 1 year in DevOps. Resume too long. Resume too short. Didn't provide GitHub, must mean he's not a coder. No LinkedIn. Not enough connections on LinkedIn. Don't know anyone from their LinkedIn. No public website, must not be passionate. Too many side projects. Too academic. Not enough research experience in this area. Too much research experience in some other area. Probably likes theory. Not enough theory, probably likes building things. Not a local candidate. No Luigi experience. Not enough Airflow. Hasn't used MySQL for a while. Hasn't used ClickHouse. We started interviewing. No consistent job titles. Too generalist. Too specialist.
Candidates can deposit a fee as promise they won't badger the interviewer. They get the money back after a year if they don't badger or lose the deposit. This might make interviewers less sour.
I don't think the fee idea is very workable. The interview process already has a high amount of hassle on the employer side. Adding in collecting, holding, and returning some kind of fee is a big addition of annoying overhead.
I don't think there's any way to incentivize giving feedback besides changing the cultural expectation across the industry.
Plenty of reasons for such feedback to be provided by a totally separate org.
Starting with the class action lawyers who'd love to argue that HR was interviewing & rejecting long-odd candidates for the purpose of boosting their Feedback Fee income.
Instead of make an ad that already consumes the visitor's attention to also consume their cpu, and this to enrich the ad-tech company, consider making a website pay the visitor for having their attention consumed by the ad instead of pay the ad-tech company.
This would be open to abuse by visitors, where visitors reload a page over and over to get paid. To prevent this type of abuse, require visitors to submit money as collateral to the website. Users pay $x per month to be part of this "ad network". If users view and get paid for more pages than their submitted collateral, they keep the money the ad paid them but they don't get their collateral back. In a way this forces users to pick which pages to visit.