As a matter of law? Sure it does. Thaler said the image at issue was "autonomously created by a computer algorithm running on a machine". He's been trying to walk that back for the last couple of years though. See Thaler v. Perlmutter, 1:22-cv01564-BAH (ECF #24), D.D.C. (Aug. 18, 2023).
The argument about whether human selection would make the human the author of the work is irrelevant, because the human in this case isn't claiming authorship, by selection or otherwise.
> Copyright only protects the actual text. LLMs have weights, not exact copies.
Following this logic a lossily compressed image is completely unprotected by copyright.
> In any case, saying "if I put in some input and get copyrighted output" is tantamount to copyright violations; if I use a generative tool and generate copyrighted info is it the tools fault?
Do you not think this is obviously fact-specific? If I gzip a bunch of (copyrighted) files, then obviously that doesn't somehow make distributing them not infringement. If I now replace the tool = ungzip + input = files combination with tool = (ungzip and files) and input = (selection mechanism over files) do you think that in the second case distributing the tool is not infringement? I don't mean to say that any of these is precisely the same as the LLM case, but I think your argument is clearly overbroad.
> OpenAI at most broke an EULA or some technicality on copyright w.r.t. local ephemeral copies. What's the damage to the NYT though?
One obvious damage claim (if you are skeptical of market harm wrt newspaper/oneline sub sales) is that they were entitled to the FMV of licensing costs of the articles, which is not so hard to value: OpenAI has entered such agreements with AP and others. [0]
The opinion actually assumes without deciding that First Amendment scrutiny applies, so I don't think it "absolutely" does. (But yes, it probably does and Sotomayor and Gorsuch would decide as much)
The quote you posted is about if the exclusion of platforms "whose primary purpose is to allow users to post product reviews, business reviews, or travel information and reviews" means the law is content-based, but the Court is saying that provision is irrelevant because TikTok brought an "as-applied" challenge (and not a facial one) [0] and that provision doesn't change how it applies to them. So they are looking at the parts of the law (and the congressional record supporting them) which actually cause TikTok to be subject to the qualified divestiture.
Right, I'm saying they based it on on the "text" of the law, instead of the motivation.
At what point in the ruling did they wonder what motivated the effective ban? "5 why's" it, so to speak. Did they ever say, "because X, Y, and Z, it is clear the intent of the law is not to prevent speech of certain parties"?
> Right, I'm saying they based it on on the "text" of the law, instead of the motivation.
Sure, although they do discuss TikTok's challenge to the motivation ("Petitioners further argue that the Act is underinclusive as to the Government’s data protection concern, raising doubts as to whether the Government is actually pursuing that interest"). I just don't think the quote you had stands for what you were saying.
> At what point in the ruling did they wonder what motivated the effective ban?
Above is at page 15. Also, I think you're probably looking for the paragraph starting with "For the reasons we have explained, requiring divestiture for the purpose of preventing a foreign adversary from accessing the sensitive data of 170 million U.S. TikTok users is not 'a subtle means of exercising a content preference.' Turner I, 512 U. S., at 645." (at 12).
I saw elsewhere you likened this to the Trump muslim ban. I don't think that comparison is apt. The First Amendment issues there were not decided by the 9th circuit in the first one (“we reserve consideration of [First Amendment religious discrimination] claims until the merits of this appeal have been fully briefed.” State v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1168 (9th Cir. 2017)) the stay there was issued due to likelihood of success on the merits wrt due process issues; I don't know offhand about the second one; and the third attempt was upheld.
Of course if the app have done anything seriously illegal it would not have been necessary to bring this law to ban it, because existing laws would have sufficed to do it.
Perhaps because US government wanted to do it despite TikTok not breaking any serious provisions of law this law has been made.
It feels like a sleight of hand from government to ban something that has broke no (serious) law (yet).
Did the SCOTUS go into the necessity of having this law to achieve what government wanted, if existing laws would have sufficed, provided that government met the standards of evidence/proof that those laws demanded.
If not, it is as if government wanted a 'short-cut' to a TikTok ban and SCOTUS approved it, rather than asking government to go the long way about it.
I appreciate the thorough response. So they speak to the motivation in part being "preventing a foreign adversary from accessing the sensitive data of 170 million U.S. TikTok users", but not at all the portion of the motivation to "prevent the CCP from having a megaphone into 170 million attentive US TikTok users" (my words). Did they omit that this was likely a motivation, or contend that it wasn't.
I think this is discussed at length in part II.D (starts at the bottom of 17). I would write more but I have spent too long already on this thread :)
I would be a bit careful about trying to liken motivation for something like an EO to a law though; many members of congress voted to pass the exact language in the final bill, and they might not all have agreed with _why_. So I would put to you that the text itself is the primary thing one should consider, especially more in the legislative case than the executive one.
> In the United States, the general rule is known as the "American Rule" - each party typically pays their own attorney's fees and court costs, regardless of who wins the case. This is different from many other countries that follow the "English Rule" where the losing party pays the winner's legal fees.
For the curious, one reason for the difference in rules is the different approaches to enforcing rights.
In the US there is a tendency to make private civil suits for damages a big part of this, and to rely less on government agencies to investigate and take enforcement actions.
In much of the rest of the world the is more of a tendency to have government agencies handle it. It's enough of a difference that people in the rest of the world often don't even know that a private civil suit is an option. (You can see this with GDPR. Article 79 gives individuals a right to sue, but most people seem to think their only option is to complain to a government data protection authority).
Anyway, since the US is depending on private civil suits to enforce rights the English rule of winner pays could greatly discourage those who are not well off (who are often the people most likely to have their rights violated) from suing when their rights violator has significantly more resources.
I believe each transaction has to be over $100 and there's a total limit on the number of pay over time plans you can have active. But yes, other than the dollar amount, I've not seen anything not be eligible.
Notice it's not "Famous person vs Non famous person". It's "Famous person vs Corporation". And in those cases it was not about the voice alone, but the use of it (which was found to be intentionally soundalike and misleading).
A lot of people look handsome, sound handsome and are even stylish. So some rich person can randomly claim some one looks closer or sounds closer to them and hence needs to forced to wear a mask to prevented from even talking?
So what happens next, when AI bots begin to sing, compose music, teach, paint or anything for that matter?
I don't think it's a trivial thing as vanity though it would be a convenient culprit. Instead, I believe what makes more sense is endorsement and one's right to their likeness. If the person had merely sounded similar it probably wouldn't be an issue. Rather it seems to be that in each case the party caught out seems to have intentionally sought to convince people that she endorsed the product and/or may have been financially tied.
It seems like a fair take to me. Certainly plenty of companies, HashiCorp included, would have fewer choices about how to license future code if they made different decisions regarding contributions. But something like:
> I wonder if the community has grounds to sue any of these companies who are ditching the AGPL in favor of proprietary, source-available licenses, especially under “third-party beneficiary contract” legal theories, like @conservancy did in their suit against Vizio.
> If the source code originally used AGPL, isn’t it still contractually obligated to ensure those rights to its users, including any new source code added to it?
seems to indicate rather strongly that the original poster doesn't understand the AGPL terms, CLAs, or the nuances of contract litigation. At least OP recognises that at least enough to ask a question about it, but I don't think "random questions I thought up about reasonably well-settled law in Twitter thread form" makes a good post.
It seems like a perfectly good topic to me (and I'm not sure why we would expect more in an OP than in a ask HN topic).
The OP may not understand why but it is very common to have gaps when relicensing because collecting CLAs, etc, is often allowed to slip to the minimum for the current license terms.
I don't believe so (although this is probably fact-specific about what "accidentally" means), at least with regards to retracting the licence. The GPL is an irrevocable licence.
They could choose not to continue to distribute the code though (but good luck clawing back the GPL licenced copies).
