I think generally yes, phenethylamines are the primary compounds known to work in the same dose range as LSD. Unfortunately they are much cheaper to produce, and the majority of the 25C- and 25I-NBOMe fatalities occur after people believed they were taking LSD. I have read similarly, that tab size of a dose might be an indicator, but I don't think it's a fully reliable method. Check out the old 2013 Erowid "Spotlight on NBOMes" article [1]-
> Silk Road prices for pure 25I-, 25C-, and 25B-NBOMe powder currently range from $90 to $200 per gram. The most problematic listings are vendors selling blotter that begs to be resold as acid: 1/4-inch perforated squares in 100-hit sheets bearing designs such as Albert Hofmann's bike ride and The Beatles Yellow Submarine, among other acid-blotter designs from the past. One vendor states "each tab is acid size, no big blotters here". Another offers hits supposedly containing 1 mg of 25I- and 25B-NBOMe each! Dosages range from 500 micrograms to 2 mg per 1/4-inch hit, with advertised doses averaging around 1 mg. On Silk Road, LSD blotter is 5-10 times more expensive than NBOMe blotter.
I think unfortunately toxic and potentially fatal doses can fit on a 1/4 inch hit or in a single liquid drop. There needs to be a lot more active chemical though, whereas you get a slight metallic taste with LSD, the article says NBOME is extremely bitter due to the higher concentration, which is sometimes covered up with mint or other flavor (never heard of this with LSD).
There's an interesting 2019 article "Multimodal imaging of hallucinogens 25C- and 25I-NBOMe on blotter papers" [2] that analyzed a random seized NBOME sample from Germany. It has lower concentration per cm² than what Erowid cited, but I don't think it's a technical limit unfortunately that prevents scary doses from fitting on a standard blotter.
Your own emails are immutable, if you trust nobody's modified your copy.
But proving to others that an email hasn't been modified is a more difficult task. As I understand it, you'd need to retain DKIM keys for the signing server, to check that historical DKIM signatures verify correctly and the old message was not forged or altered.
Are DKIM signing keys issued in some kind of Certificate Transparency log, where you can verify whether a particular DKIM key existed for a particular domain in the past, in order to do this in general?
They at least were not historically archived. This came up during the Hunter Biden laptop investigation where people were able to verify some of the messages only because the Gmail key was archived in many places because that service is so popular. I’m not aware of anyone making a comprehensive archive but I’d be unsurprised if someone did based on news like that.
people are trying to do the opposite - publish DKIM private keys regularly so everyone knows that old DKIM signatures can be forged, so that they can't be used against you.
Can anyone explain in simple terms what is going on here? Author states he's going to "discuss possible causes for this behavior and implications" but I don't really see where it's discussed.
Why would human activity impact the probability of LIGO event detection? Is this because LIGO operators are doing certain things to the detector during their work hours, or some other property of the environment around the 2 LIGO detectors?
As I read it basically the detectors get a lot of noise from the environment and humans being active. Driving to work, doing construction, whatever. It detects the waves better when everyone is asleep. Given this information, it's possible to see a shift in detections when the time changes.
The paper mentions that some of it is because of when maintenance is scheduled and when operators are onsite to keep it working. But IIRC they're just incredibly sensitive to motion and any motion (like a truck driving past) affects them.
LIGO has to filter out loads of noise to look for signals. The interferometers are sensitive enough to pick up human activity, like cars, the trains that run over and around Lake Pontchartrain and the Livingston area, and even river flow fluctuations in the Yakima River. Daylight savings transitions basically shift a lot of human activity around by an hour, which can muck with the filtering
Just to add to this train, I've run at least 10 Pis on microSD cards averaging 3 years each (mostly Pi 4s, added a couple Pi 5s), and have not had one issue on any of them... it's mostly down to using a good microSD card (I settled on SanDisk brand), a good power supply (good PoE+ HAT or official PSU), and not writing tons and tons of data to microSD (use NVMe or USB SSD/HDD if you need that).
Strictly speaking, loading an address with many UTXOs has no effect on security of the receiving address at all (beyond increasing its public profile).
The security concerns start happening after an address spends a UTXO. Before a P2WPKH (segwit) address is used, only the public key hash is known. In order to spend from it, the full public key needs to be revealed. That's why it's recommended to use single-use addresses, because a quantum computing attack or elliptic curve vulnerability could be used against an address where the attacker knows the public key, but would not work against an address where the pubkey has not yet been revealed.
So, the main security change happens after you spend from an address the first time. Subsequently, there are theoretical vulnerabilities that could occur after an address is spent from many times, but really only if the signer is malicious like dark skippy, or faulty and doesn't properly follow RFC 6979 deterministic signatures, leaking some signature entropy which could be used to crack the private key. The latter has happened with some bad custom wallet implementations, but these attacks are even further in the realm of theoretical, not super realistic, require faulty software/firmware to be implanted into signing devices.
so the risk to the wallet holder is the exact same risk that exists for every single HTTPS connection right now?
Post quantum algorithms have been available. You can do it today. Why not for bitcoin?
In reality, there are very few current real world implementations. This article makes it seem that RSA is under active exploitation. If it is, bitcoin is not the first target IMO
Yes, TLS encryption has similar potential risks, quantum and other elliptic curve vulnerabilities.
Quantum resistant algorithms are under heavy discussion in bitcoin dev mailing list, and have been for awhile. I think the signature sizes for leading algorithms are still too large to be practical within existing block size limits, but of course lots of things would probably have to change in a quantum emergency. Bitcoin devs tend to be extremely conservative with making new changes (in part because it attracts a lot of contrarians) so it's going to take a long time for people to agree on the right architecture for a quantum resistant scheme in bitcoin, but it will happen, BIPs are in the works like BIP-360 which outlines some potential structure for it.
https://fortune.com/crypto/2024/11/25/commerce-nominee-howar...