Yes, exactly as they would now, when the access over IPv6 is entirely unavailable.
With that, the customers who don't use filtering by IPv4 would be able to use IPv6. Those who do use access control by IPv4 ranges would have time to sort out their IPv6 setup, without having anything broken at the moment when IPv6 is enabled.
No, if you have a dual-homed stack right now, and they only expose IPv4, you connect over IPv4, you don't attempt to connect over IPv6 and get connection denied.
That's rather the problem - there's no trivial way to mimic that policy transparently while enabling IPv6, because most stacks will default to using IPv6 if they're dual-homed and expose both, and won't fall back if IPv6 connects but gives an error. (Offhand, I think the best you could do would be to tell everyone that you're migrating to a new URI scheme to allow cloning, with IPv6 enabled, and that as part of that, you'll have to update your allow/deny rules, then, after a truly astonishingly long time and lots of nagging of anyone who never does it, make the old path an alias of the new one and let the last remaining people break.)
I understand those prompts perfectly fine, but they are panic inducing for e.g. my mom who has about a 50% chance of clicking the wrong button and losing work.
Cities/local authorities, etc should be proactive in searching listing sites for obvious breaches, they shouldn't be reliant on private companies/individuals to hand-over information they are incentivised not to hand-over.
# This function is defined by the system
def validSignature(sig):
return false
# This function is defined by the system
def isSignaturefromGuardian(sig):
if sig.validator == "guardian":
return true
return false
# A bug in the system compared both return values
if validSignature(tx.sig) == signatureFromGuardian(tx.sig):
approve()
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