But rationalism , if the modern sort, isn't supposed to be descriptive, it's supposed to be normative -- rationality lets you win.

The problem is not with rationalism, it's with Rationalism (with a capital R), the cult-like phenomenon that has grown up around rationalism that fetishizes things like Bayes's theorem, hostile AI, Roko's basilisk, and the MWI.

Also, mandatory scriptures and group hiouses.

Analytical philosophy is rationalism done right.

There isn't a single philosophical meaning. You are probably thinking of libertarian free will..furthering Obviously false because determinism isn't obviously true.

>actually, this is obviously correct

Nobody know what's actually correct, because you have to solve epistemology first, and you have to solve epistemology to solve epistemology...etc.etc.

>And it turns out if you do this, you can discard 90% of philosophy as historical detritus

Nope. For instance , many of the issues Kant raised are still live.

>The massive advantage of the Sequences is they have justified and well-defended confidence

Nope. That would entail answering objections , which EY doesn't stoop to.

>Compatibilism is really obviously correct

Nope. It depends on a semantic issue , what free will means.

It's not just Moshowitz a lot of them have the same syndome.

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Popperians claim that positive justification is impossible.

Popperians claim.Induction doesn't exist (or at least , matter in science)

Popper was prepared to consider the existence of Propensities objective.probabilities, whereas Bayesians, particularly those who follow Jaynes believe in determinism and subjective probability.

Popperian refutation is all or nothing, whereas Bayesian negative information is gradual.

In Popperism, there can be more than one front running or most favoured theory, even after the falsifiable ones have been falsified, since there aren't quantifiable degrees of confirmation.

For Popper and Deutsch, theories need to be explanatory, not just predictive. Bayesian confirmation and disconfirmation only target prediction directly -- if they are achieving explanation or ontological correspondence , that would be the result of a convenient coincidence.

For Popperians, the construction of good theoretical conjectures is as important as testing them. Bayesian seem quite uninterested in where hypotheses come from.

For Deutschians, being hard-to-vary is the preferred principle of parsimony. For Yudkuwsians, it's computation complexity.

Error correction as something you actually do. Popperians like to put forward hypotheses that are easy to refute. Bayesians approve theoretically of "updating", but dislike objections and criticisms in practice.

(Long term) prediction is basically impossible . More Deutsch than Popper -- DD believed that the growth and unpredictability of knowledge . The creation of knowledge is so unpredictable and radical that long term predictions cannot be made. Often summarised to "prediction is impossible". Of course , Bayesians are all about prediction --but the predictive power of Ates tends only to be demonstrated in you models, where the ontology isn't changing under your feet. Their AI I predictions are explicitly intuition based.

Optimism versus Doom. Deutsch is highly optimistic that continuing knowledge creation will change the world for the better (a kind of moral realism is a component of this). Yudkowsky thinks advanced AI is our last invention and will kill us all.*

Several different definitions are being bandied about. If you think of reduction as understanding a material system in terms of its components, biology is now reductionist, having abandoned vitalism.

That's a practical limitation. There's no barrier in principle to a complete reduction.

Well, you can get it from LessWrong and , even mire, Yudkowsky. Rationalism has overall and orthodox wings

Liberal and orthodox.